OPTIONS FOR OAKLAND

A SUMMARY REPORT ON THE OAKLAND 701 PROJECT

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E R R A T A

OPTIONS OF OAKLAND (OCPD 198)

Page 9	On the second line under "Substandard Housing," change "25,400" to "26,400."
Page 57	In table 33 the entire column of figures under "LWLB" should be under "LWHB," and vice-versa.

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A SUMMARY REPORT ON THE OAKLAND 701 PROJECT

CITY PLANNING DEPARTMENT
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA
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Preface

Due to the city's persistent unemployment problems, Oakland was designated as a depressed area by the Area Redevelopment Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce in June of 1964. With this designation Oakland became eligible for an urban planning assistance grant under Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 as amended.

The City's 701 grant application was formally approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on June 3, 1965; this grant, with additional funds provided by the City of Oakland, made possible a city-wide program of survey and analyses aimed toward a Comprehensive Development Plan for Oakland.

Although the Oakland City Planning Department supplied the bulk of the staff for the 701 Project (as it is commonly called) and coordinated its activities, many other City departments have also participated. Among the departments contributing staff to the Project have been Building and Housing, Fire, Street and Engineering, Traffic Engineering, Finance, and the Auditor-Controller's office.

In addition, the services of several consultants were engaged. Stanford Research Institute was the economic, housing, and general consultant to the Project. Other principal consultants have included Survey Research Center of the University of California, California Department of Employment, and DeMars and Wells and Jack T. Sidener.

Titled *Options for Oakland*, this 701 Project report is the culmination of all these efforts. Although based largely on information contained in separate reports emanating from the 701 Project, many produced by the consultants, the conclusions and recommendations in this summary document are those of the City Planning Department. While assuming this responsibility, the Planning Department acknowledges the invaluable assistance of other City departments and consultants.

Options for Oakland

Contents

Options for Oakland

LIST OF MAPS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

OPTIONS
FOR OAKLAND

Introduction

The term "urban crisis" is by now very familiar but is not easily brushed aside. Behind it lie a multitude of problems, affecting human beings in varying degrees and requiring a meaningful effort by government and by many organizations in the private sector to solve them.

The most critical and deep-seated problems creating the urban crisis within central cities are extreme poverty, racial discrimination, inadequate housing, unemployment, and insufficient educational opportunities. To these may be added a host of other problems, all interrelated to such a high degree as almost to defy solution. To mention only a few: the continuing in-migration of people with limited education and job skills, the exodus of white population to the suburbs, the departure of heavy industry, inadequate welfare payments, racial conflicts, civil injustice, civil disobedience, student protests, tense police-community relations, loss of municipal revenues, inadequate parks and recreation areas.

The 701 Project presented the City with the opportunity of studying and attempting to resolve some of these problems which *do* exist in Oakland. The urgency of the urban crisis and the swiftness and means of solution may be debated, but not the crisis itself.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE 701 PROJECT

All urban problems could not realistically be included in Oakland's 701 Project. However, certain significant subjects required study along with physical and environmental problems, the primary orientation of the 701 Program as initially intended by the Federal Government.

The Oakland 701 Project was thus narrowed (or enlarged, depending upon one's point of view) to the study of population and housing, jobs and economic development, and physical development. It directed its concern toward the following general objectives:

1. *to provide good housing for all of Oakland's residents;*
2. *to develop a healthy economy and reduce hard-core unemployment;*
3. *to improve Oakland's physical environment.*

Aside from these basic substantive concerns, the Project started out with several other objectives relating to procedural matters.

First, the City's General Plan, which was initially adopted in 1959, needed revision and updating. This process was intended to result in a Comprehensive Development Plan to replace the Oakland General Plan. The General Plan by itself was not considered an adequate guide for Oakland's physical development; its usefulness and usability were clearly limited. At the outset the Comprehensive Development Plan was not specifically de-

fined as such but was to crystallize as the Project progressed. However, at an early stage, an emphasis on making the Plan action-oriented, in addition to its policy-making function, was evolving.

Related to the need for a Comprehensive Development Plan was also the necessity of turning the City's Capital Improvement Program (CIP) into a more usable management tool. Either the CIP had to be made realistically operational or a better substitute found.

In the area of housing, many agencies were charged with partial responsibilities but no instrument was available for guiding and coordinating their efforts. A "housing plan" that would be a component of the Comprehensive Development Plan could meet this need and more efficiently focus public and private resources on eliminating the city's slum housing and satisfying its crucial housing requirements.

Another important objective of the Project was the provision of a data base for ongoing and future studies and programs. Many surveys would be required for the 701 Project itself, but a long-term concern would be to establish an operational information system with some of these surveys as a base. Such a system would require regular updating, be flexible for expansion and change, and be quickly and efficiently available to users of the system.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND OUTPUTS

The 701 Project has resulted in a significant range of accomplishments, both tangible and intangible. On the tangible side ten surveys have been carried out to become the data base of the Project's analyses and subsequent reports: Household Survey, Shopping Survey, Survey of Alameda County Employers, Residential Survey, Urban Design Survey, Business and Industry Inventory, Block Summary Land-Use Inventory, City-Owned Property Survey, Financial Capability Survey, and Resource Allocation Program Survey.

Eight major reports have been produced by Stanford Research Institute, four by Survey Research Center of the University of California, one by the California State Department of Employment, two by DeMars and Wells and Jack T. Sidener alone and two in conjunction with City staff. Twenty-one reports were prepared by City staff, including a draft of a new subdivision ordinance. In addition, numerous technical memoes, discussion papers, and other miscellaneous documents have been produced.[1]

The intangible accomplishments of the Project are equally important, with benefits hopefully accruing to the city long after the 701 Project has ended.

At the suggestion of Housing and Urban Development officials and because of the needs of the Project, one such benefit has resulted from communication with other agencies whose outputs (principally data projections) were closely akin to the Project's studies. These contacts have demonstrated the interrelationship of activities in separate agencies and have carried over to other projects in which the City is involved. Principal among these contacts were those with the Bay Area Transportation Study, the Bay Area Simulation Study, and the Association of Bay Area Governments.

Similar benefits have, and will continue to be, derived from the significant interdepartmental cooperation that has marked the 701 Project from its inception. Firemen conducted the Business and Industry Inventory, and members of the Building and Housing Department carried out the Residential Survey and also participated in the preparation of its questionnaire. Personnel from the Statistical Services Division worked closely with City Planning staff in establishing, and retrieving information from, the Project's data files. Importantly, through this latter association the City has experienced a real demonstration of the essential role that electronic data processing can play in research, planning, and programming.

Another primary result of cooperative effort has been the creation of two interdepartmental teams. The Advance Transportation Planning Team—composed of personnel from Street and Engineering, Traffic Engineering, and City Planning—was responsible for the Project's circulation planning. The Resource Allocation Program Team, composed of members from Finance and City Planning, developed the conceptual basis for this program, prepared the necessary forms, worked with departments in submitting the needed information, and put the program package together ready for review. The success of both these teams and the processes with which they are concerned could become one of the 701 Project's most beneficial accomplishments.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report is one of many emanating from the Project; though a final report, it does not stand alone in coverage of the Project. A complete evaluation of the Project must include all its outputs and accomplishments.

Unlike the single, technical focus of almost all the other Project reports, this is multidimensional in purpose. First, it summarizes the work and accomplishments of the 701 Project. As an overview, this summary will omit some secondary considerations but should be complete enough to give the reader a good impression of the scope, objectives, organization, and outputs of the Project.

This report is also a selective summary of the Project staff's major findings in functional areas associated with population and housing, jobs, and physical development. Its coverage in these areas, however, avoids matters of detailed analysis and methodology which may be found in the Project's technical reports from which this report is derived.

Only passing mention is made in this report about findings associated with the creation and maintenance of the information system that occupied a significant amount of Project effort. These

1. For a more complete listing and description of Project surveys and reports, see the Appendix.

particular findings are available in detail in reports from Stanford Research Institute. In addition, SRI's final report, which developed an approach toward an economic development program, is intended to stand alone as a major 701 Project report.

Unlike most other reports from the Project, this report makes policy recommendations to the City. These recommendations are of two types: (1) Functional policies in the area of housing, employment, and physical development; and (2) Procedural recommendations, including the concept and form of a Comprehensive Development Plan.

It must be stressed that this report is *not itself* intended to be the City's Comprehensive Development Plan. At the present time, this would be impractical and indeed presumptuous. First, while the Project has significantly broadened the scope and content of traditional general plan studies, it is still a long way from a total or "comprehensive" look at the city. Secondly, the staff's concept of a Comprehensive Development Plan is significantly different from the existing and familiar Oakland General Plan. To present a new concept to the City without adequate discussion or debate would be undesirable.

The main body of the report is organized into three parts reflecting the Project's three substantive emphases. The first part is entitled "Population and Housing"; the second is "Jobs and Employment"; and the concluding part is "Physical Environment and Circulation."

To these three main parts are added, aside from this introduction, "Summary and Recommendations," which, within the context of the part's title, is subtitled "Determining the Needs" and "Organizing for Action." This part may be read and understood separately from the rest of the report.

An important purpose of this report is to generate city-wide discussion of Oakland's problems and the potential for solutions to them. Only through a greater understanding of the physical and socio-economic issues facing the city, coupled with meaningful citizen participation, can Oakland find the means of effectively and reasonably dealing with its "urban crisis."

PART I

SUMMARY
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 1

DETERMINING THE NEEDS

POPULATION AND HOUSING

Dramatic changes in Oakland's population and housing characteristics occurred between 1960 and 1966. Equally dramatic changes are projected for Oakland's future. Some of these changes imply an exciting potential for the city but would require the city taking advantage of opportunities as they present themselves; other changes suggest the need for adaptation and accommodation on the part of the city; and others present problems and obstacles to be corrected and avoided. How the City responds to these changes will determine the kind of city Oakland becomes in the future.

GROWTH AND PROSPERITY

Between 1960 and 1966, Oakland's population grew from 367,500 to 373,500. This growth, while modest, reversed a downward trend that occurred during the 1950's. Behind this increase of not quite two per cent lay several significant factors.

A quarter of the city's 1966 population over the age of five years had moved into Oakland within the previous five years, but this was exceeded slightly by the number moving out within the same period. In this exchange, white outflow exceeded white inflow, but the reverse was true of the nonwhite population.

During roughly this same period, birth and fertility rates for both whites and nonwhites declined by around 25 per cent, a decline sharper than the nation as a whole. However, despite its more rapid decline, nonwhite rates were still significantly higher than that of the white population in 1966, and the nonwhite population had proportionately more women of childbearing age.

Overall, nonwhite growth sufficiently exceeded the white decline to produce a total population increase of 5,900. When trend analysis is applied to factors of race, age, fertility, and migration, the result is a net gain, from 1966 to 1985, of 173,000 persons. (Different but equally possible assumptions yield a gain of only 54,000 persons.)

Population growth from 1960 to 1966 was accompanied by a 4.4 per cent increase in the city's housing supply, which reached 147,700 units in 1966. Some 18,000 units of new construction and the demolition of 11,800 units accounted for this gain. The net effect produced a decline in single-family houses and duplexes along with dramatic increases in other multiples, particularly buildings with ten or more units. As a result, although single-family homes are still very important, Oakland is gradually becoming a city of apartment (47 per cent) and rental (56 per cent) units.

The building and demolition activity probably accounted for much of the high mobility of Oakland's residents. In addition to the large numbers of people moving into and out of the city, 30 per cent of the population (over five years of age) had moved to a different residence within Oakland some time in the five

years preceding 1966.

Just as Oakland's housing supply responded to (or partially produced) the city's recent population growth, so will it have to adjust to future population changes. A computerized housing model devised to match supply with future demand indicated that the trend projection of population would require a net increase of 20,000 housing units while the lower projection would result in a net decline of 3,000 units. (Due to projected increases in family size, the large growth in population was translated into a much smaller growth—a decline in the case of the low projection—in the number of families, i.e., from 141,000 families in 1966 to a range of 137,000 to 162,000 in 1985.) More specifically, the model suggested the need for 28,000 to 49,000 additional units with the elimination of 29,000 to 32,000 existing units.

The building, demolition, and moving activity which occurred between 1960 and 1966 was accompanied by a rapid escalation in the cost of housing. Median rent rose 30 per cent in this period while the median value of a single-family house went up 44 per cent. Occurring along with increases in the cost of housing was a significant but somewhat lower increase in median family income, which rose 26 per cent in this time period (16 per cent in constant dollars). The rise in income was higher than that for the nation as a whole, and was one in which all ethnic groups participated (median income for nonwhites rose 38 per cent).

These higher incomes were directly related to the significant educational gains registered by both whites and nonwhites in median school years completed, and in the number of persons graduating from high school and college. Though increasing rapidly, the incomes and educational attainment of the city's minority groups still remain far below those of the white families.

By 1985, assuming that national and local trends in rates of income growth and educational attainment gains continue, median family income (in 1965 dollars) is projected to increase by two-thirds—from $6,600 in 1965 to about $11,000 in 1985. Almost two-thirds of all families will receive over $8,000 per year, a number almost double that in 1965.

None of these projections should be viewed as flat predictions; but they do reflect the high probability that over the next 15 to 20 years, Oakland will grow in population and will develop into much more of a middle-income community than at present. This potential cannot be realized unless the total quality of Oakland's housing, educational system, general services, and overall environment are high enough *throughout* the city to keep (and attract) families in Oakland as incomes rise. This potential cannot be realized, however, unless the needs of *all* of Oakland's citizens now and in the future can be fulfilled regardless of income.

Recommendations

1. The goal of achieving a basic character as a middle-income community should be pursued by providing, in sufficient quantities, the housing, educational, service, and environmental qualities which a larger population with generally higher incomes will seek. At the same time each family, regardless of income and relative to its needs, should have access to the city's full range of benefits.

2. In particular, the City should pursue the goal of ensuring that every family have the opportunity to live in a sound housing unit, large enough to accommodate its members, at a reasonable cost relative to its income, and without artificial constraints on its freedom of selection.

ETHNIC CHANGE

Oakland's minority groups—33 per cent of the population in 1960—comprised 44 per cent in 1966. The largest of these groups, the black population, accounted for 30 per cent, followed by Spanish-surname whites with 10 per cent, and other nonwhites with 5 per cent. If these trends continue, it has been projected that the black population will constitute 64 per cent of the total city population by 1985 (53 per cent under somewhat different assumptions). While massive and rapid changes in migration trends or in people's attitudes might alter this picture, it is considered likely that the black population will be the majority by 1985—and they will be a middle-income majority. These higher incomes, however, will depend on the success of programs both to increase the educational attainment of minority groups and to eliminate discriminatory job practices.

The make-up of the city's political institutions, as well as the racial mix of all the city's areas, will undoubtedly reflect this ethnic transition which should be accomplished as smoothly and with as little tension as possible. An important key to this smooth transition will lie, along with public recognition of these trends, with the success of City efforts to eliminate racial segregation and discriminatory practices in the sale or rental of housing.

While some success has been achieved since 1960 in breaking down these patterns, enough discrimination and segregation linger in the city to warrant action. In 1966, more than 50 per cent of all dwelling units in Oakland were located in blocks observed to be either all-white or all-, or nearly all-, black. Nearly one-third of all black families in the city and almost 50 per cent of black families living outside the city's Target Areas felt they were discriminated against in renting or buying a housing unit. And finally, a higher proportion of all black families, regardless of income, were inadequately housed when compared to white families in the same income and family-size categories.

Though great strides have recently been taken, the ability of the City to effectively remove all artificial barriers creating these patterns is a necessary prerequisite to any program in the field of housing. This factor is especially critical in the sale of housing since home ownership among minority groups is increasing

rapidly in Oakland and will soon equal the white rate of home ownership.

Recommendations

1. The City should take the leadership in seeking additional means of achieving a completely open housing market that would permit any family access to any part of the housing supply within the city as well as within the region.

2. The City should support and urge creation of programs to increase the enjoyment by all the city's minority groups in the educational and employment benefits and opportunities available in the city.

POVERTY

In 1966, according to a Federal definition of poverty (which for a family of four means an annual income of under $3,200), 46,700 people, or 13 per cent of the city's population, were poor. As another measure, 29 per cent of all the city's households and 37 per cent of the city's rental households had incomes low enough to meet the entry requirements for public housing. By location, 40 per cent of the total population lived in areas with unemployment high enough and incomes low enough to be officially designated as "Poverty Target Areas."

The poor and the residents of the Target Areas were disproportionately composed of black and Spanish-surname minorities, persons under 18 and over 65 years of age, members of large families, and members of families with a female head. In addition, they exhibited significant differences from the nonpoor and the Non-Target Area residents with such characteristics as higher fertility ratios, lower educational attainment, and generally worse housing conditions.

More specifically in the area of housing, 21 per cent of the Federally-defined poverty families were living in overcrowded conditions in 1966, as opposed to a 5 per cent rate for nonpoverty families; and 55 per cent of the rental households eligible for entry to public housing were paying gross rentals equal to 35 per cent or more of their yearly income. Overall, about 10,000 families are in need of special housing subsidies in order for them to occupy sound housing of adequate size. Without the availability of such assistance, which may take many forms, programs to eliminate substandard housing would merely result in shifting the problems elsewhere in the city.

As for the future, projections indicate that, by applying anticipated income growth rates to the 1965 income distribution, the number of poor in 1985 will be reduced by 40 per cent. Intensified or more effective efforts could reduce this number even further, for the potential to eliminate poverty entirely in the United States, if not already existing, will certainly exist by 1985. While the number requiring assistance is likely to decline over time, provisions for full support, particularly housing subsidies, should be made as soon as possible so that other essential programs can be gotten underway.

Recommendations

1. The City should become more closely identified with efforts to fight poverty by seeking additional support and new solutions for easing its burden and breaking its hold.

2. Special efforts should be directed toward assisting families with a female head, a group with a high rate of poverty and unique problems.

3. Provision should be made for about 10,000 low-income families to receive, or be advised of the existence of, any of a variety of special housing subsidies which are now available or are expected to be available in the future. Maximum advantage should especially be taken of home-ownership subsidy programs.

4. In anticipation of family income gains, encouragement should be given to those forms of subsidy that will permit low-income families to occupy standard middle-income units and guarantee them the option of continued occupancy if family incomes rise beyond subsidy eligibility.

5. The City should make a special effort to convince communities outside Oakland to make housing subsidies available so that low-income families may, if they choose, live closer to jobs or may, like their higher income counterparts, increase their range of housing opportunities.

A YOUTH-ORIENTED CITY

Oakland's population became younger in the 1960-1966 period; with the median age dropping from 35.7 to 31.9 years. Projections indicate that the median age will continue to drop—to at least 24 years by 1985.

Accordingly, persons under 18 years of age, representing 29 per cent of the population in 1960 and 31 per cent in 1966, will comprise from 38 to 42 per cent of the population in 1985. In numbers, this will mean an increase of from 50 to 100 per cent in the under-18, or school-age, population (with the latter increase representing the trend projection). Services and facilities geared to this young age group should increase proportionately to meet the increased demand.

In the short run, and as a necessary prerequisite to the higher incomes anticipated in the future, major steps must be taken to close the gaps in educational attainment that now exist between the city's white population and its minority groups, and between its Target and Non-Target Areas.

Recommendations

1. Governmental offices whose efforts are directed toward serving the needs of the young should start developing long-range expansion programs to serve a growing youthful population.

2. The Oakland Board of Education should increase its efforts to bridge the educational gaps between the city's different ethnic groups and areas.

THE ELDERLY

While the young have increased, the number of elderly persons (over 65 years of age) has remained virtually unchanged since 1960, a situation projected to continue into the future in spite of the substantial growth anticipated in total population. Still, numbering 45,000 to 50,000, the elderly warrant significant attention.

While disclosing much about the numbers and characteristics of the elderly, the 701 Project data reveal little about the problems they face. On the one hand, the incidence of poverty is presently high among the elderly and is projected to continue at the same high rate. The fixed-income characteristic of many of the elderly poses a special problem of declining dollar value not necessarily faced by others who are poor. On the other hand, few of the elderly families appear to experience severe housing problems. Many live in houses with mortgages either paid off or with payments quite low relative to house value. The fact that many elderly families continue to live in relatively large houses does not necessarily indicate a preference since few alternatives, until recently, have been available. And finally, little is known locally about the special medical and leisure-time problems faced by the elderly. More study is clearly warranted.

Recommendation

1. The City should continue to study the elderly citizens of the community in order to define their unique problems and seek solutions.

FAMILY-SIZE CHANGES AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT

While total households, 136,600 in 1966, grew by 2 per cent since 1960, households with five or more persons grew by 10 per cent. Numbering 20,300 households, they comprised 15 per cent of the total. Of this number, almost 30 per cent of which were low-income households, 9,900 were living in overcrowded conditions according to standards relating household size to the number of bedrooms in the housing unit.

Thus an immediate need is evident for almost 10,000 additional large housing units in order to correct present imbalances in the housing supply. This breaks down into a need for three-, four-, and five-bedroom units in the ratio of 2:1:1.

The trend toward large families is projected to continue into the future. The average number of persons per family, 2.6 in 1966, is projected to become 3.1 to 3.3 by 1985. By size category, families with one to three children, comprising 25 per cent of all families in 1966, will increase their proportion to around 30 per cent by 1985; families with four or more children will increase their share of all families from 7 per cent in 1966 to 11 per cent by 1985. In numbers, families with one to three children will increase by more than a third and families with four or more children will nearly double.

Translated into housing terms for two different population projections, at least 17,000 to 26,000 additional three-or-more-bedroom units will be needed by 1985 along with a minimum of 5,000 to 15,000 additional smaller units. The bulk of these needed additions to the city's housing supply will undoubtedly be made by private developers, but local government has a critical role to play in the overall housing development picture.

Recommendations

1. The City should stay aware of current housing deficiencies by keeping well informed of imbalances between housing needs and housing supply.

2. The City should encourage private housing development and should assist developers, via up-to-date information on the total picture, to make proper decisions regarding the types and location of units to be built. In some cases, assistance should take the form of helping to make land available through the urban renewal process.

3. The City should be prepared, through direct housing construction and rehabilitation if necessary, to fill the gaps in demand left unmet by private efforts.

4. The City should discourage overcrowding by providing housing subsidies to families whose income would otherwise prevent them from occupying sound housing of the proper size.

5. With the backing of sufficient housing subsidies, the City should insist that all housing added to the supply is sufficient to meet the quality and amenity demands of a growing middle-income population.

SUBSTANDARD HOUSING

Although 82 per cent of all housing in Oakland was rated as "sound" in 1966, 25,400 units, the remainder, could be considered substandard. Of this number, 7,400 units, representing 5 per cent of the total supply, were considered totally dilapidated or too deteriorated to be economically susceptible to rehabilitation. The rest of the substandard housing is deteriorating but considered to be rehabilitatable. With half the housing supply at least 40 years old, the probability of continued deterioration is very high. Analysis indicates that at present rates of deterioration, the 1966 housing supply aged to 1985 would contain four and one-half times the amount of dilapidation now existing. Demolitions resulting from normal market operations are projected to decrease this number; however, without a stepped-up program of rehabilitation and slum removal it is likely that in 1985 there will still be two to three times the number of dilapidated units that existed in 1966. In addition, 16,000 to 19,000 households will be living in deteriorating but salvagable units unless there are increased efforts to keep presently sound housing units from sliding into a deteriorating condition.

Clearly, the City has the responsibility to make certain that dilapidated units are demolished, deteriorated units are rehabili-

tated and kept from becoming dilapidated, and sound units are maintained and kept from becoming deteriorated. This responsibility is consistent with the proposed goal to establish and maintain a basic middle-income character for the city while making sure that all families are properly housed—a goal incompatible with the existing and projected degree of deterioration in the city. But, with equal consistency, the City has another responsibility to residents affected by efforts to upgrade the housing supply. No family should be made to bear a financial or social hardship as a result of such efforts. Only a balanced program will meet the requirements of the proposed goals.

Recommendations

1. The City should increase its efforts to remove dilapidated units from the housing supply but should scale its program to the degree of success in its efforts to create a totally effective open housing market, provide adequate housing subsidies, add sufficient numbers of large-size housing units to the existing supply, and provide adequate relocation staff assistance.

2. The City should increase the level of its rehabilitation and code-enforcement programs. In these efforts, the City should ensure that rehabilitation loans and grants can be made available, as needed, as well as follow-up services, and, if required, relocation assistance.

3. As soon as resources permit, the City should initiate a total inspection program, followed by periodic reinspections, aimed at maintaining housing units in sound condition.

4. The City should centralize housing assistance functions such as those providing relocation services, financial assistance and information, and general housing information and services.

JOBS AND EMPLOYMENT

Job gains and losses in Oakland during the past two decades have reflected the rapid and basic changes in the national economy since World War II, the response of the city's economic and physical structure to these changes, and the rapid growth of the Bay Area as a whole and the suburban areas in particular. For the immediate present and for the years ahead, the City of Oakland has the responsibility to encourage the continuance of job gains and to apply effective remedies in the combat against excessive unemployment.

JOB GAINS AND LOSSES

Looking ahead to the next two decades, Oakland can expect a substantial increase in the total number of civilian jobs—from 183,000 in 1966 to 225,000 in 1985. However, a net increase cannot be anticipated in all industrial sectors.

The manufacturing sector has lost and will continue to lose jobs, and the same situation prevails with wholesale trade.

In retail trade, modest job increases have occurred and are expected to continue.

In recent years, job growth came to a near standstill in the transportation, communication, and utilities sector. However, projections for this sector show substantial job increases throughout the next two decades.

In the government sector, substantial growth will continue; however, the rate of job increase will not continue as high as in the past.

The service industries will maintain a strong, steady growth in jobs.

Projections to 1985 indicate that Oakland can expect to provide 47,000 more jobs than were available in 1965. A net increase of at least 25 per cent in the total amount of occupied nonresidential floor space will be necessary to accommodate this growth. Obviously, sufficient land will be needed to accommodate new construction for both net growth and replacement and relocation of much of the existing space.

Projections also suggest that between 1965 and 1985 the Central District can expect increases of some 19,000 jobs and approximately 5.4 million square feet of occupied floor space.

LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

In 1966, Oakland's civilian labor force, with 163,000 persons, was slightly smaller than in 1950, but larger than in 1960. However, since 1950 the number of women in the labor force has increased substantially. By contrast the number of males in the labor force has been in steady decline.

Oakland is increasingly becoming a city of service workers, technicians, and professionals. Corresponding declines have been

evident in the number of city residents employed as craftsmen, operatives, laborers, and sales workers.

In 1966, the city provided almost 34,000 more jobs than the number (149,000) of civilian employed residents. However, far more workers than this number suggests—92,300 persons—were employed within the city while residing outside its boundaries, and over one-third of all employed persons residing in Oakland were commuting to jobs outside the city. The net result of total commuter movement into and out of the city was that only half of all Oakland jobs were filled by its residents. Out-commuters were disproportionately composed of nonwhite residents and manual workers.

In Oakland between 1960 and 1966, the number of jobs available in the manufacturing industries dropped sharply while the number of residents employed in these industries remained almost unchanged. In the transportation, communication, and utilities industries combined, the total number of jobs increased while the number of residents employed in these industries declined. In the service industries and government, both the number of jobs and the number of residents employed in these industries increased. The government sector is increasingly important to Oakland's resident labor force, particularly to nonwhite workers, because of its effective anti-discrimination policies.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Among all of the nation's larger cities, Oakland continues to sustain one of the highest rates of unemployment. In spite of slight but continued decline since 1950, the 1966 rate of 8.4 per cent was still critically high. This rate, seasonally adjusted to 7.7, was almost twice the 4.0 rate for the United States as a whole.

Unemployment is only one dimension of the larger problem of manpower waste. Persons employed but forced to accept part-time work or substandard wages or positions well below their skill level or persons too defeated to continue the search for work are all characteristics of underemployment. This situation may be particularly widespread in Oakland. General but unsubstantiated evidence suggests that as high as 40 per cent of the Target Area's labor force may be underemployed.

Unemployment can have its basis in a wide range of problems. In Oakland, unemployment is primarily related to two basic situations: (1) the skills of the unemployed are no longer in demand by employers, and, conversely, employer demand for certain skills cannot be met readily by the unemployed; and (2) informal barriers continue to persist for many job-seekers, and these barriers are often by-products of racial discrimination.

In Oakland, unemployment is a problem especially for young people below the age of 25 and particularly among the nonwhite youth. Unemployment is also more likely to strike nonwhite women, persons of any age or race who are undertrained or undereducated, and persons of any race who have lost their jobs and are beyond their prime working years. Unemployment among black women is particularly serious because a significant proportion searching for work are family heads.

Between 1966 and 1985, the number of jobs available in Oakland is expected to increase by almost 25 per cent. However, entry level jobs will increasingly demand higher skills. The total labor force is expected to increase at a somewhat higher rate—to 213,000 in 1985. Significantly though, the projections show a very sizable relative increase of young nonwhite persons—the very group now most susceptible to unemployment. Thus, overall unemployment rates, which in recent years have gradually dropped, can be expected to increase significantly unless public policy effectively mitigates many of the fundamental causes of unemployment.

UNEMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS

At present, there are in Oakland a wide range of programs aimed at reducing unemployment—particularly through manpower development programs which prepare workers for jobs available in the labor market. The combined level of effectiveness of these many programs will have to be doubled to reduce the level of joblessness in Oakland to near the national level. In addition the effectiveness of agencies concerned with racial discrimination in employment practices has been nowhere near commensurate with the depth and extent of the problem.

Recommendations

1. The City of Oakland should consider assuming extensive involvement and leadership in employment and manpower development programs.

2. A Human Resources Planning and Coordinating Agency should be established for the City which would be directly concerned with the overall problem of manpower development; would function within and be part of the City's administrative structure; would perform manpower development, research, and planning; would provide overall coordination of the agencies and programs currently focusing on manpower training; and would prepare a Human Resources Plan. Such a Plan could provide problem analysis, establish objectives and goals, identify the private and public organizations and the governmental structures necessary to achieve the goals, and identify specific projects which relate to the goals.

3. A Human Relations Agency should be established which would be a function of Oakland City government and whose central purpose would be to deal effectively with problems of discrimination. Such an agency would perform its function through education and mediation and would be responsible to a Human Relations Commission which would include the poor, the unemployed, and racial minorities among its community representation.

4. Greater emphasis should be placed on basic educational

instruction in all manpower training programs. Correspondingly, ways must be found to increase the proportion of young people who achieve basic educational skills at the secondary-school and junior-college levels. In the future, the university will become increasingly more important in attaining these skills.

5. In both basic educational and occupational training programs, young people should be directed in particular toward the expanding white-collar occupations—sales, clerical, subprofessional, managerial, and professional.

6. Government's positive contribution to the reduction of unemployment, through effective anti-discrimination hiring practices, should be a major factor in decisions involving the loss, development, or expansion of government offices or facilities in Oakland.

7. By insisting upon maximum utilization of jobless residents and affirmative actions to recruit racial minorities, the City of Oakland should increase opportunities for the unemployed—through its capacity as an employer, as a purchaser of goods and services, and possibly through its licensing powers.

8. Proposals of any type which seek to remedy the problems of unemployment should recognize the extent and seriousness of the problem among other population groups in addition to the young and the minorities—including the untrained, the handicapped, the female head of family, and the over-45 job seeker.

9. Oakland should establish industrial development policies to encourage those industries which are economically viable and which also provide a high proportion of low-skill entry level jobs and opportunities for upward mobility within the industry.

10. Public, private, or cooperative transportation programs should be developed which are designed to help the unemployed, the underemployed, and the job-seeker in general to reach otherwise inaccessible employment centers beyond city boundaries.

11. General open-housing policies and programs to provide low-cost housing should be instituted in Alameda County and throughout the region as another means of increasing employment opportunities for unemployed and underemployed Oakland residents. Oakland should assume leadership toward implementing this recommendation.



PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND CIRCULATION

The City's balanced growth depends on the proper location of activities relative to one another. The healthy development of any area—and the quality of life there—depends largely on the presence of open space or other amenities and upon the area's general visual quality. The benefits of an efficient, safe, well-balanced circulation system are of obvious importance. Although the city's problems are varied and multi-form, long-range solutions are available and step-by-step implementation can take place.

GENERAL FORM

Oakland's physical environment, in the main, is shabby or dull, and the man-made city generally lacks clear form. Despite a magnificent natural setting, Oakland is essentially a sprawling, low-density city with centers that fail to look like centers and diffuse neighborhoods without strong physical identity.

But new transportation facilities, especially the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system and the freeways, as well as general population growth and rising incomes, are creating enormous opportunities for restructuring and improving this physical environment.

Recommendations

1. A continuing, comprehensive process of "urban design" should be pursued to seize opportunities, as they occur, and creatively direct physical changes toward a more efficient, more livable, more beautiful, and more dramatic urban environment. In this process the City should see that all streets and other public facilities—in addition to their being individually well designed—form in the aggregate a logical, visible framework which organizes and stimulates private development.

2. As a framework for decision-making the Proposed Design Structure map and the Illustrative Future Land Use map should be approved. These are intended to take advantage of Oakland's unique opportunities, to provide for major population and economic growth, to relate urban development sensitively to the natural setting, and to relate the intensity of activity at each point to the degree of accessibility there.

RESIDENTIAL AREAS

The majority of Oakland's residential areas are dreary and uneventful. Most of the residential streets below the MacArthur Freeway are characterized by an abundance of utility poles and a shortage of trees. Overall, except in the areas near Lake Merritt, no strong, clear pattern of higher-density centers or corridors appears. The expensive, newer homes in the almost exclu-

sively single-family Hills contrast sharply with the cheaper, older houses and two-story apartments in the flatlands. Despite all these drawbacks, there are a great variety of potentially good sites for new residential construction.

Recommendations

1. Higher-density residential development should be channeled into locations offering accessibility and amenity, thereby helping to minimize disruption to the city's existing stable lower-density areas. The higher densities should be near the Central District Core and in other clusters and corridors related to major transportation routes, open spaces, creeks and other topographic amenities.

2. Important higher-density "spines" should extend along the Grove-Shafter Freeway/BART/Telegraph Avenue corridor, and along secondary corridors like 73rd Avenue which are perpendicular to the main intercity BART line and could serve as feeder-transit routes to BART stations.

3. There should be a wider choice of densities and housing types in each major section of the city, including the Hills.

4. Major efforts should be made to preserve and improve the livability and the identifiability of Oakland's neighborhoods. Massive street-tree planting programs should take place in most of the residential areas below the MacArthur Freeway.

5. Zoning amendments and review criteria should be formulated to ensure that new apartment buildings are more livable and visually harmonious with their neighborhoods.

COMMERCIAL, CIVIC, AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS

Most of the commercial and industrial environment is visually chaotic and lacking in amenities, and much of it is clearly declining or obsolescent. However, major opportunities for new commercial and industrial development exist in a variety of locations. There are also opportunities for a research and conference center at Peralta Oaks, and for a medical training center adjacent to Pill Hill.

Recommendations

1. The visual quality of all commercial and industrial areas should be vastly improved. Open spaces, planting, and similar amenities should be added to make them more humane shopping and working environments. Important shopping frontages should be protected from disruption by randomly located parking lots and open uses.

2. The Oakland Central District should be emphasized and strengthened as the East Bay's dominant commercial and civic center. Within this area, the high-intensity retail-and-office Core along Broadway from 11th Street to Grand Avenue should be clearly dominant, but the Central District should also include a variety of specialized, complementary commercial, civic, and recreational areas, as well as close-in apartment districts.

3. Besides the Central District, there should be a clear hierarchical structure of several different levels of commercial and civic areas. Major "subregional centers" should be encouraged (a) along West MacArthur Boulevard near Broadway and Telegraph Avenues and on adjacent Pill Hill, (b) along East 14th Street from about 28th to 36th Avenues, (c) around the Eastmont Mall Shopping Center at 73rd and Bancroft Avenues, and (d) around the Coliseum rapid-transit station, linked to the Coliseum Complex itself and the adjacent commercial strip along Hegenberger Road. The scale and functions of these centers should be planned and controlled so as to complement, rather than weaken, the Central District's functions.

4. In the smaller commercial centers and the commercial strips, a much clearer differentiation of scale and functions should exist than at present. The location and scale of "community" and "neighborhood" centers should be determined by their relative accessibility and trading-area population, as well as by local amenities and established development patterns.

5. A modest horizontal expansion of the industrial belt can take place, if necessary, but the emphasis should be on making more intensive use of vacant, underused, and derelict lands within it.

6. On the industrial belt's inland side, land-use and street changes should be made which will simplify and stabilize its presently ragged boundary with adjacent residential areas.

OPEN SPACES, CREEKS, AND THE SHORELINE

Vast sections of the city are severely lacking in parks, recreation areas, and other open space. Except for the fine park at Lake Merritt, Oakland's ten-mile belt of flats and lower slopes is relieved only by (usually treeless) school playgrounds and by a handful of old-style rectangular city parks.

Recommendations

1. Expansion of the city's open-space system should emphasize development in the flats and lower hills—both in the form of small neighborhood and community parks and open spaces and in major parks along selected creeks and shoreline sections.

2. Wherever possible, new parks and neighborhood open spaces should be provided in conjunction with needed new schools or school expansions.

3. The creek system should be capitalized on as a positive element in the physical environment. Flood-control designs which preserve trees and natural character should be encouraged. Sections of several streams should be developed as linear parks with creekside walks. Apartments should be encouraged to develop in corridors along creeks. Schools, libraries, and recreational areas should relate to creeks in a recognizable, connected system of public facilities.

4. The near-total industrial hold over the waterfront should be loosened and recreational (and in some cases residential) use made of much of it. Major recreational development should be concentrated in several large segments, including the section north of the Bay Bridge Approach, the Central District shoreline, Brooklyn Basin, and San Leandro Bay.

5. Bay fill should be undertaken only upon clear and convincing evidence that its benefits will outweigh its resulting environmental and other costs.

TRAFFICWAY APPEARANCE

Of Oakland's major streets, many are unsightly in the extreme and the great majority are dreary and uneventful. In the aggregate, they form a confusing, largely undifferentiated system in which major streets are often barely distinguishable from minor ones.

Recommendation

1. Major efforts should be made to improve the visual quality and "legibility" of the city's trafficway system. A massive street planting program—with concurrent undergrounding and improvements in luminaires and "street furniture"—should get underway in the near future.

CIRCULATION

Traffic projections show total average daily vehicle-trips to, from, through, or within the Oakland traffic area increasing by about 67 per cent between 1965 and 1990. Many major trafficway segments are already congested or will become so unless major construction is undertaken.

It appears that, even with the diversion of significant numbers of motorists to BART, there is a need for additional freeway facilities. The State already has plans to connect the San Francisco-to-Alameda Southern Bay Crossing, now being designed, with the Grove-Shafter Freeway and with a freeway through the Metropolitan Oakland International Airport and San Leandro. It also has plans for a Shepherd Canyon Freeway from Contra Costa County to the Warren Freeway. Other possible locations for freeways include (a) two possibly offset segments (in the general vicinity of Fruitvale Avenue and High Street) in the corridor (State Route 77) from the Nimitz to the Warren Freeway; and (b) the corridor (State Route 13) from the Airport to the Warren Freeway between about Seminary and 106th Avenues, where the currently planned East Oakland Cross-Town expressway may have insufficient capacity for future traffic; (c) an alignment running from Alameda toward Berkeley west of the Nimitz Freeway; and (d) an extension of the Warren Freeway through Berkeley.

Recommendations

1. A final decision on the need for freeways, especially in the Route 13 and Route 77 corridors, should be postponed until the traffic-simulation model now being developed by the 701 Advance Transportation Planning Team is operational in early 1970, allowing the alternatives to be tested more adequately. If a Route 77 freeway is determined to be desirable, it should have a single, continuous alignment—possibly near (east or west of) Fruitvale Avenue.

2. The Proposed 1985 Circulation System map should be approved. This plan includes a hierarchical, clearly differentiated system of several different levels of trafficway, each of which performs a separate principal function. Each level should have its own appropriate, identifiable form (type and scale of planting, typical cross-section, etc.), and should be connected to the next higher and lower levels in a recognizable pattern.

3. "Freeways" should be designed to handle extremely large volumes of through traffic. They should have full control of access, grade separation at all intersections, and physical separation of opposing lanes.

4. A secondary (currently nonexistent) level of "expressways" should be designed for heavy through-traffic routes. Their design should feature full or partial control of access, restriction of cross traffic to major intersections, and physical separation of opposing traffic lanes.

5. "Arterial streets" should serve as the basic network for through-traffic flow between different sections of the city. They should connect freeways and expressways with collector and local streets, and should define rather than sever residential neighborhoods, industrial tracts, and commercial areas.

6. "Collector streets" should serve traffic movement between arterial and local streets and also provide direct access to abutting properties. They should be so designed that they do not attract large volumes of through traffic.

7. "Local streets" should be used primarily for access to abutting property. Their design should discourage all through traffic and should respect the importance of pedestrian movement.

8. Attractive "pedestrianways" should be provided in areas of heavy foot traffic and in locations of unusual visual, community, or historical significance.

9. The use of mass transit should be encouraged and facilitated, especially in small-area planning where the relationship of BART feeder lines to neighborhood development patterns should be explored.

10. Some 38 miles of new major city streets or widening, realignment, or other major improvements to existing ones should be built—at a total cost of some $64 million—to accommodate the forecast traffic flows in 1985. Significant improvements should include (a) creating a continuous "Embarcadero" route through the industrial belt; (b) widening of several lateral (southwest-northeast) streets across Fruitvale and East and South Central Oakland, some of which may not be needed if a Route 13 or Route 77 Freeway is built here; and (c) widening of several

existing streets, and opening of some new street connections, in West Oakland and the Central District to tie in with urban renewal activities and the Grove-Shafter Freeway.

RENEWAL AND PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS

Vast areas of Oakland are in need of some kind of renewal action or major improvements. At least some deteriorating or dilapidated housing is found in every section of the city. Unfortunately, only a few selected project areas—in or near the Central District—have ever received renewal treatment of any depth. And major public capital investments in parks, schools, and other neighborhood facilities are badly needed in most of the city.

A number of relatively small "rebuilding areas"—found especially in the Central District and along the edges of the industrial belt—have a potential for clearance and total rebuilding because of extreme dilapidation or obsolescence or defective basic layout. Much more extensive are the potential "renovation areas" which do not need complete reorganization of their land uses and physical pattern but have many blighted structures and a severe lack of amenities and adequate public facilities. This category embraces most of the residential sections of the Target Areas, as well as a number of declining commercial and industrial areas. A large number of potential "conservation-and-improvement areas" are today in generally good condition but require both code enforcement and substantial environmental improvements to prevent future area decline. This category covers another vast belt of residential areas inland from the renovation areas, as well as many older commercial and industrial areas.

Recommendations

1. Every area of the city should receive some kind of attention to cure or prevent blight, with the types and scale of actions in each area tailored to its unique conditions and needs. Maximum use should be made not just of the urban renewal and code-enforcement programs, but of the full range of Federally-assisted open-space, neighborhood-facilities, beautification, and housing programs.

2. The emphasis in using the urban renewal program should be on taking many separate actions scattered across wide areas, rather than on concentrated treatment of entire large areas. Such actions should stress rehabilitation and conservation—and the creation of new development opportunities—rather than large-scale clearance. Renewal should be a continuous, flexible process which is sensitive to changing conditions and current market opportunities.

3. Street construction and other capital improvements should be timed and coordinated very closely with renewal and concentrated-code-enforcement actions, to give maximum support to these actions.

ZONING AND SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS

A large proportion of the city appears to be inappropriately zoned. In particular, several whole residential neighborhoods are now industrially zoned, and the zoning pattern in general makes inadequate distinction between the widely differing kinds of residential, commercial, and industrial areas in the city.

Further, Oakland's existing subdivision ordinance, adopted in 1939, is inadequate to today's needs.

Recommendations

1. Extensive rezonings should be undertaken to promote the land-use proposals made in this report. They should be accomplished largely in stages keyed to renewal, public improvements, and other major developments, and in general as conditions in each area become ripe for the rezoning.

2. The zoning applied to any given area should be closely tailored, or provide for a gradual transition, to the desirable functions and character proposed for that area. The amount of land zoned for each type of use should not be substantially in excess of demand, given a reasonable margin for individual choice.

3. Residential rezonings should achieve a greater differentiation of densities, with some areas increased in allowable density and others decreased.

4. Nonresidential rezonings should seek to give each commercial and industrial area the zoning appropriate to its special functions and should promote the pattern of centers proposed in this report.

5. The new, more comprehensive Real Estate Division Regulations—drafted as part of the 701 Project—which incorporate modern land development concepts should be adopted.

Chapter 2

ORGANIZING FOR ACTION

THE COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

An important attempt to coordinate programs in the city was the Oakland General Plan. It served a useful purpose, when adopted in 1959, of demonstrating a systematic approach for stating, in general terms, physical development policy for the City.

The Plan, however, was conceived as a device for dealing with only a limited number of issues facing the City. Its range of concern was restricted primarily to selected physical issues; it concentrated on the long-run future, offering little assistance for near-future decisions. The focus was a single static map that was both general and precise, depending upon what was being mapped. Amendments to the map, a cumbersome process, tended to stress minor spatial changes. Unfortunately, the plan was neither a strong statement of policy nor a clear picture of development targets.

The need for an emphasis on short- and middle-range development programming was indicated at a very early date. To this was added the need for clear statements of policy, a wider and more flexible scope, and a consequent de-emphasis of the plan map's role.

These objectives could be accomplished by a Comprehensive Development Plan consisting of two parts: a Policy Plan and a Development Program. The two parts would complement each other, but each would be meaningful by itself.

The Policy Plan. The Policy Plan would be a document containing the up-to-date policies, objectives, and intent of the City concerning Oakland's social, economic, and physical development. Adopted by City Council, it would guide the City administration in its budgeting, programming, and resource allocations. At the same time, the plan would inform Oakland's citizens of the City's policies as they might relate to actions undertaken by the private sector or by other governmental agencies.

The nucleus of such a Policy Plan could be this report's concerns: housing, jobs, and physical development. At a later time other subjects deemed appropriate could be added, such as fiscal policy and more complete subarea policies based on neighborhood or area plans.

The document itself should be concise and nontechnical, but technical back-up studies could be included by reference. It should be expandable and flexible and be subject to continuous review, addition, and change. Word statements—explicit and completely devoid of ambiguity—should be stressed but the Plan should also include, where appropriate, maps and other supporting graphic material.

The Development Program. While the Policy Plan would present the City's general, usually long-range intentions and directions, the Development Program, guided by the Policy Plan, would

describe a specific program of actions in the near future, along with a generalized program for later years. Adopted yearly, the Development Program would include the nature, cost, and means of financing everything the City expects to accomplish in the next five to six years.

Such a program would assign priorities to different actions on the basis of relative need and eliminate duplication and conflict between them. It would phase related actions to achieve maximum economy and to allow for simultaneous construction of projects in the same area.

At the heart of the Development Program would be the Resource Allocation Program (RAP), developed as part of the 701 Project and now undergoing its first year's test. The Resource Allocation Program is an attempt to cope more systematically with all the competing demands made upon the City's limited resources. It is similar to a form of Capital Improvement Program (CIP) which the City has used in recent years, but different in several important respects:

	Capital Improvement Program (CIP)	Resource Allocation Program (RAP)
Time Span	5 years ahead.	5 years ahead **plus** 10 more years into future (as a long-range framework and to better understand the implications of programs proposed in the very near future).
Geographic Basis	City-wide.	City-wide **plus** subarea (to allow for better coordination and to show the implications of priorities accorded to the different areas of the city).
Origin of Proposals	Each department submits list of needs.	"Functions" (appropriate groupings of departments) submit their complete programs.
Scope	Capital improvement needs only.	Capital improvement needs **plus** additional operating requirements (personnel, equipment, etc.).
Fiscal Constraints	No fiscal constraints placed on departments.	Functions submit balanced programs that cannot exceed fiscal constraints placed on them.

Under the procedures developed, each function is given two or more total allocations for each of three five-year time periods, each allocation to represent an expenditure level based on different revenue assumptions.[1] Each function lists, costs out, and assigns priorities to each new or expanded facility or operating program that it feels is necessary. The function then proposes a balanced program that cannot exceed its allocation except where the function can identify funds coming from sources outside the City. Complete information on its balanced programs as well as unmet needs are submitted on special forms and maps ready for review, ultimately by the City Manager.

Extensive work will be required in the future to refine the RAP concept as well as to develop measurement criteria for a better evaluation of the costs and benefits of proposed projects and programs.

Other programs could be added to RAP that do not necessarily involve additional funds, but which are needed to describe the work emphasis of certain departments. Examples: the City Planning Department's rezoning program and the Building and Housing Department's nonassisted code enforcement projects.

A program now being developed as a result of the 1968 Housing Act is the Neighborhood Development Program (NDP).[2] To be effective, NDP must be integrated into RAP, thus allowing for better coordination between projects of the Redevelopment Agency and other City programs.

The programs of other city agencies not under the direct authority of the City Council, such as the Port of Oakland, the Housing Authority, and even the Oakland Economic Development Council, Inc. and the Board of Education, could be integrated into the Development Program for better coordination of related programs and for informational purposes.

Recommendations

1. Direct the preparation of a Comprehensive Development Plan as a replacement for the existing Oakland General Plan and as a means for systematically expressing City policies and integrating them into City development programs.

2. Approve the general concept of a Policy Plan and authorize its preparation, indicating subjects to be initially included.

3. Approve the Resource Allocation Program concept as the first step toward a total five-year Development Program.

4. Approve the concept of attempting to integrate programs of agencies outside the authority of the City Council into a City Development Program.

FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION

During the course of the 701 Project, problems of coordination were uncovered within several study areas. In two such areas, interdepartmental teams were created to cope with the problems. In two other areas, organizational solutions are needed to deal with the problems of coordination. The objective of such solutions is more than merely "letting the right hand know what the left hand is doing" but rather putting together combined skills and resources to optimum advantage.

Advance Transportation Planning Team. Three major City responsibilities—street engineering, traffic engineering, and city planning—are involved with the design, type, location, and timing of circulation improvements to meet the needs of traffic in any given area.

1. The allocations used in the first-year test of RAP were based on a special financial cabability study prepared as part of the 701 Project. The first level given to each function represented a realistic projection of existing financial resources. The second level included the first plus additional resources derived from some rate revisions and several new sources of revenue.
2. NDP replaces the conventional project approach to renewal with an approach that focuses on selected renewal actions that can be programmed and financed on a yearly basis. Actions can take place anywhere in the city as long as such actions are in an eligible urban renewal area. Local credits are captured in the urban renewal area in the same way as in conventional project areas.

To achieve solutions which would ensure maximum coordination and mutual understanding, a three-man Advance Transportation Planning Team was established as part of the 701 Project, with senior representatives from the departments dealing with these responsibilities. The Team worked well together and earned the confidence of the concerned departments through its findings and recommendations.

Many large and small circulation problems still remain for later consideration. The proposed 1985 major-trafficway network itself must be implemented, carefully reviewed, and revised as conditions change and new data become available. (This process will be facilitated by use of a computerized traffic-simulation model already prepared by the Team.)

A priority-rating system developed by the Team for programming improvements is the first step in the direction of objective scheduling, but needs to be improved. The system should be permanently incorporated into the RAP process, but it should be regularly evaluated and refined as necessary.

Continued, intensive transportation planning is certainly needed. As an ongoing entity the Advance Transportation Planning Team can continue to be effective but only if individual members can be freed from conflicting assignments. A permanent position should be assigned to the Team from each department.

Resource Allocation Program Team. When work began on the Capital Improvement Program phase of the 701 Project, the need became evident for concentrated central-staff work by both the Finance Department and the City Planning Department. A working team composed of personnel from both departments was then created which developed the Research Allocation Program. The RAP concept calls for the Program to become an annual study, but its procedures will still require continual refinement. This team approach has been effective and should be continued —with major control exercised by the Finance Department.

Manpower Coordinating Function. There are now in Oakland a wide range of programs aimed at job training, placement, and development. Many of these programs are making important contributions to the reduction of unemployment. However, the total effort lacks an overall framework and many individual programs compete for the same funds and frequently perform overlapping functions.

The City should assume the basic responsibility for this function and create an office within the City's administrative structure to undertake the important task of research, planning, and coordination. As soon as possible, the overall problem and alternate solutions should be discussed and a concerted, meaningful course of action taken. In addition, a local agency is needed to deal with problems of discrimination in existing employment practices and to help break down such barriers in the city.

Housing Coordination Function. Oakland's attempts to seek solutions to the city's housing problems pose, themselves, a serious problem. Many agencies within the city are concerned with one or more aspects of the total housing picture. But many aspects are dealt with by more than one agency, often in an overlapping or competing way. Some facets of the housing problem, too many in fact, receive no consideration at all.

Construction of new housing is handled mainly by private developers, but some new housing, including special housing for the elderly, is being built by nonprofit groups and the Housing Authority.

Housing subsidies for the low- and low-middle-income family are provided principally by the Federal government through direct programs as well as through the Housing Authority, the Redevelopment Agency, and the County Welfare Department.

Housing assistance, mainly relocation services and information, is provided by the Building and Housing Department, the Redevelopment Agency, and the Housing Authority.

Various kinds of controls over the quality of the housing supply and the residential environment are handled by the Building and Housing Department, the City Planning Department, and the Redevelopment Agency.

An impressive amount of effort is being expended in the housing field. But the *individual* concerns of all the agencies are, compared with the total picture, extremely limited. Which agency is totally knowledgeable about the range of housing aids now available from both Federal and local agencies? Which single agency can an individual with a housing problem turn to? Who knows the mortgage market and can make the information available? Who arranges for loans when public action insists on housing improvement? Who has money to lend to people who can't get loans elsewhere? Who is taking advantage of the self-help or "sweat-equity" programs now available? Which agency is responsible for filling the gaps in the city's housing supply? Which agency is in the business of promoting or sponsoring middle-income housing programs outside of redevelopment project areas? Who is helping to break down racial barriers that still linger in the community? And who is coordinating the overlapping objectives of those agencies now involved?

Probably the main difficulty lies in the lack of a total and basic commitment by the City to provide and improve housing for *all* the people of Oakland now and in the future. The announcement of such a policy is an essential first step toward the undertaking of a *total* housing plan for Oakland.

The second step is to determine the organizational structure best able to coordinate all efforts aimed at solving the total housing problem. Various alternatives would be the creation of a new housing office, the assignment of the major housing responsibility to an existing agency, or the assignment of new housing functions to an existing staff office. In any case, the designated agency should have the authority to prepare a total housing plan for Oakland, coordinate the efforts of all relevant agencies, assume new responsibilities as the need indicates, and,

in some cases, absorb some responsibilities from other agencies.

Recommendations

1. Continue the operations of the Advance Transportation Planning Team.

2. Continue the operations of the Resource Allocation Program Team.

3. Create an office within the City's administrative structure to handle the research, planning, and coordination for the many projects now associated with manpower training, job placement, and job development.

4. Create a local agency to deal with problems of discrimination in existing hiring practices and to help break down racial barriers associated with employment opportunities in the city.

5. Create or select an office to prepare a total housing plan for Oakland and to coordinate and initiate programs directed toward its effectuation.

NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING

Neighborhood planning is urgently needed in Oakland. Since decisions are almost constantly needed concerning programs, priorities, and allocation of resources, solid neighborhood/City contacts with some agreement as to basic neighborhood policy could help the overall decision-making process without conflict or bitterness.

In the traditional sense, small-area plans could be prepared by City staff alone, but experience has shown that their practical effect would be negligible. Without active involvement by neighborhood residents, neighborhood planning can easily produce tensions and hostilities within a neighborhood.

Much lip service has been paid to citizen participation, but the City has rarely been able to pursue a successful program in this direction. This lack of success may be because the City has not listened carefully or has been unwilling to provide an area of decision-making involvement to the neighborhood. The City needs to develop new techniques, which may vary from area to area, for establishing effective communication with its citizens.

It must be recognized that the *process* of neighborhood planning through citizen involvement is more important than the neighborhood *plan* itself, though such a plan would be highly valuable. This principle is especially important when both a plan and effective neighborhood support are insisted upon within a fixed period of time—a situation difficult to achieve.

Recommendations

1. Endorse a policy of devoting significant attention to neighborhoods and to establishing processes for improving communication between the City and neighborhood residents.

2. Find means of providing true involvement and a greater voice in the decision-making process to the neighborhoods themselves.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND DATA MAINTENANCE

Sound planning and decision-making depend on information. To be effective in his managerial and planning functions, the modern city official must be informed. It is not sufficient that the information exists; it must exist in a way that makes it useful and quickly available to the administrator.

Previous applications of data processing for the City have been directed primarily to financial and accounting functions. These types of applications are important, but they are limited to day-to-day operations.

Rapid growth in the activities of the City has required the handling of expanding volumes of data; more important, it has dictated the need for new kinds of data to plan adequately for an ever-changing environment and for the future needs of Oakland residents.

A major task of the 701 Project was to establish a computer-based system for accumulating, organizing, and reporting a variety of data collected during the Project to fulfill the need for better information. The Oakland Planning Information System (OPINS) resulted. Members of the Building and Housing Department, Fire Department, and City Planning Department as well as consultants to the 701 Project contributed substantial efforts to establishing this system.

OPINS is not intended as the ultimate in design or processing concepts. As with any undertaking of its kind, constraints of time and cost limited the scope and coverage of the system. For these reasons, OPINS is considered a first-generation planning information system. Many functions of the City that are important for planning and operational purposes are not covered. OPINS was designed, however, so that it can be adapted to future system growth, improved computer facilities, other data systems, and future changes in administrative and planning processes.

One important example of OPINS growth and adaptation is a data system—developed by the Advance Transportation Planning Team—relating to physical and operational aspects of the city street system. As an essential ingredient in the continuing process of planning, evaluating, and revising the circulation system, it should be implemented by the Team and integrated into OPINS as soon as feasible.

The City has recently established a Statistical Services Division. Officials had become increasingly aware of the need for a separate division which is capable of extending information-storage, handling, and reporting services to all City departments. The role of this division should extend well beyond a traditional accounting or payroll orientation. Handling requests for OPINS data could become an important function of the Division: as many as 12 to 15 departments, agencies, and organizations are expected to use information from OPINS.

At the present time, OPINS can provide the City with a

wealth of statistical data. However, rapid changes within the city will soon limit the usefulness of these data unless the City takes steps to reflect these changes through a file-maintenance routine as part of OPINS. Most of the data elements in OPINS are adaptable to updating from relatively few sources: the Alameda County tax assessment rolls, the City's building permits and business licenses, and special file-maintenance forms which permit manual inputting of miscellaneous changes to the files.

The process of initially collecting data and storing it on computer files has been a difficult and costly task. But the cost of continuing to update this information would be far less than the money already expended. The necessity for incurring these heavy initial costs again in future years can be largely avoided by maintaining the current system on an up-to-date basis.

Recommendations

1. Conduct a limited study to determine the necessary steps and the relative costs and benefits of modifying the City's existing building-permit and business-license procedures for the purpose of OPINS file maintenance.

2. Appoint an interdepartmental steering committee to consider the future form of OPINS and make recommendations which would include: the future expansion of the system; the incorporation of additional data elements, especially those dealing with the city street system; the integration of OPINS maintenance operations with other activities of affected departments so as to reduce duplicate effort; the means for retaining time-series data for historical purposes; the frequency of updating file elements; and the charges, if any, for using the system.

3. Assign control responsibility for OPINS input, maintenance, and subsequent file changes to the new Statistical Services Division.

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES

Planning and program development is a continuing process and the 701 Project, though taking a more comprehensive approach than ever done previously, is only one step in this process.

Quick and definitive solutions to Oakland's long-standing problems are not offered here. Rather, this report can only raise issues, suggest approaches, and stimulate discussion on solutions to these problems. This latter point is vital, for to be useful the report should be thoroughly discussed, not just by the people charged with governmental responsibility but by *all* citizens. The well-being of everyone is affected by these problems.

Only after thorough discussion and public hearings should policies be adopted, appropriate programs and projects undertaken, new coordinating functions initiated and integrated into the City's administrative structure, and additional studies authorized to find answers to open questions.

If the recommendations in this report are felt to be sound, certain actions and studies should then be authorized:

Comprehensive Development Plan. The concept of the Comprehensive Development Plan should be completely refined, with special concern for the relationship between the Policy Plan and the Development Program. The form, organization, and content of the Policy Plan should be carefully delineated; particular attention should be given to its relationship to the existing General Plan which it would supersede and to the newly-passed City Charter.

Resource Allocation Program. The procedures and approach of the Resource Allocation Program should be refined in accordance with any problems encountered in its first year of operation. Integration with the Neighborhood Development Program should also be accomplished in the near future.

City Housing Office. Further study should be undertaken on the structure and responsibilities of a City housing office.

Oakland Planning Information System. Studies should be made on the feasibility, methods, cost, and responsibilities of maintaining and updating the OPINS data files.

Neighborhood Studies. Programs should be initiated with the joint task of preparing neighborhood plans and of setting up effective channels of communication with neighborhood residents.

Strategy for Renewal and Public Improvements. An overall strategy for renewal and public improvements should be formulated, building upon the findings and policies presented in this report. Its preparation (integrated with the City's total Resource Allocation Program) should involve further analysis of area needs for renewal and improvement, the preparation of general plans for urban-renewal and concentrated-code-enforcement areas, and widespread discussion of goals and priorities. A timetable of specific renewal actions over the coming years would result.

Housing Studies. While the 701 Project covered the problems of housing in considerable depth, additional studies should be undertaken. There is a great potential for continued analysis based on available 701 data. In addition, the housing model developed in the Project should be refined in order to test alternate population and public-policy assumptions.

Economic and Manpower Analyses. Additional feasibility studies should be made of detailed economic sectors to provide greater insight into Oakland's highest economic potential. Continuing analyses of manpower needs and, concomitantly, of job-training requirements are also indicated.

Physical Development Follow-Up Actions

1. The proposed new Real Estate Division Regulations should be carried through all necessary steps to final review and adoption by the City Council.

2. Miscellaneous zoning text changes, as suggested in this report, should be detailed and presented to the Planning Commission for consideration.

3. The general rezoning proposals made here should be followed up with area-by-area studies, precise boundary designations, and public hearings.

Additional Physical Development Studies

1. A detailed street-categories plan should be prepared, defining such elements as the scale and design of planting, lighting, and street furniture for each level of street.

2. A detailed study of low-rise apartments should be made leading to new zoning text amendments and specific design review criteria.

3. A City-wide street tree planting program should be developed, reflecting guide lines suggested in this report.

4. Detailed feasibility studies and prototype designs should be prepared for creek development with particular attention given to coordination with Flood Control District work and the possibility of using Federal open-space and other funds for creek development.

5. Design plans should be made for areas which are undergoing major physical change, with a high priority given to BART-station-area plans that would build upon the impact studies done by the 701 Project.

6. Detailed analysis of local streets and pedestrianways should be undertaken during area- or neighborhood-level planning studies.

7. Further major circulation planning should be carried out, including especially additional study of public transportation needs, refinement of the street-improvement priority-rating system, and a thorough evaluation of the need for more freeways and their possible alignments.



PART II

POPULATION
AND
HOUSING

Chapter 3

POPULATION

The dynamic interaction between population trends and housing factors requires in-depth analysis of each subject. The changes occurring and anticipated in each require a fresh approach to the ever-present problems accruing to a city in transition.

CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTING POPULATION

Because several years had elapsed following the 1960 Census, and due to suspected changes in Oakland's population, Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of California was engaged to conduct an up-to-date Household Survey for the 701 Project. The information from the survey was similar to that available in the U.S. Census so that changes could be analyzed.[1]

For the 701 Household Survey (and for the 701 Project in general) Oakland was divided into seven "household areas":

Target Areas
- North Oakland (Area A)
- West Oakland (Area B)
- Fruitvale (Area C)
- East Oakland (Area D)

Non-Target Areas
- Hills (Area E)
- South Central Oakland (Area F)
- North Central Oakland (Area G)

The four Target Areas were officially designated as such under the Oakland anti-poverty program. Each of the Non-Target Areas is a section of the city with generally similar terrain and socio-economic characteristics (*Map A*).

The 1960 U.S. Census of Population provided information for 99 census tracts but the 701 Household Survey sample permitted reporting for only these seven areas. However, each of these seven areas is composed of whole census tracts so that valid comparisons can be made with available information from the 1960 Census and expected data from the 1970 Census.

POPULATION GROWTH

Between 1960 and 1966, Oakland's total population increased modestly from 367,500 to 373,500 persons, slightly reversing a downward trend during the 1950's (*Table 1*).

This six-year growth did not proceed evenly throughout Oakland. The three Non-Target Areas increased from 208,200 to 225,200—a gain of eight per cent; the

four Target Areas dropped from 159,300 to 148,200—a loss of seven per cent (*Table 2*).

This loss-gain situation is due principally to different rates of housing construction and demolition. In West Oakland, where demolition was most extensive, population declined by almost a fourth. North Oakland also experienced major demolition, and lost some 11 per cent of its residents.

All five other areas of Oakland registered population gains. The largest absolute increase occurred in the Hills, one of the two areas, with North Central Oakland, that have experienced a recent boom in residential construction.

ETHNIC TRANSITION

To understand these overall population changes better, the white and nonwhite populations should be examined separately. From 1950, the white population steadily declined at a somewhat faster rate than the nonwhite population grew. In the 1960's, the nonwhite population growth was heavy enough to more than offset the continuing white decline. The proportion of the population which was nonwhite rose from 14 per cent in 1950 to 26 per cent in 1960. By 1966, 35 per cent of the city's residents were nonwhite.

These changes become more sharply delineated when four ethnic groups are distinguished (*Table 3*):

1. white without Spanish surname *(white)*;[2]
2. white with Spanish surname;
3. black;
4. other nonwhite.

From 1960 to 1966, *whites* declined in number from 246,800 to 207,500—a decrease of 16 per cent. In the same period, the black population increased by 33 per cent; the other nonwhite population, primarily persons of Oriental descent, increased by 44 per cent; and the Spanish-surname population, the fastest growing minority group, increased by 51 per cent.

Despite their somewhat faster growth rates, whites with Spanish surnames and

TABLE 1

Total Population by Color: Oakland, 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1966

Color	1940	1950	1960	1966
Total	302,163	384,575	367,548	373,460
White	287,936	328,797	270,523	243,250
Nonwhite	14,227	55,778	97,025	130,220
Per Cent Nonwhite	4.7	14.5	26.4	34.9

Source. SRC-5.

TABLE 2

Total Population by Household Area: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Household Area	1960		1966		Per Cent Change
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
City Total	367,548	100.0	373,460	100.0	1.6
Target Areas	159,308	43.3	148,250	39.7	—7.0
A	28,893	7.9	25,650	6.9	—11.3
B	57,625	15.7	43,460	11.6	—24.6
C	39,563	10.7	41,160	11.0	4.0
D	33,225	9.0	37,990	10.2	14.3
Non-Target Areas	208,240	56.7	225,220	60.3	8.2
E	76,166	20.7	86,940	23.3	14.1
F	81,001	22.1	83,440	22.3	3.0
G	51,073	13.9	54,830	14.7	6.0

Source: SRC-3.

TABLE 3

Total Population by Ethnicity: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Ethnicity	1960	1966	Change	
			Number	Per Cent
Total	367,548	373,460	5,910	1.6
White without Spanish Surname	246,794	207,520	—39,270	—15.9
White with Spanish Surname	23,729	35,730	12,000	50.6
Black	83,618	110,850	27,230	32.6
Other Nonwhite	13,407	19,360	5,950	44.4

Source: SRC-5.

1. The 701 Household Survey, as its name implies, covered only the residents of housing units, i.e., the "household population." Excluded—except in the specially-made estimates of total population by ethnicity—were residents of group quarters (people living in quarters other than housing units, such as institutions, hospitals, and college dormitories). On the other hand, the 1960 Census figures generally refer to the *total* population. However, because group-quarters residents comprised only an estimated two per cent of Oakland's 1966 total population, their exclusion does not appreciably affect overall results.
2. In this chapter *white*, when italicized, means the first category only: white without Spanish surname.

MAP A

REPORTING AREAS OF THE 701 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY

BERKELEY

SAN PABLO AVE.

ADELINE ST.

TELEGRAPH AVE.

EMERY-VILLE

A

BROADWAY

WARREN FWY.

E

PIEDMONT

S.F.-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE

B

G

MAC ARTHUR BLVD.

FRUITVALE AVE.

C

F

ALAMEDA

FOOTHILL BLVD.

73rd AVE.

HIGH ST.

SAN LEANDRO ST.

98th AVE.

D

E. 14th ST.

MAC ARTHUR FWY.

NIMITZ FWY.

SAN LEANDRO

TARGET AREAS

A—NORTH OAKLAND

B—WEST OAKLAND

C—FRUITVALE

D—EAST OAKLAND

NON-TARGET AREAS

E—HILLS

F—SOUTH CENTRAL OAKLAND

G—NORTH CENTRAL OAKLAND

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

nonwhites other than blacks together still comprise only about 15 per cent of Oakland's total population.

As a result of all these changes, Oakland's total minority-group population—Spanish-surname whites plus blacks plus other nonwhites—increased from 33 to 44 per cent.

Changes in ethnic composition were also taking place in the Target and Non-Target Areas. In the Target Areas, the traditional residence of minorities, the minority-group population increased from 62 per cent in 1960 to 75 per cent in 1966 (*Figure I*).

The Non-Target Areas are at an earlier stage of ethnic transition: minorities accounted for 10 per cent in 1960 and 25 per cent six years later. This substantial shift, explained both by rising minority incomes and by faster rates of housing construction, broke down many earlier patterns of residential segregation.

Blacks remain the only ethnic group with a majority of its members in the Target Areas, but 21 per cent of the city's black residents now live in the Non-Target Areas.

FIGURE I

Total Population by Ethnicity and Area: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Source: SRC-5.

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS

Only a small proportion of Oakland's adult household residents are native Californians:

Age Group in Years	*Percentage California-Born*
0-9	84
10-19	72
20-29	41
30 or over	26

The over-30 age group has diverse geographic backgrounds. Ninety per cent of the black residents 30 years of age and over were born in the southern United States. The majority of other nonwhite residents in the same age group were born abroad, typically in Asia, while 33 per cent of the Spanish-surname whites were from Mexico and other foreign countries. While 33 per cent of Oakland's *white* population over 30 are California-born, 17 per cent were born abroad.

RECENT MOBILITY

Oakland's residents are highly mobile. In 1966, a quarter of the city's household population (five years of age and older) had moved into Oakland since 1961. More than another quarter had changed residence within the city during this period.

Since 1961, Oakland lost an estimated 87,500 out-migrants (persons who were living in Oakland in 1961 but had moved out by 1966) and gained 85,500 in-migrants. Population growth was still maintained because births in the city far exceeded deaths.

Of all in-migrants since 1961, the majority came from outside the San Francisco-Oakland area. Although black in-migration to Oakland in the past was often directly from the South, this is much less the case today. Only 5,800 (less than a third) of the blacks who moved into Oakland between 1961 and 1966 had been living in the South—a figure smaller than the total number of in-migrants to Oakland from foreign countries. Contrary to popular assumption, a slightly larger proportion of Oakland's *white* residents were recent in-migrants than were the black and Spanish-surname residents.

FIGURE II

Age-Sex Pyramid of the Household Population: Oakland, 1960 and 1966



Number of Persons in Thousands

Source: SRC-5.

The majority of both recent in-migrants and out-migrants were *white*—with out-migration so much greater than in-migration that the *white* population was substantially reduced. Approximately 50,000 *whites* moved in, but 75,000 *whites* moved out. This *white* exodus was disproportionately composed of families with minor children. It also appears that lower- and middle-income families have been more likely to move away. The higher-income *whites,* concentrated in the Hills and North Central Oakland, seem predisposed to remain there (or at least be replaced with others of similar income).

In contrast to the pattern for *whites*, net in-migration added to the three minority groups. Some 7,000 Spanish-surname whites moved into Oakland and less than 500 moved away. (Apparently, Oakland has become a terminal point of recent movements by this group.) The city gained 22,000 black in-migrants and lost 8,500 black out-migrants. Some 6,500 other nonwhites moved into the city, while 3,000 moved away.

The shifting ethnic profile of Oakland's various areas is partially explained by persons moving *within* the city, necessitated in part by major housing demolition in West Oakland and North Oakland. The major black movements were from West and North Oakland to East Oakland, Fruitvale, and South Central Oakland. Smaller numbers of blacks changed their residences to ones in North Central Oakland and the Hills.

The most important *white* movements, less in evidence because larger numbers were moving out of the city, were from the areas where West Oakland residents were moving in, and into South Central Oakland and the Hills.

AGE COMPOSITION

Several major changes are found in a 1960-1966 comparison of Oakland's population by age and by sex (*Figure II*).

Perhaps the most important fact in the six-year period was the significant decrease in the number of children under five years of age. Here, a recent drop in the birth rate, described below, was beginning to affect the city's age composition.

A second important change was the sizable increase in the number of women between 15 and 24, and a smaller increase in the number of men in the same age bracket. Much of this growth is explained by the addition to these categories of Oaklanders who were under 15 in 1960, but a significant part is due to the migration of young persons, particularly women, into the city. Many of these young in-migrants were *whites.* Interestingly, although the number of *white* persons in every other category declined between 1960 and 1966, the number of *white* women between 15 and 24 and of *white* men between 20 and 24 increased. The city continues to attract younger *white* persons in substantial numbers, although many of them leave when they marry and begin to raise children.

A substantial reduction in the number of persons in their thirties and forties has also occurred, due to the out-migration of *whites* in these age categories. As a result, Oakland's population now includes large numbers of both the young and the old but a disproportionately small number of people in the economically productive years of early middle age.

Since the major population gains between 1960 and 1966 took place in the

younger age brackets, the city's median age dropped—from 35.7 years to 31.9. The number of elderly residents, those 65 and over, stayed virtually unchanged but they now comprise a slightly smaller proportion of the population.

Oakland's *whites* tend to be older than the minority residents; in fact, between 1960 and 1966, the age gap widened. The median age of the *white* population increased from 41.2 to 42.3 years. At the same time the median age of nonwhites dropped from 25.5 to 22.2 years, and that of Spanish-surname whites from 26.0 to 22.1.

By 1966 at least two-fifths of each minority group were children, persons under 18, and almost four-fifths were under 45. By contrast only about one-fifth of the *white* residents were children, and more than one in six were at least 65 years old.

Looked at another way, *whites* comprise 85 per cent of the elderly and 64 per cent of the potential voters (21 and over). But a substantial majority of the city's children are members of minority groups; only 37 per cent are *white*.

TABLE 5

Median Years of School Completed by Ethnicity: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Ethnicity	Median Years of School Completed [a]	
	1960	1966
All persons 25 Years Old and Over	11.4	12.2
White	12.0	12.4
Without Spanish Surname	12.1	12.4
With Spanish Surname	8.9	9.9
Nonwhite	9.7	11.2
Black	[b]	11.0
Other Nonwhite	[b]	12.2

Source: SRC-5.

a. Figures for 1960 describe the total population. Those for 1966 describe the household population.
b. Not available for 1960.

BIRTHS AND FERTILITY

The birth rates of Oakland residents have followed the steady decline in the U.S. birth rate, although the reduction in both the white and nonwhite rates has been sharper than in the nation as a whole (*Table 4*).

The decrease in Oakland's nonwhite rate has been especially striking. In the 1960-1966 period, this rate fell from 30.9 to 21.5 live births per thousand population, a drop of more than 30 per cent. The city's white birth rate, which included Spanish-surname whites, dropped 25 per cent.

Birth rates can be misleading since they measure births per thousand people in the *total* population. In Oakland's case, the white population includes a disproportionate number of elderly people, while the nonwhite population contains proportionately more women of childbearing age. Fertility rates are more meaningful because they refer to the number of live births per 1,000 women of childbearing age (15 to 44).

Since 1960, the fertility rates of both white and nonwhite Oakland residents have declined, the nonwhite rate in 1966 falling below the white fertility rate six years earlier. But their relative positions remained about the same. With a rate about one-third above the white rate, the nonwhite population continued to hold a relative advantage in population growth.

TABLE 4

Birth and Fertility Rates by Color: Oakland and the United States, 1960 and 1966

Rate and Color	United States			Oakland		
	1960	1966	Per Cent Change	1960	1966	Per Cent Change
Birth Rates						
Total	23.7	18.4	—22.4	22.2	16.8	—24.3
White	22.7	17.4	—23.3	19.1	14.3	—25.1
Nonwhite	32.1	26.1	—18.7	30.9	21.5	—30.4
Fertility Rates						
Total	118.0	91.3	—22.6	113.4	82.2	—27.5
White	113.2	86.4	—23.7	102.8	73.2	—28.8
Nonwhite	153.6	125.9	—27.7	137.7	96.8	—29.7

Source: SRC-5.

TABLE 6

Median Family Income by Ethnicity: Oakland, 1959 and 1965

Ethnicity	Median Family Income		Change	
	1959	1965	Amount	Per Cent
Current Dollars				
All Families	$6,303	$7,925	$1,622	25.7
White	6,802	8,508	1,706	25.1
Without Spanish Surname	6,908	8,797	1,889	27.3
With Spanish Surname	5,731	6,518	787	13.7
Nonwhite	4,906	6,792	1,886	38.4
Constant (1959) Dollars				
All Families	$6,303	$7,320	$1,017	16.1
White	6,802	7,858	1,056	15.5
Without Spanish Surname	6,908	8,125	1,217	17.6
With Spanish Surname	5,731	6,020	289	5.0
Nonwhite	4,906	6,273	1,367	27.9

Source: SRC-5.

To compare fertility rates among the four ethnic groups, the only measure for which data are available is the fertility ratio—the number of children under five years old per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44.

This measure indicates that *white* and Spanish-surname residents differ widely in fertility. In 1966, the *white* group had the lowest ratio—307 children under five per 1,000 women. The Spanish-surname minority was at the other extreme with a ratio of 640. Blacks and other nonwhites were in between—555 and 489, respectively. The fertility ratio of all ethnic groups except Spanish-surname declined between 1960 and 1966. The Spanish-surname ratio increased from 604 to 640.

EDUCATION

The largest gains in median educational attainment between 1960 and 1966 were registered by the Spanish-surname and nonwhite populations (*Table 5*).

Nevertheless, major differences remain between the educational levels of Oakland's *white* and minority residents. By 1966, 64 per cent of the *white* residents 25 years of age and over were high school graduates, and 32 per cent had completed at least one year of college. By contrast, only 40 per cent of the black residents of the same age were high school graduates, and only 16 per cent had completed one or more years of college. The educational attainments of other nonwhites differ substantially from those of the black population, and more closely resemble those of the *whites*.

Spanish-surname citizens have the most severe educational handicaps of the minority groups. In 1966, their median attainment was slightly below a tenth-grade education. Only 36 per cent were high school graduates, and 44 per cent had ended their schooling at or before the eighth grade. With such educational deficiencies, employment opportunities are clearly limited.

In each ethnic group, younger persons typically had received a more complete education than older persons. Less than 20 per cent of black residents in their sixties were high school graduates, but the proportion increases as the age level goes down: 26 per cent in their fifties; 38 per cent, forties; 55 per cent, thirties; and 71 per cent, twenties. College training was also more common among younger than older black people.

Young *whites* still retained an appreciable advantage over young black per-

TABLE 7

Federal Poverty Limits by Family Size: 1966[a]

Number of Persons in Family	Maximum Family Income	Number of Persons in Family	Maximum Family Income
1	$1,600	8	$5,300
2	2,000	9	5,800
3	2,500	10	6,300
4	3,200	11	6,800
5	3,800	12	7,300
6	4,200	13 or More	7,800
7	4,700		

Source: SRC-2.

a. Based on U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Bureau of Work Programs. These limits may be regarded as approximations of the more elaborate Social Security poverty index utilized in Bureau of the Census reports.

sons in college education. More than half the *whites* between 20 and 29 had at least some college, and 24 per cent were college graduates. By contrast, only six per cent of the blacks in the same age bracket were college graduates, while a third had completed at least one year of college.

FAMILY INCOME

Between 1959 and 1965[1] the median income of Oakland's families[2] increased from $6,303 to $7,925—a gain of 26 per cent (16 per cent if expressed in 1959 dollars) and somewhat above the increase for the nation as a whole (*Table 6*).[3]

The various ethnic groups did not share equally in this income gain. The median income of *white* families increased 27 per cent (in current dollars), that of the Spanish-surname families only 14 per cent. Nonwhite families, which started with by far the lowest incomes in 1959, gained 38 per cent. The 1960 Census did not report incomes separately for black families; as a conservative estimate, however, their median income increased by at least 35 per cent.

The incomes of minority families remain, however, far below those of *white* families. In 1965 the median income of *white* families was about $8,800, that of black families $6,600, and that of Spanish-surname families $6,500. The median income of other nonwhite families ($8,100) more closely approximates that of *white* families. Similarly, the median income of families in the Target Areas was about $6,100, only two-thirds of the $9,200 median in the Non-Target Areas.

Recent gains in black family incomes may be attributed, in part, to the declining unemployment rate among nonwhite males and the growing proportion of blacks in better-paying jobs. Black families are also increasing the number of their family members who work; in fact, in 1965 black families averaged 1.51 employed persons per family compared with 1.39 for *whites*. Another 1965 comparison:

TABLE 8
Total and Poverty-Level Household Population by Ethnicity and Area: Oakland, 1966

Ethnicity	Household Population				
	Total		Below Federal Poverty Level[a]		Poverty Rate (Per Cent)
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
City Total					
Total Persons	365,490	100	46,720	100	13
White without Spanish Surname	201,180	55	14,560	31	7
White with Spanish Surname	35,200	10	6,630	14	19
Black	110,050	30	23,860	51	22
Other Nonwhite	19,060	5	1,670	4	9
Target Areas					
Total Persons	145,160	100	34,050	100	24
White without Spanish Surname	35,480	24	5,300	16	15
White with Spanish Surname	15,690	11	4,860	14	31
Black	86,400	60	22,570	66	26
Other Nonwhite	7,590	5	1,330	4	18
Non-Target Areas					
Total Persons	220,330	100	12,670	100	6
White without Spanish Surname	165,700	75	9,270	73	6
White with Spanish Surname	19,510	9	1,770	14	9
Black	23,650	11	1,290	10	5
Other Nonwhite	11,470	5	346	3	3

Source: SRC-2.
a. See Table 7 for poverty-level limits.

Number of Family Members Who Work

Black	*Income*	*White*
2	about equals	1
3	exceeds	2

A sizable proportion of Oakland's black families have quite respectable incomes. Some 23 per cent had incomes of $10,000 or more in 1965, a larger number of families than those with incomes below the Federal poverty level. This comparison is also true for Spanish-surname families.

POVERTY

Family income by itself can be a misleading indicator of economic circumstances, for it fails to take family size into account. In this section, Oakland's poor are identified by a series of Federal income limits related to family size (*Table 7*). These limits represent incomes just sufficient to maintain a minimum nutritionally sound diet while allowing for other needs.

By this standard, some 47,000 or 13 per cent of Oakland's household residents were poor in 1966 (*Table 8*). In the

1. Both the 1960 Census and the 701 Household Survey in 1966 reported income from the preceding calendar year.
2. In this instance, families exclude one-person families, sometimes called "unrelated individuals."
3. Further income data for 1966 are provided by Table 19.

TABLE 9

Family Poverty Rates by Ethnicity and Sex of Head (Percentages): Oakland, 1966

Sex of Family Head	Total [a]	White without Spanish Surname	White with Spanish Surname	Black
All Families	9	5	13	16
Male Head	7	4	13	10
Female Head	20	8	[b]	37

Source: SRC 1

a. Total includes "other nonwhites" not shown separately.
b. Not reported due to inadequate sample size.

Target Areas, where nearly three-fourths of the city's poor lived, almost a fourth of the residents were below the poverty level. In the Non-Target Areas, only six per cent were poor, but the majority of these poor resided in South Central Oakland, where one resident in eleven was living in poverty.

The figures in this section, based on the strict Federal definition of poverty, are best regarded as *minimum* estimates. With the more liberal definition used by the Oakland Economic Development Council, Inc., the number of Oakland's poor was about 74,000 people—a fifth of the entire household population.

With the city's lowest incomes, the black and Spanish-surname minorities comprised a disproportionate share of the poor. Their larger family size also contributed to the higher incidence of poverty. The incidence among blacks was three times that among *whites*, while the Spanish-surname rate was only slightly below the black rate. Of Oakland's total poor, 31 per cent were *whites*, 14 per cent were Spanish-surname whites, 51 per cent were blacks, and four per cent other nonwhites.

More than half (51 per cent) of Oakland's poor were children (persons 18 years of age and under) in 1966. About a fifth of the city's children—in the Target Areas, more than a third—were in families below the Federal poverty level. As mounting evidence seems to show, if deprivations experienced early in life have lasting effects on health, job opportunities, and personality, the prospects for many of Oakland's future citizens are not bright.

The poverty rate was also higher than average for elderly persons, those 65 and over. About 16 per cent of Oakland's senior citizens were living in poverty.

Almost half (48 per cent) of the poor were members of families with at least six persons. Indeed, the incidence of poverty rose steadily with family size.

Poverty was also much more common among families with a female head. Such families have a more difficult time supporting themselves, particularly if young children require continuous care. An especially high poverty rate, fully a third (48 per cent if black), occurred in families with a female head under 45 years of age.

In Oakland, as in the nation, a larger proportion of black families (23 per cent) had a female head than did *white* (12 per cent) or Spanish-surname (10 per cent) families. And some 37 per cent of these black families were poor (*Table 9*).

Families with a female head accounted for a very large share of black poverty in Oakland. About half (51 per cent) of poor black families had a female head. This compared with 20 per cent for *white* and eight per cent for poor Spanish-surname families.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FUTURE POPULATION

The preceding section was concerned with Oakland's present population. Starting with these existing data, Stanford Research Institute (SRI) projected the information to 1985, under varying assumptions, to derive future population growth, ethnic changes, and other demographic characteristics.

TOTAL POPULATION BY COLOR AND AGE

Total population was first divided by Stanford Research Institute into two groups with the following labels:

1. black;
2. white (but including "other nonwhite" as well).

For each of these color groups a "high" and a "low" projection were made for each five-year age group, to 1975 and 1985.[1]

The high-black (HB) and low-white (LW) projections assumed a continuation of trends since 1950 in each color group's birth and migration rates. The low-black (LB) projection postulated a decline in birth and in-migration rates. The high-white (HW) projection assumed a stabilization of the white population through a reversal of its out-migration trends.

The results of these highs and lows indicate that in any case the median age of the black population (19.5 to 19.7 years in 1975, and 19.0 to 21.0 years in 1985) will still be below that of all other groups (33.5 to 34.9 years in 1975, and 31.1 to 32.0 years in 1985) (*Table 10*).

The two highs and two lows were combined to form four different projec-

1. The "cohort survival" technique was used for this process. This section will not attempt to describe the intricate projection techniques used by Stanford Research Institute. However, the material presented will parallel the actual sequence followed by SRI.

tions of total population:

1. low-white/low-black (LWLB);
2. low-white/high-black (LWHB);
3. high-white/low-black (HWLB);
4. high-white/high-black (HWHB).

The total population, which was 374,000 in 1966, could range from 392,000 to 444,000 by 1975, and from 427,000 to 642,000 by 1985. The percentage black, 30 per cent in 1966, could range from 39 to 45 per cent by 1975, and from 43 to 64 per cent by 1985 (*Table 11*).

The balance of this section will present data for only the two combinations most likely to be realized: the trend projection LWHB and the LWLB projection which, although deviating from longer-run trends, has some basis in recent changes in birth and migration rates. The HWHB projection was rejected by SRI as totally unrealistic because of its extremely high growth rate. HWLB, for which SRI made complete projections but which is omitted here, implies a complete and unlikely reversal of trends.

Under either of the two likely projections, Oakland's total population will become considerably younger. The overall median age of 35.7 in 1960 and 31.9 in 1966 will drop to 25.8 to 29.4 in 1975, and 22.5 to 24.0 in 1985 (*Table 12*). The percentage of the population under 18 years of age, less than 30 per cent in 1960 and more than 31 per cent in 1966, will be 35 to 37 per cent in 1975, and 38 to 42 per cent in 1985.

TABLE 10

Total Population in Age Groups by Color: Oakland, 1975 and 1985
(Thousands)

Age Group (Years)	Black				Other			
	1975 Projections		1985 Projections		1975 Projections		1985 Projections	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Total	166.2	185.8	228.4	357.7	225.7	258.1	198.8	294.7
Under 5	25.4	28.5	29.3	57.8	19.3	20.7	18.4	27.8
5-9	22.1	24.2	28.3	50.7	17.1	19.5	16.3	25.3
10-14	19.7	20.6	30.6	41.0	16.2	19.7	15.7	24.8
15-19	17.9	21.5	25.9	36.1	16.7	19.1	16.5	24.4
20-24	17.4	20.7	24.5	32.5	15.8	20.3	16.1	24.3
25-29	16.4	16.0	22.3	32.6	17.5	19.1	14.3	20.5
30-34	8.3	10.0	19.3	29.8	12.6	15.3	12.8	19.9
35-39	6.0	7.1	11.3	20.0	9.8	12.3	11.8	19.9
40-44	5.5	5.9	8.1	10.7	8.8	11.2	9.0	15.7
45-49	6.1	5.8	5.2	7.1	10.1	12.3	7.3	17.6
50-54	6.3	6.1	4.8	5.5	12.7	14.4	7.0	12.2
55-59	5.4	6.0	5.1	5.3	13.0	15.4	7.8	11.9
60-64	4.1	4.8	4.7	5.6	15.9	16.4	10.0	12.2
65-69	2.6	3.3	3.7	4.8	13.9	14.3	9.6	10.8
70-74	1.7	2.4	2.9	3.8	9.4	10.8	9.4	10.0
Over 75	1.4	2.8	2.5	4.5	17.0	17.2	16.9	17.4
Median Age	19.5	19.7	21.0	19.0	34.9	33.5	32.0	31.1

Source: SRI-1.

FAMILIES BY COLOR

SRI next converted its 1985 projections of total population to projections of household population by subtracting out an estimate of group-quarters residents from each color and age group. It then converted the remaining population into numbers of families.[1] As a result, total families, 141,000 in 1966, are projected to become 137,000 in 1985 under the low projection and 162,000 under the high (*Table 13*).

An obvious divergence occurs between projected changes in household population and in the number of families. For example, for the LWLB projection, a 1966 to 1985 household-population increase of almost 55,000 people is accompanied by a decrease of more than 4,000 families.

The major cause of this divergence is that the black percentage of the population is projected to increase, and black households are significantly larger than white households. The white population has a higher proportion of people in the over-55 age group and, within each age group, more whites than blacks live as one-person and childless families.

Not only was the average black household size larger to begin with in 1966, it is expected to get larger in the future. The average family size for blacks goes from 3.3 in 1966 to 3.6 to 4.0 in 1985; the white (or other-than-black) shift is only up from 2.4 to 2.5 in the same period. Because of this, the black percentage of household *population* in 1985 will range from 52 to 64 per cent, while the black percentage of *families* will range from 44 to 53 per cent.

FAMILIES BY SIZE AND AGE OF HEAD

The projected total number of families were then divided into four size categories:

1. one-person families (synonymous with unrelated individuals);
2. two-or-more-person families without children;

1. The household population projected to 1985 for each color and age group was divided by its estimated 1966 headship rate (the ratio of population to number of families for each color-age group) to arrive at the number of families in each group. "Families" from here on will include one-person families previously referred to as unrelated individuals.

TABLE 11

Total Population by Color: Oakland, 1950, 1960, 1966, 1975, and 1985

Color	1950	1960	1966	1975 Projections LWLB	1975 Projections LWHB	1975 Projections HWLB	1975 Projections HWHB	1985 Projections LWLB	1985 Projections LWHB	1985 Projections HWLB	1985 Projections HWHB
Total											
Number (Thousands)	384.6	367.5	373.5	391.8	411.5	424.2	443.9	427.3	546.6	523.2	642.5
Per Cent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Black											
Number (Thousands)	47.6	83.6	110.8	166.2	185.8	166.2	185.8	228.4	347.7	228.4	347.7
Per Cent	12	23	30	42	45	39	42	53	64	43	54
Other											
Number (Thousands)	337.0	283.9	262.7	225.7	225.7	258.1	258.1	198.8	198.8	294.7	294.7
Per Cent	38	77	70	58	55	61	58	47	36	57	46

Sources: SRC-3 and Table 10.

TABLE 12

Total Population by Age: Oakland, 1960, 1975, and 1985

Age (Years)	1960	1975 Projections LWLB	1975 Projections LWHB	1985 Projections LWLB	1985 Projections LWHB
Total					
Number (Thousands)	367.5	391.8	411.5	427.3	546.6
Per Cent	100	100	100	100	100
Under 6					
Number (Thousands)	41.2	52.5	56.1	56.5	89.6
Per Cent	11	13	14	13	16
6-17					
Number (Thousands)	65.9	87.9	94.8	107.5	141.9
Per Cent	18	22	23	25	26
18-64					
Number (Thousands)	214.5	205.5	219.4	218.3	266.1
Per Cent	58	53	53	51	49
Over 65					
Number (Thousands)	46.0	45.9	41.2	45.0	49.0
Per Cent	13	12	10	11	9
Median Age	35.7	29.4	25.8	24.0	22.5

Sources: SRC-3 and Table 10.

3. families with one to three children (children being defined as persons under 18);
4. families with four or more children.[1]

The results of this step show the number and relative importance of large families increasing, while those of small families decrease (*Table 14*). The two family-with-children categories, which represented 32 per cent of all families in 1966, are projected to comprise from 39 to 42 per cent in 1985.

To anticipate the special attention required for housing the elderly, the number of families in each group were further broken down as follows:

1. family head over 65 years of age;
2. family head under 65 years of age.[2]

Overall, little change is expected in the over-65 group (31,000, or 22 per cent of all families, in 1966; 31,000 to 34,000 families, or 21 to 23 per cent, in 1985). The black percentage of all over-65 families is projected to increase from 10 per cent in 1966 to 19 to 25 per cent in 1985 (*Table 15*).

1. This distribution by family size for the projected number of 1985 families followed the 1966 distribution with several alterations that reflect recent changing patterns.
2. For the last two family-size categories, those with children, the family head was always assumed to be under 65.

TABLE 13

Household Population and Families by Color: Oakland, 1966 and 1985

Color of Family Head	1966					1985 — LWLB Projection					1985 — LWHB Projection				
	Population		Families			Population		Families			Population		Families		
	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Persons per Family	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Persons per Family	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Persons per Family
Total	365.5	100	141.2	100	2.6	419.3	100	136.9	100	3.1	538.6	100	162.2	100	3.3
Black	110.0	30	33.2	24	3.3	218.4	52	60.5	44	3.6	346.7	64	85.8	53	4.0
Other	255.4	70	108.0	76	2.4	191.8	48	76.4	56	2.5	191.8	36	76.4	47	2.5

Source: SRI-1.

TABLE 14

Families by Size: Oakland, 1966 and 1985

Family Size	1966			1985 — LWLB Projection			1985 — LWHB Projection		
	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Per Cent Black	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Per Cent Black	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Per Cent Black
Total	141.2	100	24	136.9	100	44	162.2	100	53
1 Person	45.0	32	16	38.9	28	31	43.2	27	38
2 or More Persons, No Children	50.3	36	17	44.9	33	37	51.2	32	45
1-3 Children	36.0	25	31	39.9	29	56	49.8	31	65
4 or More Children	9.8	7	53	13.2	10	70	18.0	11	78

Source: SRI-1.

TABLE 15

Families by Age of Head: Oakland, 1966 and 1985

Age of Head	1966				1985 — LWLB Projection				1985 — LWHB Projection			
	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Per Cent Black	Per Cent 1-Person Families	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Per Cent Black	Per Cent 1-Person Families	Number (Thousands)	Per Cent	Per Cent Black	Per Cent 1-Person Families
Total	141.2	100	24	32	136.9	100	44	28	162.2	100	53	27
Under 65	110.1	78	27	27	105.5	77	52	22	128.5	79	60	21
65 or Over	31.0	22	10	51	31.4	23	19	49	33.7	21	25	48

Source: SRI-1.

TABLE 16

Families by Income: Oakland, 1966 and 1985

1965 Family Income	1966 Number (Thousands)	1966 Per Cent	1966 Per Cent Black	1966 Per Cent with Age of Head 65 or Over	1985—LWLB Projection Number (Thousands)	1985—LWLB Projection Per Cent	1985—LWLB Projection Per Cent Black	1985—LWLB Projection Per Cent with Age of Head 65 or Over	1985—LWHB Projection Number (Thousands)	1985—LWHB Projection Per Cent	1985—LWHB Projection Per Cent Black	1985—LWHB Projection Per Cent with Age of Head 65 or Over
Total	141.2	100	24	22	136.9	100	44	23	162.2	100	53	21
$ 0- 3,999	39.6	28	26	47	20.0	15	32	58	22.5	14	39	54
$ 4,000- 7,999	47.5	34	27	15	30.1	22	48	32	36.1	22	57	30
$ 8,000-14,999	43.7	31	21	9	47.9	35	41	12	56.1	35	50	11
$15,000 or More	10.4	7	10		38.9	28	52		47.5	29	60	

Source: SRI-1.

FAMILIES BY INCOME

Each family group defined so far (by family size, color, and age of head) was broken down still further into four annual-family-income categories:

1. under $4,000;
2. $4,000 to $7,999;
3. $8,000 to $14,999;
4. $15,000 or more.[1]

Annual growth rates in real income (income measured in 1965 dollars) were applied to the 1965 income of each family in Oakland, resulting in a new distribution of family income in 1985 (*Table 16*).[2]

The most striking feature of a comparison between the 1965 and 1985 distributions is the dramatic increase in the number and proportion of families in the two highest income categories. In effect, these projections show that Oakland has the potential of becoming much more of a middle-income community than it was in 1965.

Black families are projected to share substantially in these income gains. They formed only 21 and 10 per cent, respectively, of the two highest categories in 1965, but move up to 41 to 50 per cent and 52 to 60 per cent in 1985. This

TABLE 17

Families by Size and Income (Percentages): Oakland, 1966 and 1985

1965 Family Income	1-Person Families 1966	1-Person Families 1985 Projections LWLB	1-Person Families 1985 Projections LWHB	2-or-More-Person Families, No Children 1966	2-or-More-Person Families, No Children 1985 Projections LWLB	2-or-More-Person Families, No Children 1985 Projections LWHB	Families with 1-3 Children 1966	Families with 1-3 Children 1985 Projections LWLB	Families with 1-3 Children 1985 Projections LWHB	Families with 4 or More Children 1966	Families with 4 or More Children 1985 Projections LWLB	Families with 4 or More Children 1985 Projections LWHB
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
$ 0- 3,999 . . .	49	36	35	19	7	7	15	6	6	22	3	3
$ 4,000- 7,999 . . .	36	30	31	30	20	20	33	16	16	45	26	26
$ 8,000-14,999 . . .	14	27	26	41	42	42	41	34	33	24	39	39
$15,000 or More . . .	1	7	8	10	31	31	11	44	45	9	32	32

Source: SRI-1.

1. Families whose head was over 65 were placed in only the first three categories since so few had annual incomes over $15,000 in 1965.
2. These growth rates were based on a continuation of rising income-per-capita trends and secondary-family-earner trends along with varying assumptions on the income level of families migrating to and from Oakland.

TABLE 18

Families and Household Population by Household Area: Oakland, 1966 and 1985

	City Total	Target Areas					Non-Target Areas			
		Total	A	B	C	D	Total	E	F	G
1966										
Families (Thousands)	141.2	52.7	10.2	18.1	14.5	9.9	88.5	28.6	31.1	28.7
Per Cent by Area	100	37	7	13	10	7	63	20	22	20
Per Cent Black	24	51	63	56	25	67	7	5	13	4
Per Cent with Income Over $8,000	38	23	24	14	28	28	48	68	39	37
Household Population (Thousands)	365.5	145.2	25.5	41.7	40.1	37.9	220.3	85.5	81.3	53.5
Per Cent Under 18 Years	31	39	30	35	38	49	27	29	29	18
1985 LWLB Projection										
Families (Thousands)	136.9	44.1	9.4	12.7	12.0	10.0	92.8	33.5	29.0	30.3
Per Cent by Area	100	32	7	9	9	7	68	24	21	22
Per Cent Black	44	57	65	54	43	71	38	36	44	35
Per Cent with Income Over $8,000	63	52	60	39	50	64	69	83	61	60
Household Population (Thousands)	419.3	148.8	29.7	34.6	35.8	48.6	270.5	121.7	89.5	59.3
Per Cent Under 18 Years	36	45	38	40	41	57	31	34	37	19
1985 LWHB Projection										
Families (Thousands)	162.2	52.1	11.4	14.9	14.5	11.3	110.1	41.8	34.3	34.0
Per Cent by Area	100	32	7	9	9	7	68	26	21	21
Per Cent Black	53	64	71	61	53	74	48	48	52	42
Per Cent with Income Over $8,000	64	50	54	35	52	62	71	85	61	62
Household Population (Thousands)	538.6	185.9	36.1	42.0	48.5	59.3	352.7	168.0	113.6	71.1
Per Cent Under 18 Years	40	48	37	42	47	60	36	39	40	24

Source: SRI-1.

increase is a reflection not only of the more rapid increase in incomes expected for black households,[1] but also of the basic assumption of the projections concerning the continuing out-migration of middle-income whites. Thus the predominantly middle-income community that Oakland is projected to become will be, to a much larger extent than in 1965, based on a black middle-income population.

These middle-income black families may possibly start moving out to the suburbs at the same rate as middle-income white families. Thus these high income projections may only be realized if housing and City services in Oakland can adjust to the demands of higher income families.

Projections were also made of the number of poor families that will exist in Oakland by 1985. According to the definitions used by SRI,[2] 50,000 families (including one-person families) were poor in 1966, but the number is projected to decrease to around 30,000 families, a 40 per cent reduction (*Table 33 in Chapter 4*). This ratio applied to the actual number of poor in 1966 according to the official Federal definition results in 28,000 persons as members of 10,000 poverty-stricken families by 1985.

FAMILIES BY SIZE AND INCOME

All family-size groups are projected to register income gains by 1985 (*Table 17*). The percentage of each group with annual incomes under $8,000 will be dramatically reduced—with the reduction more significant as the size of the family increases. This reduction presumably reflects the increasing number of secondary wage earners in the family as well as a general increase in earning power.

Although the per cent of one-person families earning over $8,000 will more than double, some 36 per cent of this group, many of them elderly, will still

1. The projected income growth rates assume a continuation of increases in black educational attainment and black integration into the better paying jobs.
2. Since the income categories used had a wide span, refined poverty standards similar to the Federal definition used earlier in the chapter were not possible. For purposes of the SRI study, the poor were defined as any family with annual income under $4,000; any one-to-three-child family with income under $6,000; and any four-or-more-child family under $8,000.

TABLE 19

Families by Color, Income, Age of Head, and Size: Oakland, 1966 and 1985
(Thousands)

Color of Family Head	1965 Family Income	Total Families			Head Less than 65 Years Old												Head 65 Years or Older					
					1-Person Families			2-or-More-Person Families, No Children			Families with 1-3 Children			Families with 4 or More Children			1-Person Families			2-or-More-Person Families		
			1985 Projections			1985 Projections			1985 Projections			1985 Projections			1985 Projections			1985 Projections			1985 Projections	
		1966	LWLB	LWHB	1966	LWLB	LWHB	1966	LWLB	LWHB	1966	LWLB	LWHB	1966	LWLB	LWHB	1966	LWLB	LWHB	1966	LWLB	LWHB
Total	Total	141.2	136.9	162.2	29.3	23.6	26.9	35.0	28.9	33.7	36.0	39.9	49.8	9.8	13.2	18.0	15.8	15.3	16.2	15.3	16.0	17.5
	$ 0- 3,999	39.6	20.0	22.5	9.3	5.1	6.0	3.8	0.7	0.8	5.5	2.4	3.1	2.2	0.4	0.5	12.9	8.9	9.3	5.9	2.6	2.8
	$ 4,000- 7,999	47.5	30.1	36.1	13.9	7.5	8.9	10.2	3.2	3.7	11.8	6.4	8.1	4.4	3.4	4.6	2.3	4.0	4.4	5.0	5.6	6.3
	$ 8,000-14,999	43.7	47.9	56.1	5.5	8.1	8.7	16.2	11.0	13.1	14.6	13.4	16.4	2.4	5.2	7.1	0.6	2.5	2.6	4.4	7.8	8.4
	$15,000 or More	10.4	38.9	47.5	0.6	2.9	3.3	4.8	14.0	16.2	4.1	17.7	22.2	0.8	4.2	5.8						
Black	Total	33.2	60.5	85.8	6.1	9.6	13.0	7.4	13.1	17.9	11.2	22.5	32.5	5.2	9.3	14.1	1.3	2.4	3.3	1.9	3.7	5.1
	$ 0- 3,999	10.4	6.4	8.8	3.4	2.4	3.3	1.0	0.2	0.3	2.4	1.9	2.6	1.4	0.3	0.4	1.0	1.1	1.5	1.1	0.5	0.7
	$ 4,000- 7,999	12.6	14.5	20.5	1.8	3.9	5.3	3.2	1.5	2.0	4.1	3.8	5.5	2.5	2.4	3.6	0.3	1.0	1.4	0.6	1.9	2.6
	$ 8,000-14,999	9.2	19.5	27.8	0.8	2.0	2.7	2.7	5.6	7.6	4.2	6.8	9.7	1.2	3.6	5.5	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2	1.3	1.8
	$15,000 or More	1.0	20.1	28.6	0.1	1.2	1.6	0.4	5.8	7.9	0.4	10.0	14.6	0.1	3.0	4.6						
Other	Total	108.0	76.4	76.4	23.2	14.0	14.0	27.6	15.8	15.8	24.8	17.4	17.4	4.6	3.9	3.9	14.4	13.0	13.0	13.4	12.3	12.3
	$ 0- 3,999	29.2	13.6	13.6	6.0	2.7	2.7	2.8	0.5	0.5	3.1	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.1	0.1	11.8	7.8	7.8	4.8	2.1	2.1
	$ 4,000- 7,999	34.9	15.6	15.6	12.1	3.6	3.6	6.9	1.7	1.7	7.6	2.6	2.6	1.9	1.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	4.4	3.7	3.7
	$ 8,000-14,999	34.5	28.4	28.4	4.6	6.0	6.0	13.5	5.4	5.4	10.4	6.6	6.6	1.2	1.6	1.6	0.6	2.2	2.2	4.2	6.5	6.5
	$15,000 or More	9.3	18.8	18.8	0.5	1.7	1.7	4.4	8.2	8.2	3.7	7.7	7.7	0.7	1.2	1.2						

Source: SRI-1.

have yearly incomes less than $4,000 in 1985. As a result, half the number of families projected to be poor in 1985 will be one-person families, half of whom, in turn, will be white over 65 years of age.

Two-or-more-person families without children will experience their greatest reduction in the income range under $4,000. Their greatest gain will occur in the over-$15,000 income category—which will be triple the 1965 rate. Only about 12 per cent of the total poor families in 1985 will come from two-or-more-person families, most of whom will be white and over 65.

Families with one to three children will show reductions in the three income levels under $15,000 by 1985—most pointedly in the category under $8,000. However, 45 per cent of these families are projected to earn $15,000 or more per year, four times the proportion in 1965, and 80 per cent over $8,000. Nevertheless, about 21 per cent of the poor will be from this family size.

Of all family sizes, those with four or more children show the greatest reduction in the under-$8,000 categories—especially under $4,000—and the greatest increase in the over-$8,000 categories. However, almost 30 per cent still are projected to have incomes under $8,000 by 1985—not a very high income for a large family. Accordingly, 15 per cent of the projected number of poor families

in 1985 will be large.

FAMILIES BY AREAS

With alternative projections made for each of 44 socio-economic family types (*Table 19*), the final step was their distribution to Oakland's seven household areas[1] and their conversion back to household population by age group for each area (*Table 18*).

For both projections, declines or relatively minor gains are shown in each of the Target Areas and in South Central Oakland (Area F), but major growth is shown in the Hills (Area E) and North Central Oakland (Area G). In 1985 most areas will retain their 1966 share of the city's families—with two exceptions.

1. West Oakland (Area B) drops from 13 per cent of the total to 9 per cent.

2. The Hills increases from 20 per cent to around 25 per cent.

The proportion of families which are black, which varied greatly between areas in 1966, will probably be much more equalized by 1985. Under the low (LWLB) projection, no area has less than 35 per cent nor more than 71 per cent of its families black. For the high (LWHB) projection, the range is from 42 to 74 per cent. These redistributions reflect the higher number of black families in the city, their higher incomes, and the assumed lowering of barriers preventing black families from moving to areas of better housing.

Similarly, all areas show a dramatic increase from 1966 to 1985 in the proportion of families earning over $8,000. Only the Hills and West Oakland deviate significantly from the city-wide proportion of families in the upper income brackets.

In converting families to household population for each area, a critical question arises concerning the future distribution of the school-age population. Except for East Oakland (Area D) and North Central Oakland, all areas are expected to stay quite close to the city-wide percentage of persons under 18, which increases significantly from 31 per cent in 1966 to a 1985 range from 36 to 40 per cent. These same areas, however, were exceptions in 1966.

GENERAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Dramatic population changes have occurred or are projected in Oakland which have profound implications for what the city should do now or what it should prepare to do. Some general conclusions are presented here. Specific implications concerning housing, jobs, and physical development are discussed in the remainder of this report.

POPULATION GROWTH

If previous population trends continue, growth rates will accelerate:

1960 to 1966—less than 2 per cent;
1966 to 1975—about 10 per cent;
1975 to 1985—about 33 per cent.

As a result, Oakland could experience a net gain of 173,000 people in the 19-year period from 1966 to 1985. Although a possible lower projection would yield only a 54,000-person increase, Oakland will still be accommodating a lot more people.

This additional population will require substantial housing additions (discussed in the next chapter). It will also need proportionate increases in municipal services, the groundwork for which should be started now. The requisite land to accommodate this increase is available and sufficient to keep residential densities within desirable limits (to be covered in greater detail in Chapter 7).

ETHNIC CHANGES

The overall population growth in Oakland will actually consist of a gain in black residents and a loss in the rest of the population. Trends indicate that black residents, 30 per cent in 1966, will constitute 64 per cent of the population by 1985. At that time some 73 per cent of the school-age population and 69 per cent of all families with children are likely to be black.

Even under assumptions which completely reverse present trends, 43 per cent of the population will be black by 1985. The city's political institutions, including both City government and the Oakland Board of Education, will undoubtedly reflect this racial make-up. Public recognition of these trends may well alleviate tensions that might otherwise result from this political transition.

CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN

By 1985, present trends indicate that persons under 18 years of age will jump from 31 per cent of the population to 42 per cent—with the number of children more than double the 1966 young population. Even under the low projection, the number of children will increase by more than 50 per cent. In any case, Oakland will become much more youth-oriented than today.

Even if present levels of service for children were adequate, the number of such facilities as playgrounds and classrooms might require doubling. A younger population also implies a disproportionate increase in automobile usage, especially for recreational trips. Similarly, families with children will increase in importance, with the number of such families increasing by 50 per cent. Thus an increasing number of parents will be asking and possibly demanding that these necessary facilities be provided.

FAMILY SIZE

Not only will the number of families with children increase significantly, but average family size is also projected to increase by 1985. Under the trend projection, total families will increase by only 15 per cent, but families with one to three children will increase by more than a third and those with four or more children will nearly double. These increases

1. SRI obtained this information as a by-product of its projections of housing requirements as discussed in the next chapter.

will have a marked impact on the types of housing required in the future (as discussed in detail in Chapter 4).

THE ELDERLY

Both the number of persons over 65 years of age and the number of families whose head is over 65 are projected to remain about the same as now. Still—with around 50,000 people in this age bracket—the special problems of the elderly, both now and in the future, will require special attention. Because the number of elderly is not projected to increase, demands may be made for a higher *quality*, rather than *quantity*, of housing and municipal services.

FAMILY INCOME

Family incomes in Oakland are projected to escalate dramatically by 1985. Median family income will increase by two-thirds (in 1965 dollars), the number of families earning over $8,000 will almost double, and those with incomes over $15,000 will increase almost five-fold. This is consistent with gains between 1960 and 1966, but will depend on continued efforts to close the gap between whites and nonwhites in educational attainment, and to eliminate discriminatory job and housing practices.

To attract a population with these income levels, Oakland must offer the kind of housing, educational system, services, and environment that higher income families want. In this respect, Oakland will be competing with other communities in the Bay Area. If the right conditions are not met, the number of middle- or upper-income families, and their proportion of total families, is likely to be lower than the projections indicate.

Therefore, the city must be prepared to institute many changes and to spend more money to attract and keep a more affluent population. The fiscal picture will brighten at the same time, because more people will have more money to pay for these improvements.

In addition, with more affluent families, spending patterns can be expected to change significantly. Expenditures for housing and services are likely to increase the greatest. Dramatic increases also will probably occur in recreation and other leisure-oriented expenditures.

POVERTY

Using a somewhat gross poverty standard, the number of poor families in 1985 is projected to be only 60 per cent of the number in 1966. Application of this ratio to Federal definitions of poverty shows significant reductions from the 47,000 persons living in poverty in 1966, but it still leaves approximately 28,000 persons as members of extremely poor families.

The number of poverty-stricken families will further diminish if Federal efforts to reduce poverty are intensified or made more effective through alternate means now being discussed. The amount of funds available for such efforts is expected to increase substantially in the future.

While prospects are bright to alleviate poverty, local efforts must not be relaxed. In fact, efforts should be intensified to seek additional support and to find new solutions for breaking poverty's intolerable grip.



Chapter 4

HOUSING

Oakland's housing supply should be adjusted in its size and characteristics to satisfy the needs of the city's growing and changing population. With the objective of providing every *family with the opportunity to live in adequate quarters, careful planning and vigorous action must be undertaken now. The alternative is a large number of families continuing to live in insufficient housing.*

CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING, 1960-1966

Dramatic changes took place in Oakland's housing supply between 1960 and 1966.

The city's total stock increased from 141,500 to 147,700—a 6,200-unit gain representing a 4.4 per cent increase (*Table 20*). This gain, however, was spread unevenly throughout the city.

- The Target Areas sustained a net loss of 5.4 per cent or 3,200 units, and reduced their share of total units from 42 to 38 per cent.
- The Non-Target Areas experienced a net gain of 11.5 per cent or 9,400 units, and increased their proportion of total units from 58 to 62 per cent.

Behind the city-wide 6,200-unit net gain were both an unusually high rate of new construction—18,000 new units, almost twice San Francisco's rate—and an unprecedented removal of 11,800 housing units.

Eighty-four per cent of the new construction was in multiple-family buildings; 74 per cent was in the Non-Target Areas. North Central Oakland (Area G), which includes the Lake Merritt area, had 30 per cent.

Sixty per cent of the demolitions were in multiple-family buildings. Sixty-seven per cent occurred in the Target Areas, with West Oakland (Area B) sustaining the heaviest loss—5,100 units or 43 per cent of all demolitions.

By individual areas, North Oakland (Area A) experienced a slight decrease from 1960; West Oakland had a dramatic loss of 18 per cent of its 1960 units; Fruitvale (Area C) gained slightly in number but kept its 1960 proportion of total units; East Oakland (Area D) had a significant gain of 12.8 per cent; the Hills (Area E) increased by 11.5 per cent; South Central Oakland (Area F) had an increase of 8.3 per cent; and North Central Oakland had the highest increase, with a 15.3 per cent gain over its 1960 total.

Overall, units in single-family buildings

TABLE 20

Total Housing Units, Net Change, New Construction, and Demolitions by Household Area: Oakland, 1960-1966

	Total	Target Areas					Non-Target Areas			
		Total	A	B	C	D	Total	E	F	G
Total Units, 1960										
Number	141,537[a]	59,254	10,993	24,139	14,637	9,485[a]	82,283	26,126	30,869	25,288
Per Cent	100.0	41.9	7.8	17.1	10.3	6.7	58.1	18.4	21.8	17.9
Total Units, 1966										
Number	147,700	55,980	10,400	19,800	15,140	10,640	91,720	29,130	33,430	29,150
Per Cent	100.0	38.0	7.1	13.4	10.3	7.2	62.0	19.7	22.6	19.7
Net Change in Units, 1960-1966										
Number	6,220[a]	—3,220	—590	—4,340	500	1,210[a]	9,430	3,010	2,560	3,860
Per Cent	4.4	—5.4	—5.4	—18.0	3.4	12.8	11.5	11.5	8.3	15.3
Units Added by New Construction										
Number	18,040	4,710	570	750	1,710	1,680	13,330	3,810	4,060	5,460
Per Cent	100.0	26.1	3.2	4.1	9.5	9.3	73.9	21.1	22.5	30.3
Units Demolished[b]										
Number	—11,820	—7,940	—1,170	—5,090	—1,210	—470	—3,890	—800	—1,500	—1,590
Per Cent	100.0	67.1	9.9	43.0	10.2	4.0	32.9	6.8	12.7	13.4

Source: CS-2.

a. The 1960 Census presented two totals for the city and Area D differing by 58 units. Total units for 1960 here use the larger of the numbers; net change is based on the smaller numbers.

b. Demolitions, here, include units permanently vacated by code enforcement and discontinued public housing.

experienced some loss from 1960 to 1966, but especially heavy losses were found in two-family buildings. Units in all other multiple-family buildings showed significant gains but units in ten-or-more-unit buildings increased by 32.5 per cent, many in high-rise buildings around Lake Merritt. Although losing units, detached single-family houses still dominated the housing supply with 47.6 per cent of the units in 1966. The next biggest category was ten-or-more-unit buildings, with 18.1 per cent of the city's housing units (*Table 21*).

Oakland also became more a city of renters during the 1960-1966 period. Of all units, 82,000 or 56 per cent were rental units. Owner-occupied units experienced a slight gain of 700 units but declined in importance from 48 to 46 per cent of all occupied units. The home ownership phenomenon was shared almost equally by whites and nonwhites. If the rate of home ownership among nonwhites, which rose to 43 per cent in 1966, continues to increase, it will soon equal the rate among whites, which has been declining in Oakland since 1950.

These changes were accompanied by a rapid escalation in the cost of housing between 1960 and 1966. For rental units, the median gross rent was $95 in 1966, an increase of 30 per cent over 1960. The median value of owner-occupied single-family housing in 1966 was $20,500, a 44 per cent increase. The biggest increase was recorded by four-or-more-bedroom houses — an amazing 86 per cent jump.

By size of unit, two-bedroom units dominated the supply with 40 per cent of total units and also recorded the largest increase over 1960. Though second in importance in 1966, one-bedroom units were the only unit type to decline from 1960. Four-or-more-bedroom units, with only six per cent of the total, had the smallest number of units in 1966 but registered a healthy increase since 1960.

As an indication of demand, the overall 1966 vacancy rate of 5.5 per cent was practically the same as the rate in 1960. However, rates varied widely according to

TABLE 21

Selected Characteristics of Total and Occupied Housing Units: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Characteristic	1960 Units	1960 Per Cent	1966 Units	1966 Per Cent	Per Cent Change
Total Housing Units	141,537[a]	100.0	147,700	100.0	4.4
Number of Units in Structure					
1 (Detached)	72,295	51.1	70,270	47.6	—2.8
1 (Attached)[b]	7,793	5.5	7,760	5.3	—0.2
2	15,153	10.7	13,600	9.2	—10.3
3-4	15,087	10.7	17,120	11.6	13.4
5-9	10,945	7.7	12,180	8.2	11.3
10 or More	20,206	14.3	26,780	18.1	32.5
Tenure					
Owner	[c]	—	65,580	44.4	—
Rental	[c]	—	82,120	55.6	—
Number of Bedrooms in Unit					
0	13,950	9.9	15,850	10.7	13.6
1	39,885	28.2	35,660	24.1	—10.6
2	51,350	36.4	58,680	39.7	14.3
3	27,551	19.5	28,090	19.0	1.9
4 or More	8,483	6.0	9,420	6.4	11.1
Occupancy Status					
Total Vacant	7,694	5.4	8,120	5.5	5.6
Available Vacant	5,848	4.1	5,760	3.9	—1.5
Total Occupied	133,843	94.6	139,570	94.5	4.3
Owner-Occupied Units	63,581	100.0	64,300	100.0	1.1
Number of Bedrooms in Unit					
0-2	35,311	55.7	34,890	54.3	—1.2
3	21,260	33.5	21,360	33.2	0.5
4 or More	6,847	10.8	8,050	12.5	17.6
Median Value[d]	$14,200	—	$20,500	—	44.4
Renter-Occupied Units	70,262	100.0	75,270	100.0	7.1
Number of Bedrooms in Unit					
0	12,029	17.7	13,780	18.3	14.5
1	31,802	45.1	28,960	38.5	—9.8
2	19,794	28.1	25,670	34.1	29.7
3 or More	6,800	9.7	6,870	9.1	1.1
Median Gross Rent	$73	—	$95	—	30.1

Source: CS-2.

a. As presented by the 1960 Census, total housing is 58 units more than the sum of units by structure category.
b. Duplex, row, and similar units separated by a wall extending from ground to roof.
c. Not available for 1960.
d. Value information is presented only for single-family houses where there is only one housing unit, and no business, on the property.

type of unit. Single-family structures had a vacancy rate of about 3 per cent, while units in different sized multiple-family buildings had vacancy rates ranging from 7 to over 9 per cent. Similarly, owner units had a 2 per cent vacancy rate and rental units had a rate over 8 per cent. By size of unit, vacancy rates decrease as size increases; the rates ranged from less than 3 per cent for four-or-more-bedroom units to 11 per cent for zero-bedroom units.

None of these characteristics were shared equally by Target and Non-Target Areas. Along with a greater recent loss of units, Target Areas have significantly more multiple-family units, more rental units, smaller units by bedroom size, lower rents and values, higher vacancy rates, and more substandard and older housing (*Table 22*).

EXISTING HOUSING PROBLEMS

The characteristics just summarized, while interesting and often dramatic, are still only numbers. Behind these numbers are trends which must be recognized in making estimates of Oakland's future requirements. But behind them are also problems: problems with the housing supply itself and problems associated with its occupancy.

In order to focus on housing problems, a highly generalized and almost noncontroversial goal statement could be made: *Every family should have the opportunity to live in a sound housing unit, which is large enough to accommodate its members, at a reasonable cost relative to its income, and without artificial constraints on its freedom of selection.*

From this general goal statement, four problem areas are indicated: (1) substandard housing, (2) overcrowding, (3) excessive payments for housing, and (4) discrimination and segregation in housing.[1]

1. One aspect of the housing situation that should be added to the above goal is the right of every family to live in a pleasant residential neighborhood. This subject will be treated in Chapter 7.

SUBSTANDARD HOUSING

Eighty-two percent of all housing units in Oakland were in structures considered sound in 1966. Although deteriorating, 13 per cent or 19,000 units were in buildings which could probably be rehabilitated. Unfortunately, 7,400 units representing 5 per cent of the housing supply were in either totally dilapidated structures or ones not economically susceptible to rehabilitation.

The worst housing in Oakland is apt to be a low-rent, two-bedroom rental unit found in an old structure (over 98 per cent of them were built before 1939) located in a Target Area (*Table 23*).[1]

Looking at the problem in terms of occupancy, seriously substandard housing conditions are endured by almost 6,900, mostly low-income, households. More than 80 per cent of these units are in the Target Areas.

While certainly not the only factor, age of structure appears to be the most significant cause of substandard housing. Seventy per cent of the units built before 1900 were substandard by 1966, and over 90 per cent of the units not economically worth rehabilitation were constructed before 1920. Although most old housing units (with the exception of those built before 1900) were rated sound, the existence of old housing *does* increase the possibility of deterioration.

Oakland is a city of relatively old housing. Half of the housing units existing in 1966 were built before 1926 (median age of the stock was 40.4 years) and 7 per cent of the supply (9,200 units) dated from before the turn of the century. Further, while Oakland had only one-third of the housing units in the East Bay in 1960,[2] the city then contained more than half of the East Bay housing constructed before 1930. As a result, Oakland with its older supply starts out with a higher potential of having substandard units. However, because so much old housing *is* sound, other factors are clearly present.

Obviously, deterioration does not happen all at once. It results from long-run neglect and lack of proper maintenance. True, such maintenance could be carried out on a regular basis by owners or through insistence by local or state government. But unwillingness or the lack of financial resources or knowledge has apparently prevented many from doing so.

Poverty-level owners of substandard housing generally cannot afford proper maintenance. Even if they could just eke out the requisite dollars, loans for making improvements are almost impossible to come by. For owner-occupants defined as poverty-stricken (estimated at from 4,600 to 11,600 households in 1966, depending on varying definitions of poverty), code enforcement could be an extreme hardship. A possible remedy could be provision for housing subsidies or proper loans.

In 1966, there were 11,500 rental units and 7,500 owner units in deteriorating but rehabilitable structures. Code enforcement would be most effectively and equitably applied to owners of these units whose income would allow them to undertake corrective work, but who otherwise lacked the know-how or the willingness to do so. Particularly fruitful would be the application of code enforcement to those absentee owners whose *only* interest in their property is the rent payments, so often derived at the expense of proper maintenance. Such

TABLE 22

Selected Characteristics of Housing Units by Area: Oakland, 1966

Area	Total Housing Units		Per Cent in Single-Family Buildings[a]	Per Cent Rental Units	Per Cent Vacant	Per Cent by Number of Bedrooms in Unit			Median Gross Rent of Renter-Occupied Units	Median Value of Owner-Occupied Single-Family Houses[b]	Per Cent Low-Rent or Low-Value Units[c]	Per Cent in Sound Buildings	Median Age (Years)
	Number	Per Cent				0-1	2	3 or More					
City Total	147,700	100.0	52.8	55.6	5.5	34.9	39.7	25.4	$ 95	$20,500	17.2	82.1	40.4
Target Areas	55,980	37.9	44.4	64.7	6.4	38.0	41.5	20.5	79	15,900	34.8	65.8	50.4
Non-Target Areas . .	91,720	62.1	57.9	50.0	4.9	33.0	38.6	28.4	106	21,700	6.9	92.1	37.0

Source: CS-2.

a. "Single-family" here includes both "detached" houses and "attached" single-family units.
b. Value information is presented only for single-family houses where there is only one housing unit, and no business, on the property.
c. See Table 27 for definitions of "low-rent" and "low-value."

1. See Chapter 9 for more details on the distribution of substandard housing within Oakland.
2. 1966 data were not available for the East Bay.

TABLE 23

Selected Characteristics of Housing Units by Condition of Structure: Oakland, 1966

Condition of Structure	Total Housing Units		Per Cent in Target Areas	Per Cent in Single-Family Buildings[a]	Per Cent in Rental Units	Per Cent by Number of Bedrooms in Unit			Per Cent Low-Rent or Low-Value Units[b]	Per Cent Built Before 1940	Per Cent Built After 1949
	Number	Per Cent				0-1	2	3 or More			
Total	147,700	100.0	37.9	52.8	55.6	34.9	39.7	25.4	17.2	66.2	23.6
Sound	121,290	82.1	30.4	53.6	54.4	35.0	39.7	23.3	12.0	59.2	28.6
Deteriorating, Rehabilitation Probably Feasible	18,970	12.8	69.0	49.0	60.6	37.6	38.2	24.2	40.7	98.1	0.2
Deteriorating, Rehabilitation Probably Not Feasible	4,740	3.2	80.6	47.1	56.8	23.5	40.8	35.7	34.6	98.9	0.6
Dilapidated	2,690	1.8	83.6	52.9	72.1	28.6	50.6	20.8	49.1	98.2	0.1

Source: CS-2.

a. "Single-family" here includes both "detached" houses and "attached" single-family units.
b. See Table 27 for definitions of "low-rent" and "low-value."

action would prevent these units from becoming completely dilapidated.

But what about the 7,400 units not worth rehabilitating that should probably be eliminated? Code enforcement and urban renewal programs could remove these units and have done so in the past (2,500 units were removed by code enforcement alone in the 1960-1966 period). But the displaced families—most of whom have low incomes—would need housing elsewhere, and available low-cost housing is extremely scarce. For example, in 1960 only 560 rental units were found vacant and available for rent in the low-rent range, but these were practically all zero- or one-bedroom units and many were in poor condition themselves. Short of doubling up, overcrowding themselves, or paying excessive rents, many families would require a form of subsidy not yet available in adequate amounts to match the need. So the one problem becomes a double problem: should such units be eliminated at once or should they be retained until resources to house displaced families become available?

OVERCROWDING

Overcrowding may occur voluntarily, but the situation more often arises when families cannot find adequate housing at prices they can afford. When overcrowding does happen, it can often lead to a more rapid deterioration of the housing stock. Thus, overcrowding is both a symptom of an inadequate supply as well as a cause of substandard housing.

A conventional measure of overcrowding is a housing unit occupied by more than one person per room.[1] For example, a typical two-bedroom apartment—including kitchen, bathroom (not counted as a room), and living-dining room—would be overcrowded if it had more than four occupants. By this standard, 9,600 or 7 per cent of all occupied housing units in 1966 were overcrowded. Over the years overcrowding has become less of a problem. In 1950, the figure was 9.5 per cent of occupied units, and by 1960, the percentage had dropped to 8.2 (*Table 24*).

But overcrowding is still a serious problem. Rather than being randomly distributed, overcrowding is concentrated among certain ethnic and economic groups and in certain areas of the city. In 1966, only 1.9 per cent of the *white*[2] households were overcrowded as compared to 15.3 per cent of the Spanish-surname households, 16.6 of the black households, and 19.6 of other nonwhite households.

A very high incidence of overcrowding —21.4 per cent—occurred in those famlies below the extreme poverty level. Similarly, while Non-Target Areas experienced overcrowding in only 3.8 per cent of the households, the Target Areas had a 13.2 per cent rate.

An interesting cause-and-effect relationship is suggested by the changes in the

1. The Census of Housing provides information in this form.
2. *White*, as italicized in this chapter, refers to whites without Spanish surname.

TABLE 24

Selected Characteristics of Total and Overcrowded Households: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Characteristic	Total Households, 1966	Households with 1.01 or More Persons per Room: Number, 1966	Per Cent: 1960	Per Cent: 1966
Total	136,570	9,590	8.2	7.0
White Head of Household	99,130	3,220	4.9	3.2
With Spanish Surname	10,030	1,530	17.8	15.3
Without Spanish Surname	89,100	1,690	4.0	1.9
Nonwhite Head of Household	37,410	6,370	20.6	17.0
Black	32,000	5,310	a	16.6
Other Nonwhite	5,410	1,060	a	19.6
Above Poverty Level[b]	121,790	6,430	a	5.3
Below Poverty Level	14,780	3,160	a	21.4
Target Areas	52,390	6,920	15.0	13.2
Non-Target Areas	87,150	2,960	3.4	3.4
1-4 Persons in Household	116,300	960	a	0.8
5-6 Persons in Household	14,300	3,960	a	27.7
7 or More Persons in Household	5,960	4,670	a	78.4

Sources: SRC-1, SRC-3, and CS-2.

a. Not available for 1960.

b. See Table 7 for poverty-level limits.

overcrowding rate in each of the seven household areas from 1960 to 1966. In this period, most areas of Oakland decreased in their rate of overcrowding, with three exceptions:

	Per Cent of Units Overcrowded	
Household Area	*1960*	*1966*
East Oakland	20.4	25.5
South Central Oakland	5.3	6.1
Fruitvale	12.9	12.9

All three of these areas figured prominently in the relocation of families from West Oakland (as a result of the huge amounts of demolition in that area), with the largest number going to East Oakland. The data do not show specifically that the displaced people did indeed move into or out of overcrowded quarters. However, the evidence suggests that much of this displacement resulted in overcrowded households —an anomaly when, generally speaking, families were finding it easier to obtain quarters large enough for their needs.

Another overcrowding measure, although not as conventional as the above, is one that relates household size to number of bedrooms (*Table 25*). By this definition, 14,600 or 11 per cent of all households would be considered overcrowded.

In both comparisons, the largest percentage of overcrowding occurred in large families. Many large families are also poor; 30 per cent of all households with five or more persons and 56 per cent of all such rental households had low incomes.[1]

By either measure, from 10,000 to 15,000 households were overcrowded in 1966, and of these, between 8,500 and 10,000 households with five or more persons should have been living in larger quarters.

It is possible that overcrowding results not from an inadequate supply of big units as such but from an inadequate distribution of the large units that do exist. By simply comparing all households by family size and all housing units by number of bedrooms, enough adequately sized housing units were available in Oakland for every household in 1966. The actual maldistribution becomes more apparent when, as the data indicate, almost half of all units with four or more bedrooms —expected for occupancy by households with at least seven persons—were actually used by households with four persons or less. Unfortunately, this knowledge neither eases the problem nor offers much potential for its solution.

And solutions to overcrowding are not easy. On the public side, action could be directed toward providing more larger-sized housing units in public housing and urban renewal projects. In the private sector, short of providing developers with information on housing gaps, little else seems available at the present time.

In addition to the occupancy provisions in the Oakland Housing Code, City and other governmental agencies could develop indirect devices to control overcrowding, such as incentives for the construction of units in short supply, special subsidies to large families who are ineligible for public housing, and inducements to elderly occupants of large units to move to smaller and more suitable quarters. The feasibility of these suggestions, as well as others to eliminate overcrowding, should be subjects for a continuing housing study.

EXCESSIVE PAYMENTS FOR HOUSING

A frequently used indicator of inadequacies in the housing supply is the proportion of all households which pay an excessive or unreasonable amount of money for their

1. As defined by criteria in Table 27.

TABLE 25

Total and Overcrowded Households by Number of Persons in Household: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Number of Persons in Household	1960		1966		Per Cent Change	Minimal Number of Bedrooms [a]	Households with Less than Minimal Number of Bedrooms, 1966	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent			Number	Per Cent
Total	133,843	100.0	136,570	100.0	2.0	—	14,636	100.0
1	33,557	25.1	37,400	27.4	11.4	0	0	0.0
2	44,752	33.4	45,710	33.5	2.1	1	1,243	8.5
3	21,845	16.3	20,530	15.0	—6.0	2	2,788	19.0
4	15,325	11.4	12,660	9.3	—17.4	2	675	4.6
5	9,052	6.8	8,960	6.6	—1.0	3	3,337	22.8
6	4,544	3.4	5,340	3.9	17.6	3	1,808	12.4
7	2,250	1.7	2,880	2.1	28.0	4	2,138	14.6
8 or More	2,518	1.9	3,080	2.3	22.2	5 or More	2,640	18.0

Sources: SRC-1 and SRC-3.

a. This general standard, developed by the Oakland City Planning Department, approximates the more precise occupancy standards used by the Oakland Public Housing Authority.

housing. One common definition of "excessive" is rent payments equal to 25 per cent or more of annual family income or, for owners, house value equal to 2.5 or more times income.

By these criteria, 22,300 households or almost 50 per cent of the owners of detached single-family homes, and 28,800 or 41 per cent of the rental households, had excessive housing costs in 1966. Of these, 9,900—or 21 per cent of the owners—occupied houses valued at four or more times their income; and 16,400—or 24 per cent of the renters—paid at least 35 per cent of their income for rent (*Table 26*).

These numbers probably exaggerate the problem. For example, the data do not reveal how many of these families—most likely middle or higher income—are knowingly and voluntarily paying these "excess" amounts. For homeowners, the analysis is even more inconclusive in that it does not relate their actual mortgage, tax, and utility payments to income. Many of the homeowners with a high value/income ratio may in fact be elderly persons whose homes are either completely paid off or have mortgage payments which are low relative to house value.

For rental households, the number of families paying excessive rents because they could not find adequate housing at lower rents may be partially determined by examining the rent/income relationship of low-income households eligible for entry to public housing.[1] In 1966, the number of households so eligible amounted to 20,250. Of this number, 16,700 or 83 per cent were paying 25 per cent or more of their income for rent and would thus need lower cost housing.

This estimate of need is probably minimal for it still leaves some important unknowns. These include the number of low-income households not only paying excessive rents but also living in substandard or overcrowded conditions, and the additional need for low-cost housing from the remaining 17 per cent of public-housing-eligible households who were presumably paying lower rents by living in substandard or overcrowded housing. Also, the number eligible for public housing excludes many low-income households (homeowners, single persons under 62 years of age, and families with less than one year's residence in Oakland) who may also have problems finding housing at a reasonable price.

Another way to examine Oakland's deficiency in low-income housing is to compare the number of low-income renter and owner households in each household-size category with the number of low-rent or low-value housing units in the equivalent unit-size category.[2]

Comparing total low-income households (both owner and rental), with all low-cost units in 1966, the apparent net deficiency was 16,800 units concentrated in the zero-, one-, and four-or-more-bedroom categories (*Table 28*). This total is increased to 19,700 if the 2,960 seriously substandard low-rent and low-value units are subtracted from the available supply.

For just low-income rental households, the apparent deficiency in the city was 10,300 units, with significant gaps in all unit-size categories. When the 2,490 substandard low-rent units are deducted, the

1. For income limits of families eligible for admission to public housing in 1966, see Table 27.
2. For criteria defining "low" incomes, rents, and values by size, see Table 27.

TABLE 26

Total and Public-Housing-Eligible Renter Households by Gross Rent as a Percentage of Income: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Gross Rent as a Percentage of Income[a]	Total Renter Households			Renter Households Eligible for Entry to Public Housing	
	1960	1966		1966[b]	
	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	—	73,120	—	20,250	—
Rent or Income Zero or Unknown	—	3,520	—	640	—
Total Computable	100.0	69,600	100.0	19,610	100.0
Less than 10	10.0	5,230	7.5	—	—
10-14	21.2	13,850	19.9	140	0.7
15-19	18.5	12,660	18.2	680	3.5
20-24	12.6	9,100	13.1	2,060	10.5
25-34	13.0	12,370	17.8	6,010	30.6
35 or More	24.7	16,380	23.5	10,720	54.7

Source: CS-2.

a. The income of the primary family or individual in the household.
b. Not available for 1960.

TABLE 27

Definitions of Low-Income Families and Low-Cost Housing Units (As Used in This Chapter)

Number of Persons in Family	Maximum Family Income[a]	Number of Bedrooms in Unit	Maximum Gross Rent[b] (21 Per Cent of Income)	Maximum Value of Single-Family House (2.5 Times Income)
1	$3,300	0	$ 58	$ 8,250
2	3,800	1	66	9,500
3	4,300	2	79	11,250
4	4,700			
5	5,100	3	93	13,250
6	5,500			
7	5,900	4	103	14,750
8 or More	6,300	5 or More	110	15,750

Source: CS-2.

a. Income level based on December 1966 maximum-income limits for families eligible for admission to Oakland Public Housing Authority units.
b. Includes water, gas, and electricity payments.

deficiency is increased to 12,800. In comparison, the 1,400 public housing units existing in 1966 played a very minor role in meeting the needs of low-income households.

As a measure of the need for low-income housing, the deficiency noted above is considerably understated. Many low-cost units, in addition to those seriously deteriorating or dilapidated, are occupied by families who can afford to pay more, thus making these units unavailable to the poor. Further, though occupying relatively low-cost units, some low-income households may still be paying an excessive amount of their income for housing. Finally, the number of low-income households should be increased to include some share of the "income unknown" cases, and the number of available low-income housing units should be decreased to allow for a normal vacancy factor.

It is apparent from several indicators of low-income housing needs that at a minimum, between 13,000 and 17,000 low-income households were paying far too much for their housing in 1966.

The present shortage of housing for low-income households was partly created —one could reasonably conclude— by the heavy amount of demolition that occurred between 1960 and 1966. Of the 11,800 units demolished, two-thirds were in the Target Areas and 43 per cent were in West Oakland alone. Most of these units, the majority eliminated as a result of public action,[1] were old and in poor condition, but they were also primarily low-cost housing.

DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION

Of all the variables associated with housing problems, the most difficult to demonstrate and analyze is the effect of racial discrimination in housing, that is, the denial of complete freedom of choice in the selection of housing *due to race* rather than income. Segregation, a possible effect of housing discrimination, is somewhat easier to observe but still difficult to

1. Units eliminated by *major* public actions included 4,300 resulting from redevelopment and code enforcement projects, 2,425 from freeway and BART construction, and 1,380 from discontinued public housing built during World War II.

TABLE 28

Low-Income Households by Size Compared to Total Low-Cost and Public Housing Units by Number of Bedrooms: Oakland, 1966

Number of Persons in Household	Low-Income Households [a]				Number Eligible for Entry to Public Housing	Low-Cost (Low-Rent and Low-Value) Units [a]			Apparent Deficiency in Units		Public Housing Units	
	Total		Rental Only			Number of Bedrooms in Unit	Total	Rental Only	Total	Rental Only	Number	As a Per Cent of Households Eligible for Entry
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent								
Total	37,850	28.7	26,270	37.1	20,250	—	21,080	15,950	—16,770	—10,320	1,422	7.0
1.	15,940	44.0	10,800	40.7	7,130	0	6,020	6,020	—9,920	—4,780	32	0.4
2.	9,760	18.1	5,380	27.2	4,260	1	5,080	4,640	—4,680	—740	408	9.6
3-4	6,270	19.4	5,320	33.4	4,240	2	6,280	3,420	10	—1,900	560	13.2
5-6	3,280	24.1	2,720	50.1	2,690	3	3,290	1,570	10	—1,150	352	13.1
7 or More .	2,610	44.2	2,050	66.1	1,930	4 or More	420	300	—2,190	—1,750	70	3.6

Source: CS-2.

a. See Table 27 for definitions of "low-income," "low-rent," and "low-value."

interpret.

In 1960, 26 per cent of the total population was nonwhite, but 53 per cent of the Target Area population (ranging from 24 per cent in the Fruitvale Area to 71 per cent in West Oakland) and only 6 per cent of the Non-Target Area population was nonwhite. By 1966, with 35 per cent of the city's population nonwhite, these percentages had increased to 64 per cent in the Target Areas (ranging from 39 to 76 per cent for different areas) and 16 per cent in the Non-Target Areas. Movements obviously were occurring, but the individual household areas are too large to indicate whether these movements were into segregated or desegregated neighborhoods.

As part of the 701 Household Survey conducted by Survey Research Center, the interviewers were asked to note, for every household, the racial mix existing on the block containing the household. Since they were only based on quick observations, the results are not totally reliable. They show, however, that 30 per cent of all households were in all-white blocks (5 per cent of households in the Target Areas and 45 per cent in the Non-Target Areas), and that 4 per cent were in all-black blocks (11 per cent in Target Areas and none in Non-Target Areas).

These two extremes are obvious cases of complete segregation. But what of the in-between categories? Thirty per cent of all households were in mostly-white blocks —were these examples of true or just accidental integration? Can the 15 per cent of households found in the half-white, half-black blocks be considered part of a stable, integrated situation or were these merely blocks in transition to an all-black status? And did the 17 per cent of the households in mostly-black blocks (40 per cent in Target Areas and 4 per cent in Non-Target Areas) represent the attempts of whites to integrate, or the near end of a transition to all-black?

There is simply not enough information to show whether the racial transition had resulted in true integration, temporary desegregation, or just redistribution; or whether less prejudice or the lowering of racial barriers was really occurring. We were probably seeing a little of all of these results as well as a continuation of older patterns of segregation.

For the future, the critical question is: If, as projected, black families continue to increase within Oakland, will the net effect be to integrate blocks now all-white, or will only more all-black blocks be created? Attitudes or sale and rental practices will likely require changing for the former to occur.

With reference to racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, the 701 Household Survey asked this question of each black household being interviewed: "Have you ever gone looking for a house or apartment in Oakland and felt you were kept out of a place you wanted because they wouldn't rent or sell to a Negro?" It should be kept in mind that the answers to this question show "felt," not demonstrated, discrimination. The city-wide results were 31 per cent "yes," 68 per cent "no," and the remainder unknown.

Depending on one's inclination, the city-wide results can be interpreted, in the extreme, either as "two-thirds of the

black households in Oakland have never felt any discrimination and the remaining one-third probably imagined it," *or* as "more than 30 per cent felt they were being discriminated against, and the remaining two-thirds didn't want to cause trouble or probably never tried to rent or buy outside the ghetto." Strong evidence for the latter interpretation is suggested when the breakdown by area of the city is examined. Only a quarter of the black households then living in the Target Areas answered that they had felt discriminated against, whereas almost half those living in the Non-Target Areas answered positively.

However, whether real or imagined, about 10,000 black households *felt* that they were discriminated against in obtaining housing. This fact is cause enough for serious thought and effective action.

FAMILY TYPES LIKELIEST TO BE INADEQUATELY HOUSED

The previous sections of this chapter have made reference to groups of people affected by individual housing problems, but no overall evaluation was made of the types of families having the most difficulty finding adequate housing.

For this analysis, it is necessary to turn to the work done by Stanford Research Institute (SRI) for the 701 Project and to the 44 socio-economic groups, identified in the preceding chapter, that were defined by SRI for its population projections. Since the 1966 housing characteristics of each group were also identified by the number in each of four unit-size categories and in each of three condition-of-structure categories, it is possible to identify the proportion of each group that was inadequately housed.[1]

This analysis demonstrated that a socio-economic group is most likely to be inadequately housed if it is:

1. a family or individual, of any race, with less than $4,000 annual income;
2. a black family or individual with less than $8,000 income;
3. a family, of any race, with one to three children and less than $8,000 annual income;
4. a black family with children and less than $15,000 income; or
5. a family, of any race, with four or more children and less than $15,000 income;

. . . in other words, the poor, the black, and the large family. The presence of so many black families in this group, regardless of income, further substantiates the existence of artificial barriers to an open housing market.

Most of the city's elderly families, with the exception of elderly black households with under $8,000 annual income, did not appear to have difficulty finding

TABLE 29

Occupied Housing Units and Net Change by Type of Unit: Oakland, 1966-1985
(Thousands)

		Units in Single-Family Buildings[a]				Units in Multiple-Family Buildings[a]				
	Total	Total	0-2 Bedrooms	3 Bedrooms	4 or More Bedrooms	Total	0 Bedroom	1 Bedroom	2 Bedrooms	3 or More Bedrooms
1966										
Total Housing Units . .	147.7	70.3	39.8	22.5	8.0	77.4	15.5	30.6	24.4	6.9
Vacant Units	8.1	2.4	1.6	0.6	0.2	5.7	1.7	2.0	1.6	0.4
Occupied Units . .	139.6	67.9	38.2	21.9	7.8	71.7	13.8	28.6	22.8	6.5
1985 Occupied Units										
LWLB Projection	136.4	55.8	23.1	19.6	13.1	80.6	11.3	27.9	27.3	14.1
LWHB Projection	159.2	63.0	25.2	22.8	15.0	96.2	12.1	31.7	34.1	18.2
Net Change in Occupied Units, 1966-1985										
LWLB Projection	—3.2	—12.1	—15.1	—2.3	5.3	8.9	—2.5	—0.7	4.5	7.6
LWHB Projection	19.6	—4.9	—13.0	0.9	7.2	24.5	—1.7	3.1	11.3	11.7

Sources: CS-1 and SRI-1.

a. "Attached" single-family units are included in the multiple-family category.

1. "Inadequate housing" is defined here as an overcrowded unit and/or a substandard (deteriorating or dilapidated) unit. Substandard conditions were indicated directly. Overcrowding was defined by the following situations: two-or-more-adult families in units with less than one bedroom; families with one to three children in units with less than two bedrooms; and families with four or more children in units with less than three bedrooms. No overcrowding was possible, by definition, for one-person families.

TABLE 30

Additions and Deletions of Occupied Housing Units by Type of Unit: Oakland, 1966-1985
(Thousands)

	Total Occupied Units	Occupied Units in Single-Family Buildings[a]				Occupied Units in Multiple-Family Buildings[a]				
		Total	0-2 Bedrooms	3 Bedrooms	4 or More Bedrooms	Total	0 Bedroom	1 Bedroom	2 Bedrooms	3 or More Bedrooms
LWLB Projection										
Total Net Change	—3.2	—12.1	—15.1	—2.3	5.3	8.9	—2.5	—0.7	4.5	7.6
Total Additions	28.5	7.6	0.0	1.5	6.1	20.9	0.2	2.7	8.3	9.7
New Construction . .	16.7	2.3	0.0	0.0	2.3	14.3	0.1	1.4	3.1	9.7
Conversions-In[b] . . .	11.8	5.2	0.0	1.5	3.8	6.6	0.0	1.4	5.2	0.0
Total Deletions	—31.7	—19.7	—15.1	—3.8	—0.8	—12.0	—2.6	—3.5	—3.8	—2.1
Demolitions	—3.9	—3.2	—1.7	—1.1	—0.3	—0.8	—0.2	—0.2	—0.2	—0.1
Conversions-Out[b] . .	—8.5	—8.5	—6.4	—2.1	—0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unused 1966 Units	—19.2	—8.0	—7.0	—0.6	—0.4	—11.3	—2.4	—3.2	—3.6	—2.0
LWHB Projection										
Total Net Change	19.6	—4.9	—13.0	0.9	7.2	24.5	—1.7	3.1	11.3	11.7
Total Additions	48.9	13.3	1.2	3.7	8.4	35.6	0.8	6.3	14.8	13.7
New Construction . .	35.7	7.9	1.2	1.5	5.3	27.7	0.2	3.0	10.9	13.7
Conversions-In[b] . . .	13.2	5.4	0.0	2.2	3.1	7.8	0.6	3.3	3.9	0.0
Total Deletions	—29.3	—18.2	—14.2	—2.8	—1.2	—11.1	—2.5	—3.1	—3.5	—2.0
Demolitions	—7.4	—5.9	—4.8	—0.6	—0.4	—1.5	—0.3	—0.5	—0.4	—0.3
Conversions-Out[b] . .	—9.2	—9.2	—7.7	—1.0	—0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unused 1966 Units	—12.7	—3.2	—1.7	—1.2	—0.3	—9.6	—2.2	—2.6	—3.1	—1.7

Source: SRI-1.

a. "Attached" single-family units are included in the multiple-family category.
b. "Conversion" refers to the changing of one type of unit (conversion-out) to one or more of another type of unit (conversion-in).

adequate housing. On the contrary, most had abundant quarters. For example, between 50 and 70 per cent of the one-person and 80 to 90 per cent of the two-person elderly families lived in quarters with two-plus bedrooms. Possibly, many of these older families would prefer smaller quarters but could not find suitable accommodations. And the fact that most of the elderly must live on fixed incomes poses special problems for this group that the data cannot reveal. The specific nature of the problems facing the elderly and the solutions to these problems should be determined by further study.

FUTURE HOUSING REQUIREMENTS

Although solutions could be sought to existing housing problems, based on the information already presented in this chapter, the picture would not be complete without a look at the future and its possibly quite changed housing requirements and problems.

As part of its work for the 701 Project, SRI developed a mathematical "model" (a complex technique using electronic data processing to simulate the future) which portrays Oakland's housing needs in 1985. The model also indicates the ways in which these housing requirements could be met, and shows the resulting distribution of housing units by various types among Oakland's seven household areas.[1]

Although SRI developed future housing needs for three of the four alternate population projections described in Chapter 3, only those for the two most probable ones will be discussed here—the low-white/high-black (LWHB) and the low-white/low-black (LWLB) projections.

Estimates of future housing require-

1. The model started with the population and family projections described in Chapter 3. Each kind of family had a demand for housing that could be satisfied with several different types of housing units, defined in the model in terms of number of bedrooms, condition, number of units in the structure (single-family versus multiple-family building), and location by household area. In most cases these theoretical demands by type of family were similar in pattern to those that existed in 1966. However, shifts were permitted within the model from one household area to another under an assumption of racial desegregation within the city, as well as shifts from single-family houses to units in multiple-family structures. (These shifts would only occur within the model if it were to the economic advantage of the families to do so.) The demands of all families, in the aggregate, were then matched with the expected supply of each type of housing unit. If the supply was inadequate, the model determined a combination of ways (new construction, demolition, etc.) that the housing supply could be changed to meet these demands. Overall, the model operated on a least-cost criterion so as to create the fewest changes in the stock consistent with the demand that all the housing requirements be met.

ments may be used in two ways. The first is to provide definite targets which the city, through both public and private efforts, may shoot for. The second use is to set up a long-run framework for existing problems. By providing insights into probable or possible changes that might occur, better decisions can be made *now* that will cope with not only Oakland's existing housing problems but future needs as well.

In this case, the future-framework idea makes better use of the results from the model. The present findings are only a first look at Oakland's housing requirements.[1] The results are not firm enough for the city to set specific targets. But the findings do put existing problems in a long-range perspective, warn of possible new problems, and suggest broad directions for City policy and action.

NET CHANGE, 1966-1985

In 1985, according to the model, between 136,400 and 159,200 occupied housing units of all types will be needed in Oakland, compared with 139,600 occupied units in 1966 (*Table 29*). If an overall vacancy rate of 5 per cent were then applied, total housing units in 1985 (compared with 147,700 in 1966) would be:

- 143,400 units—LWLB projection;
  or
- 167,600 units—LWHB projection.

Returning to occupied units, the net decrease of 3,000 in the LWLB projection represents a large decrease of 12,000 single-family units and a sizable increase of 9,000 multiple-family units. The LWHB projection shows a net increase of 20,000 occupied units—a loss of 5,000 single-family units and a gain of 24,000 multiple-family units.

By individual types of unit, the 1966-1985 net change varies (depending also on which projection is used) anywhere from a decrease of 15,000 units to an increase of 12,000. In both projections, losses generally occur in the smaller units and increases in the larger units, reflecting the shift to larger families in 1985.

The sharp decline in small (fewer-than-three-bedroom) single-family houses, against the increase in two-bedroom apartment units, may be somewhat overstated. The shift from single-family to multiples, which the SRI model generally allowed to occur based on a similar shift occurring between 1960 and 1966, may have been too drastic. The 1960-1966 period was unusual in both demolition and construction rates. Many two-bedroom homes were demolished and few new ones built, whereas the greatest increase occurred in two-bedroom apartments. In this six-year period families forced out of two-bedroom houses because of so much public action may have moved into two-bedroom apartments, quite possibly due to lack of choice rather than preference.

Though alternative interpretations of the need or lack of need for different types of two-bedroom units are possible, the need for significantly more *large* units, both single-family and apartments, is unmistakable for both projections. This will be made even clearer in the following discussion.

ADDITIONS AND DELETIONS OF OCCUPIED HOUSING, 1966-1985

The previous section discussed the prospect for dramatic net changes in the occupied housing supply. When an examination is made of the manner in which these shifts in demand may be met by additions to and subtractions from the 1966 supply, a more complete picture of the full impact of the projections on each unit type can be drawn under both projections (*Table 30*[2]).

Within the housing model, additions to the 1966 supply were accomplished either by new construction or by conversion of one unit type to another (by adding rooms or whole units to an existing unit). Deletions from the 1966 occupied stock occurred for several reasons:

1. demolition of dilapidated buildings to make land available for new housing;
2. demolition of housing in industrial areas;
3. conversion to another type of unit; or
4. remaining unused deteriorating or dilapidated units which would not be needed for occupancy in 1985 (such units should presumably be demolished but the model left them standing).

Though the net change in occupied units for each unit type is fully stated, the numbers for both additions and deletions are somewhat, though probably equally, understated. This is partly because of technical difficulties associated with the model and partly because no attempt was made to estimate the number of demolitions required for street widenings and other public construction. Any sound unit deleted as a result of such action would require that a similar unit be added by new construction. Also, only additions and deletions of *occupied* housing were covered; the changes would be greater if a factor allowing for vacancies were applied.[3]

For the low (LWLB) projection, only 75 per cent of the 1966 occupied stock would meet 1985 housing demands, with rehabilitation (not shown on Table 30) of some 3,000 units being required. This means that almost 32,000 units would or should be eliminated from the 1966 occupied stock. Almost two-thirds of these deletions would be single-family units of which most would be small houses either needed for conversion, usually to larger houses, or becoming unused. Almost all of the deletions from the occupied multiple-family stock would be unused deteriorating or dilapidated units. Of the total deletions, the greatest number—19,000 units—would consist of substandard units becoming unused.

The low projection would require almost as many additions—some 28,000 units—as deletions. Only a modest 8,000 (or 26 per cent) of these would be single-family houses of which most, 6,000 units, would have four or more bedrooms. The greatest demand, 21,000 units, would be for multiple-family units, of which almost half would be for apartments with

1. Time did not allow rerunning the model under different assumptions as to either future population characteristics or future housing behavior. Time was also not available to test the impact of alternative policies on changes needed in the housing supply. Finally, the model was not able to illustrate the feedback effects of the housing supply on future population characteristics.
2. This aggregate, city-wide table sums up the required actions in all of the seven household areas. The presence of deletions along with additions in a unit-type column reflects not only the need to demolish dilapidated units, but also the lack of demand for the unit in some areas and possibly heavy demands for it in others.
3. The amount of conversions is probably far overstated. In practice many of the changes shown as conversions in the table will probably be achieved by a combination of demolition and new construction.

three or more bedrooms. A large number of two-bedroom apartments, 8,000 units, would also appear to be needed. Of the total additions under this projection, the model calls for almost 60 per cent (17,000 units) to be new construction with the remainder of 12,000 units coming from conversions.

For the high (LWHB) projection, 77 per cent of the 1966 supply would be used for occupancy, with 3,000 units of it needing rehabilitation. Thus the model called for 29,000 units of the 1966 occupied stock to be demolished or to become unused. Again, almost two-thirds of the deletions (or 18,000 units) would be single-family units, of which 14,000 would be small houses—5,000 to be demolished for their land and 8,000 needed for conversion purposes. The deletion of 11,000 units from the 1966 multiple-family stock would be, as before, due largely to deteriorating or dilapidated units becoming unused, but would also include demolition of 1,500 units. Of all deletions from the 1966 stock, about 25 per cent would be required demolitions, 31 per cent would be conversions to other unit types, and 43 per cent would consist of units becoming unused.

The high projection would require the addition of 49,000 occupied units—13,000 single-family houses and 36,000 units in multiples. Over a third of the added units in multiple-family buildings would need to have three or more bedrooms, and an even larger number of two-bedroom apartments would be required. Of the total additions under this projection, some 73 per cent (36,000 units) would be in the form of new construction.

By comparing the 19-year need for additional units under the two projections with the 1960-1966 new-construction experience[1] (which amounted to approximately 3,000 single-family and 15,000 multiple-family units for a period of time about a third as long as the projection period), it is possible to determine if these projections are realistic.

For the low (LWLB) projection, only one-half the multiple rate and five-sixths of the single-family rate of construction from 1960 to 1966 would be necessary. We may thus reasonably expect that the additions needed for this projection would be made to the housing stock even if future new construction fell short of recent activity.

For the high (LWHB) projection, construction at the 1960-1966 rate would exceed the need for additional multiples (36,000 units) by 9,000 units, a comfortable margin of safety. However, the 1960-1966 rate for single-family units would fall far short, more than 4,000 units short, of the projected need for 13,000 units. The average yearly rate would have to increase by 50 per cent to meet this need. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the additions called for by the model must be regarded as minimal and the actual need greater. Also the rate of residential construction from 1960 to 1966 was unusually high, thus making the single-family, and perhaps even the multiple-family, requirements still more difficult to meet.

To cope with these possible deficiencies, the City would either have to encourage (or assure through direct or indirect intervention) more single-family construction, or stimulate or assure the building of multiple units which would provide the amenities that large families now seem to find only in single-family houses.

Whether single- or multiple-family, some 18,000 units (or 62 per cent of all the required additions) in the low projection, or 26,000 (53 per cent of all additions) for the high projection, will need to be units with three or more bedrooms. This will require from 1,000 to 1,500 of these units to be added per year, compared with a *net* increase of 1,500 large units in the entire period from 1960 to 1966.[2] Thus from all viewpoints, the present and two possible futures, Oakland needs significant additions of large housing units.

If the case is clear for more large units, it is somewhat confused for smaller, particularly two-bedroom units. The LWLB projection calls for the addition of 8,000 two-bedroom apartments along with the deletion of 15,000 small (mainly two-bedroom) houses; LWHB calls for 14,000 additions and 13,000 deletions, respectively.

From the demand side, it has already been pointed out that the model may have overstated the shift from single-family houses to apartments.

On the supply side the model, because it was cheaper in theory, created many units by converting otherwise "undemanded" sound small houses rather than by new construction. In the low (LWLB) projection 8,000 single-family houses, mostly small, were converted to 5,000 larger houses and 7,000 small apartment units; in the high (LWHB) projection 9,000 houses were converted to 5,000 larger houses and 8,000 apartments. However, because of small lots and other technical difficulties, much of this conversion activity, quite likely more than half, is probably not practical. The units the model created by conversion would have to be replaced by new construction, which is generally costlier and means finding buildable land; however, in most areas where conversions were indicated, there would be enough unused dilapidated units to provide the land necessary for new construction. And as a consequence, the small sound houses not used for conversion might be able to satisfy up to 40 per cent of the seeming demand for additional two-bedroom apartments, the average rent of which in 1966 was just about equivalent to that of a small house. Such a transfer of demand, if reasonable, would save many small houses which the model seems to condemn to disuse, deterioration, or conversion.

CHANGES BY AREA, 1966-1985

This section will briefly summarize the major changes called for by the housing model in each of the city's seven household areas. Table 31 shows the projected

1. For this comparison, it will be assumed that additional units will be provided through new construction.
2. Data for the 1960-1966 period on new construction or demolitions by number of bedrooms in unit were not available.

TABLE 31

Occupied Housing Units and Net Change by Household Area: Oakland, 1966-1985
(Thousands)

	City Total	Target Areas					Non-Target Areas			
		Total	A	B	C	D	Total	E	F	G
1966										
Total Housing Units	147.7	56.0	10.4	19.8	15.1	10.6	91.7	29.1	33.4	29.2
Vacant Units	8.1	3.6	0.5	1.4	1.1	0.6	4.5	0.7	1.9	1.8
Occupied Units	139.6	52.4	9.9	18.4	14.1	10.1	87.2	28.4	31.5	27.3
1985 Occupied Units										
LWLB Projection	136.4	44.5	9.1	12.9	12.1	10.5	91.9	32.6	30.9	28.4
LWHB Projection	159.2	50.9	10.4	14.6	14.3	11.7	108.3	39.5	36.9	31.9
Net Change in Occupied Units, 1966-1985										
LWLB Projection	—3.2	—7.9	—0.8	—5.5	—2.0	0.4	4.7	4.2	—0.6	1.1
LWHB Projection	19.6	—1.5	0.5	—3.8	0.3	1.6	21.1	11.1	5.4	4.6

Sources: CS-1 and SRI-1.

net change in occupied units in each area, as well as the number of occupied units in 1985 that the change implies. Overall, under the low (LWLB) projection, the Target Areas would decrease by 8,000 occupied units between 1966 and 1985 and the Non-Target Areas would increase by 5,000. Under the LWHB projection, the Target Areas would decrease by 1,500 while the Non-Target Areas would experience a 21,000-unit increase. Depending on the projection used, the Target Areas will contain either 32 or 33 per cent of the city's occupied units in 1985, whereas in 1966 they had about 38 per cent.

North Oakland (Area A) would decrease slightly in occupied units under the LWLB projection and increase slightly under LWHB. From 3,000 to 4,000 added one- and two-bedroom apartments will be needed, along with modest additions of occupied three-bedroom houses. These additions will be made at the expense of from 1,300 to 1,500 deletions from the occupied housing supply. Under both projections, the model shows a large amount of unused dilapidated units in 1985. Because of this, code enforcement could help meet the demand for less expensive units in this area by preventing the dilapidation of about 500 multiple units with two or more bedrooms.

West Oakland (Area B) would decrease by 3,800 occupied units under the LWLB projection, and by 5,500 under LWHB. Added units—from 3,500 to 5,000—will be required in the one-, two-, and three-or-more-bedroom multiple categories. Under both projections, large amounts of dilapidated units, numbering from 7,000 to 8,000, will remain unused and should be demolished.

Fruitvale (Area C) would decrease by 2,000 occupied units under the low (LWLB) projection but increase slightly under the high (LWHB). Under the low projection, the 1966 stock would apparently meet the 1985 demands reasonably well, requiring only about 1,600 added multiple units, principally of the larger sizes. Some 2,600 unused—largely dilapidated—units would be left over, presumably requiring demolition.

For the high projection, additions of about 3,300 apartment units and 500 large houses would be needed; approximately 2,000 units would remain unused under this projection.

East Oakland (Area D) would increase by 400 occupied units under the low projection and by 1,600 under the high. From 3,500 to 4,500 additional units, principally large houses and large apartments, will be required. The model shows many of them being built on land freed by the demolition of dilapidated units. Under the high projection, no unused units would remain, whereas about 900 would be unused in 1985 under the low projection.

The Hills (Area E) will experience, according to the model, a net increase of from 4,000 to 11,000 occupied units. The area will require the addition of from 3,000 to 6,000 large single-family houses, and from 2,500 to 4,000 multiple-family units (the largest amount of them three-

bedroom apartments). Land availability to 1985 does not appear to be a serious problem in the Hills, and thus the model shows no demolitions.

South Central Oakland (Area F) would decrease slightly under the LWLB projection, but increase by 5,400 occupied units under LWHB. Under the low projection additions of about 2,000 units each of large houses, two-bedroom apartments, and three-or-more-bedroom apartments would be needed. Approximately 2,500 small houses are used in the model for conversion, principally to larger houses. If these small houses were used instead to satisfy the demand in the two-bedroom-apartment category, then the needed large houses would have to be provided by new construction.

Under the high projection approximately 11,000 added units would be needed, most of them about evenly divided among large houses, two-bedroom apartments, and three-or-more-bedroom apartments. Here again, the 3,000 small houses in sound condition used for conversion to larger houses could be used to satisfy the demand for two-bedroom apartments, thus requiring new construction for the large houses.

Only about 700 units would remain unused under the high projection, but 3,600 would fall into this category under the low projection.

North Central Oakland (Area G), the city's apartment-house district, would increase by about 1,000 occupied units under the LWLB projection, and by almost 5,000 under LWHB. Additions of from 4,000 to 8,000 occupied units will be required, almost all of them in multiples and most of them in the two-bedroom category. The model shows much of this demand being satisfied by the conversion of otherwise unneeded houses which are in sound condition. Small amounts of substandard units—between 500 and 1,200 units—will remain unused according to the model.

CONDITION OF OCCUPIED HOUSING IN 1985

One vital factor affecting the demand for, and price of, housing is its physical condition. Accordingly, for its housing model, SRI "aged" the housing stock existing in 1966 so as to estimate its condition in 1985.[1] The model used only three condition categories—sound, deteriorating (rehabilitation possibly feasible), and dilapidated (rehabilitation highly unlikely)—rather than the four categories used in this chapter's section on existing substandard housing conditions.[2]

In 1966, according to the SRI categories, 13.8 per cent of all occupied units were deteriorated and 3.7 per cent dilapidated. The same stock aged to 1985 would, if left standing, be 11.9 per cent deteriorated and 16.5 per cent dilapidated, which is one reason for the large amount of deletions from the occupied housing supply discussed previously. However, the model shows a good deal of "demand" for unsound housing in 1985—that is, many unsound units still being occupied. This is because the model assumes that housing behavior, and public policies affecting housing, which existed in 1966 will continue (except for shifts to multiples and racial desegregation). Its requirements, therefore, were based on existing occupancy patterns (including rent-paying patterns), rather than on the requirement of sound housing for all.

Overall, the model shows a higher percentage of sound housing for both 1985 futures than in 1966, with the low (LWLB) projection giving slightly better results than the high (LWHB). The unit type with the most dilapidation in 1985 appears to be apartments with three or more bedrooms, followed by two-, zero-, and one-bedroom apartments and small single-family houses (*Table 32*).

While the model results do not show the requirements for achieving 100 per cent sound housing, it is possible to read into them "problems to be avoided" much as "problems to be corrected" can be seen in the 701 Residential Survey results.

Thus, unless housing behavior or public policy changes in the future, between 2,700 and 3,200 households at the minimum will be living in dilapidated quarters that should be demolished; and between 16,000 and 19,000 additional households will be living in quarters requiring extensive repairs to keep them from becoming dilapidated.[3] These numbers can be interpreted as an amount of additional code-enforcement and urban-renewal activities required between 1966 and 1985, in addition to that which would be carried out under existing levels of these programs.

As a possible indication of still more needed code-enforcement and renewal activities, the model also shows (see Table 30) that between 13,000 and 19,000 units—largely dilapidated—remaining from the 1966 stock will be unused in 1985. If these are not removed, many low-income families will likely occupy them because of their low rents. An SRI estimate of this switchover, based on those shown as paying excessively high rents in 1985, is 5,000 families for the high (LWHB) projection and 2,000 for the low (LWLB).

HOUSING FOR THE POOR IN 1985

Though declining in number from 1966, low-income families will still be present in a significant amount in 1985. Further, according to results from SRI's housing model, some of these families will be faced with housing problems more severe than their counterparts faced in 1966.

The number of poor families and the percentage of them inadequately housed are shown in Table 33 for 1966 and 1985.[4]

The number of families (50,000) shown by the table in 1966 significantly exceeds the 38,000 households with incomes at least as low as the entrance requirements for public housing (which were the number and definition of low-income families discussed in the section on existing housing problems). Adjusting by the ratio between these figures would lower the 27,000 to 31,000 poor families shown in 1985 to some 20,000 to 24,000 for the two projec-

1. This was done by assuming that age is the most important variable affecting condition, establishing present-day relationships between condition and age, and then applying this relationship to compute future condition.
2. "Sound" means the same in both sets of categories. Of the two "dilapidated" categories, SRI's is more inclusive.
3. As mentioned earlier, the model did rehabilitate 2,900 to 3,000 units—that is, changed them from "deteriorating" to "sound"—for occupancy in 1985. This is only a minimum statement of the effort required, under the model's assumptions, to house the 1985 population. To prevent people from living in substandard quarters, public policy might call for a far greater amount of rehabilitation.
4. See footnote 2 on page 37 for the definition of "poor" used in this table.

tions.

The table shows that, with but two minor exceptions, the percentage of each low-income group inadequately housed will remain the same or get larger by 1985. As in the 1966 picture, the groups most inadequately housed will be families that are very poor, large (four or more children), and black. Families with four or more children will be particularly hard hit, for the model shows their average rents going up sharply, with the poorer of these families paying up to 50 per cent of their income in rent.[1] In contrast, families without children may be able to find housing at a considerably reduced rent because of the apparent excessive supply of small houses and apartments in 1985.

SRI has estimated that, in the absence of special public subsidies, 11,500 to 16,000 poor families will be living in housing that is unsound, and/or too small, and/or too expensive.[2] About half of these will be in deteriorating housing that could be corrected through rehabilitation, with some assistance. The other half—those overcrowded and occupying dilapidated units—typically will require greater assistance to aid them in upgrading their housing.

Overall, the conclusion can be drawn from the model results that a declining number of low-income families will need an increasing amount of financial assistance to acquire adequate housing.

GENERAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Underlying any recommendations for housing policies and actions must be Oakland's dual responsibility to (1) take such measures as are necessary to maximize its highest potential and (2) make sure that all its citizens live or have the opportunity to live in adequate housing. Stated more directly as goals for the city, Oakland should take steps to insure its basic character as a middle-income community and at the same time make sure that each family, regardless of income, has access to adequate and proper housing relative to its needs.

TABLE 32

Occupied Housing Units by Condition of Structure (Percentages): Oakland, 1966 and 1985

Condition of Structure[a]	Total Occupied Units	Occupied Units in Single-Family Buildings[b]				Occupied Units in Multiple-Family Buildings[b]				
		Total	0-2 Bedrooms	3 Bedrooms	4 or More Bedrooms	Total	0 Bedroom	1 Bedroom	2 Bedrooms	3 or More Bedrooms
1966										
Sound	82.5	84.8	83.0	89.6	87.2	79.9	87.7	82.3	79.4	61.4
Deteriorating	13.8	12.5	14.2	7.8	10.3	15.3	9.2	13.8	15.5	28.4
Dilapidated	3.7	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.5	4.8	3.1	3.9	5.1	10.2
1985— LWLB Projection										
Sound	86.5	87.5	80.4	91.9	93.2	85.7	87.1	84.0	88.8	82.7
Deteriorating	11.5	10.7	17.2	6.4	6.0	12.1	10.6	14.4	9.4	13.4
Dilapidated	2.0	1.8	2.4	1.7	0.8	2.2	2.3	1.6	1.8	3.9
1985— LWHB Projection										
Sound	86.0	87.3	79.2	91.5	94.7	85.1	86.4	82.8	87.9	83.5
Deteriorating	12.0	11.3	19.1	7.1	5.0	12.4	11.4	15.4	9.8	12.7
Dilapidated	2.0	1.4	1.7	1.4	0.3	2.5	2.2	1.8	2.3	3.8

Sources: CS-1 and SRI-1.

a. The condition categories here are different from those used in Tables 23 and 61. See footnote 2 on page 55.
b. "Attached" single-family units are included in the multiple-family category.

1. As just noted, some of these families may, in order to lower their rents, shift to dilapidated units that are left standing.
2. SRI defined "too expensive" as having a rent higher than was being paid in 1966 in real dollars. This should not be confused with "excessive payments for rent" referred to previously in this chapter.

Fortunately, these goals are not incompatible. Indeed, the first goal cannot be really achieved without success in the second. Where family income is high enough to permit complete freedom of choice, housing selection is based not only on the housing unit itself but on the total neighborhood and community as well. A city that permits many of its citizens to be ill-housed to the extent that portions of the city become blighted has little chance to attract and keep more affluent families. Though expected to diminish significantly over the coming years, as long as poverty persists in our country it will continue to concentrate in central cities like Oakland; this is a traditional role of the central city that is not expected to cease. Therefore, for both practical and humane reasons, Oakland must make certain that those declining numbers of poor families, who surely will continue to come to Oakland to live, have adequate housing rather than being permitted to live in poor and unsuitable housing. Conversely, such poor housing in large numbers must not be even available to live in.

The decision to pursue this double goal should be made regardless of the future ethnic make-up of the city. If ethnic transition continues to take place in the city, it will do so no matter what housing policies are settled upon. On the other hand, if Oakland becomes a middle-income community, analysis points to this eventuality whether the city is predominantly white or black. Local housing policies will not grossly alter the city's racial mix, but they can help hold and attract a large middle-income group.

The obstacles that stand in the way of achieving these goals were described in the previous two sections of this chapter. When present and possible future inadequacies are compared, a clear pattern of

TABLE 33

Total and Inadequately Housed Poor Families by Color, Age of Head, Income, and Size: Oakland, 1966 and 1985

Color of Head	Age of Head	Family Income	Family Size	Number of Poor [a] Families (Thousands)			Per Cent of Poor Families Inadequately Housed [b]	
					1985 Projections			
				1966	LWLB	LWHB	1966	1985
Total Poor Families				49.9	31.2	26.7	35	39
Black	Under 65	$ 0-3,999	1 Person	3.4	3.3	2.4	53	59
			2 or More Persons, No Children	1.0	0.3	0.2	53	56
			Family with 1-3 Children	2.4	2.6	1.9	49	62
			Family with 4 or More Children	1.4	0.4	0.3	74	82
		$4,000-5,999 [c]	Family with 1-3 Children	2.1	2.8	1.9	42	40
		$4,000-7,999	Family with 4 or More Children	2.5	3.6	2.4	56	58
	65 or Over	$ 0-3,999	1 Person	1.0	1.5	1.1	60	74
			2 or More Persons	1.1	0.7	0.5	43	49
Other	Under 65	$ 0-3,999	1 Person	6.0	2.7	2.7	23	28
			2 or More Persons, No Children	2.8	0.5	0.5	19	23
			Family with 1-3 Children	3.1	0.5	0.5	55	55
			Family with 4 or More Children	0.8	0.1	0.1	72	72
		$4,000-5,999 [c]	Family with 1-3 Children	3.8	1.3	1.3	27	27
		$4,000-7,999	Family with 4 or More Children	1.9	1.0	1.0	63	70
	65 or Over	$ 0-3,999	1 Person	11.8	7.8	7.8	20	19
			2 or More Persons	4.8	2.1	2.1	17	25

Source: SRI-1.

a. See footnote 2 on page 37 for the definition of "poor" used in this table.

b. Inadequate housing is defined as units which are overcrowded and/or deteriorated or dilapidated (see footnote 1 on page 50).

c. The figures for this family-size group were estimated by taking half of the $4,000-7,999 income category.

needed adjustments in the housing supply emerges. This pattern can be expressed in terms of the numbers and types of housing units to be added and eliminated over the coming years and, as such, can be the basis of housing programs that the City should undertake. But the knowledge gained in these analyses also indicates that certain fundamental policies must be agreed upon for such programs to be successful. These policies and programs are discussed below.

THE CREATION OF AN OPEN HOUSING MARKET

Consultants and staff for the 701 Project have emphatically concluded that Oakland's future as a middle-income community and the success of its housing programs depend largely on its ability to remove, within and outside the city, artificial barriers preventing any family from having access to any part of the housing supply. The elimination of these barriers would also help the city to become and act as one community instead of the many conflicting and competing communities into which it is now divided. State and Federal legislation already exists to help remove these barriers, but local efforts and leadership are mandatory for effective results.

HOUSING SUBSIDIES

Without financial assistance, many a low-income family in Oakland is forced to accept housing that is either deteriorated or dilapidated, too small for the family's size (a situation which can lead to deterioration), or too expensive, thus forcing reductions in expenditures for other necessities. Programs to eliminate or correct substandard housing cannot be successful if families, required to move under such programs, have no alternative but to live in similar conditions elsewhere in the city. This does not solve housing problems but merely shifts them, and the whole city is adversely affected.

In need of such assistance now, at least 10,000 families should be provided with special housing subsidies. These subsidies may take many forms. Many are now available and more expected. The most effective form of subsidy for Oakland would be one that would allow low-income families to occupy standard middle-income units. The units would then be available to those families who chose to remain if and when their incomes rose, or to other middle-income families on a nonsubsidized basis.

A straight rent-subsidy program will have to suffice for many families. However, subsidy programs aimed at increasing home ownership or supporting the rehabilitation efforts of existing homeowners should be emphasized.

Over a period of time, the number requiring all forms of subsidy is expected to decline, but it is essential that adequate support be provided to those families still needing it. Communities outside Oakland should also be urged to make such subsidies available.

THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL LARGE UNITS

Analysis has indicated an immediate need for an additional 7,500 to 10,000 three-, four-, and five-bedroom units (in the ratio of 2:1:1) in order to correct present imbalances between housing demand and housing supply. Over the next two decades, at least 17,000 to 26,000 such units (plus 5,000 to 15,000 smaller housing units) will be required to meet the needs of our future population. The private sector will undoubtedly take care of the bulk of this development, though governmental encouragement may be necessary.

The critical role of local government in housing development should be the following.

1. Make up-to-date housing deficiency estimates by keeping abreast of changes in the city's households and housing supply.

2. Assist private developers to make wise decisions in the types and location of units to be built.

3. Fill the gaps in demand left unmet by private efforts.

4. Make sure that all housing added to the supply will be of sufficient quality and have the proper amenities to satisfy the future demands of the growing number of middle-income families in Oakland.

5. Help to maintain a housing stock that meets middle-income standards of quality by providing lower-income families with sufficient housing subsidies to enable them to occupy housing of higher quality than their incomes would otherwise allow.

THE ELIMINATION OF SUBSTANDARD HOUSING

In 1966, approximately 7,400 housing units in Oakland were nearly or totally dilapidated. Without a stepped-up program of rehabilitation and slum removal this number will at least double by 1985. An additional 19,000 deteriorating but salvageable units now require rehabilitation. This number will persist unless there are additional corrective efforts. Oakland cannot afford this much substandard housing, but neither can it afford to eliminate it unless truly acceptable alternate housing is readily available to those displaced as a result.

Present occupants of substandard housing should not be made to bear the financial and social hardship of past inadequate programs. A stepped-up City program should be undertaken to eliminate existing substandard housing and to keep housing from becoming substandard in the future, but the program should be scaled to maintain a balance between housing need and availability. In particular, the program should be coordinated with efforts to create an open housing market, to provide sufficient housing subsidies, to add sufficient numbers of large housing units to the supply, to make arrangements for rehabilitation loans and grants, and to provide relocation assistance and other services that are necessary to ease the hardships of displacement and code enforcement. (Additional program criteria will be found in Chapter 9.)

PART III

JOBS
AND
EMPLOYMENT

Chapter 5

JOBS AND THE ECONOMY

Economic evolution has been taking place in Oakland during recent years, involving the city's traditional role and its regional orientation. Although each city represents a unique assemblage of human activity and physical structure, Oakland, in many fundamental ways, has been experiencing an evolutionary development akin to that of many other cities across the nation.

Many of Oakland's more critical problems can be traced to changes in the economic system. An understanding of the causes and dynamics behind these problems—and of the city's economy today and in the future—must precede the formulation of solutions.

RECENT CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY

By the end of World War II and on into the early 1950's, fundamental changes began to appear in the American economy which ultimately had far-reaching effects on the character of the national job market. Increasingly widespread job dislocation occurred in the older central cities, such as Oakland, when these broad economic changes were combined with changing patterns of urban land development. Indeed, the central cities were totally unprepared for these events; such broad and rapid alterations were never clearly anticipated.

Since before the turn of the century, jobs in the nation's manufacturing industries had kept pace with the growth in total nonagricultural employment. But in the 1940's, a relative slowdown of growth in manufacturing jobs and a corresponding speed-up in the service sector began. This trend continued and intensified throughout the 1950's and early 1960's; recent studies suggest its continuation into the future.

The reasons for the changes in the national economy are varied and complex. Certainly the demands of the war years provided powerful incentives for revolutionizing research and development systems and for greatly extending management science techniques. Continuing rapid advances in technology led to increased productivity and to the substitution of electronic control devices for workers. Interwoven with the increasingly efficient systems of productivity were major gains in family income and significant changes in consumer preferences for goods and services. Nationally, these same trends are continuing today.

Central cities — Oakland included — cannot immediately respond to the physical requirements of new technologies and changing economic patterns. A city's inflexible physical "plant," often reflecting a functional role of an earlier day, faces obsolescence during such dynamic periods.

On top of all this, the postwar period saw a previously pent-up demand for new housing which could not be accommodated within the confines of central cities. Federally insured low-interest loans provided more fuel for housing demand and encouraged housing construction in the semirural areas just outside the central cities. The burgeoning freeway network plus increasing automobile ownership both accommodated and encouraged this suburban housing development.

Some of the older industries followed residential development out beyond the old urban centers—for a variety of reasons:

- seeking the resettled labor force;
- acquiring more land at less cost;
- avoiding an antiquated transportation network;
- finding escape from the congested city and its bleak, worn-out environment.

Oakland, like other cities, was affected by this flight. Beginning in the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's, the city experienced a continued net loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector at the very same time southern Alameda County registered continued growth in these industries. And many new industries which during an earlier period would have settled in Oakland found locations outside the city.

But manufacturing was not the only economic activity breaking out of its traditional locational framework. The vast outlying residential development and consequent population shifts caused significant changes in the locational pattern of retail establishments. The postwar housing boom caused a major drop in the old downtown's share of retail sales. In recent years, Oakland's Central District has shown signs of partial recovery, but complete recovery of its former regional role is considered unlikely.

Certain elements of the "service" sector—finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE), services, and government—never migrated to the developing outer areas as manufacturing and retailing did. They found that for their specialized activities the old city with its centrality and functional variety was preferable to the dispersed and fragmented suburbs.

Recent trends suggest that the drop in central-city jobs during the 1950's does *not* signal a further downward plunge. For many old cities such as Oakland, the 1950's and 1960's may have been only a momentary pause in the midst of a fundamental readjustment and redirection of the nation's economic structure.

BASES FOR PROJECTING OAKLAND'S ECONOMY

Because alterations in the national and regional economy can have powerful effects on the economic development of cities and counties, the broad characteristics of the future economy must be understood not only for Oakland but also for the Bay Area and the nation.

The projection of a city's economy some 20 years into the future is, at best, an uncertain exercise. For such an undertaking, it was clearly necessary to develop first a set of basic *assumptions* concerning the future operation of the economic system. A few of the most fundamental of these assumptions, all supported by studies of the basic mechanism of the local economy today and in the recent past, follow.

1. *The overall rate of total job increase in the Bay Area will continue above the national rate.* Data compiled for the 1950's and early 1960's show that the total number of jobs in the Bay Area increased at a higher average annual rate than for the United States as a whole. During the next two decades the Bay Area rate is expected to drop somewhat because of an anticipated reduction of national expenditures for local defense industries. Despite this reduction, the rate of increase is assumed to continue above the national rate.

2. *Jobs in the manufacturing sector will increase more slowly than total jobs.* At least two changes in the structure of the economy help to explain this. First, manufacturing output has been growing at a rate equal to that of the Gross National Product (GNP) while the "service" sector has been exceeding it. Second, the level of productivity, measured in terms of man-hours versus output, is increasing at a higher rate in manufacturing than in services.

3. *Defense expenditures between 1970 and 1985 will equal the 1965 level, measured in constant dollars, but nondefense governmental expenditures will significantly expand.* This assumes the termination of conflict in Vietnam and no comparable war elsewhere.

NATIONAL PROJECTIONS

Recent projections indicate that the Gross National Product will increase almost 40 per cent by 1975, and by 1985 the figure will be slightly more than double the 1967 level of $790 billion. One of the more dramatic aspects of this national economic growth picture is the huge increase expected in nondefense governmental purchases of goods and services. In addition, a general increase in family income is expected to parallel closely growth in the GNP.

As seen in Chapter 3, Oakland can expect to share very substantially in these family income gains. The city will also likely benefit from a significant increase in funds available to local government. In fact, recent national projections[1] suggest that by 1975-1985, funds will be available in sufficient quantity to alleviate the city's problems of housing, unemployment, decaying neighborhoods, and general fiscal constraints.

BAY AREA PROJECTIONS

Economic development in Oakland and the consequent increase in the number of jobs available locally are closely related to economic development in the entire nine-county Bay Area. When private industries or government agencies elect to locate within the region, Oakland competes for site location with other Bay Area cities and counties.

The decision of a firm to locate within Oakland or outside its boundaries is often

1. These projections were developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce, and interpreted and applied to Oakland by Stanford Research Institute.

TABLE 34

Total Jobs by County: San Francisco Bay Area, 1959, 1965, 1975, and 1985

County	Total Jobs (Thousands)				Annual Per Cent Change		
	1959	1965	1975	1985	1959-65	1965-75	1975-85
Total 9-County S.F. Bay Area	1,420	1,668	2,210	2,814	2.7	2.8	2.4
Alameda	347	392	495	608	2.0	2.4	2.1
Contra Costa	101	128	185	258	4.0	3.8	3.4
San Francisco	472	494	551	638	0.7	1.1	1.5
San Mateo	131	162	235	309	3.6	3.8	2.8
Santa Clara	228	326	520	682	6.2	4.8	2.8
Marin	32	43	65	97	5.0	4.3	4.1
Napa, Solano, and Sonoma	109	125	159	222	2.3	2.4	3.4

Source: SRI-3.

based on present or anticipated economic developments in the outside areas. Even after a firm locates outside the city, its presence may continue to affect Oakland's economy. Indeed, the firm's locational decision may influence the location of subsequent firms.

For the labor force, distance to place of employment is often more important than a city's political boundaries. Today, for example, almost 40 per cent of Oakland's labor force commutes to jobs outside the city.

Projections show that over a half million new jobs will be added to the Bay Area economy in each of the next two decades. By 1985, total jobs in the Bay Area will reach 2.8 million. The greatest absolute increase in total jobs is expected in Santa Clara County, followed by Alameda County. In terms of the rate of increase during the next decade, Santa Clara County will continue to experience the fastest growth, followed closely by Marin, Contra Costa, and San Mateo Counties. However, beyond 1975, Contra Costa is expected to be the Bay Area's fastest growing county (*Table 34*).

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS

For the nation as a whole, total jobs increased rapidly in recent years, but for Oakland and most of the other central cities, job increases came to a near standstill. By contrast, dramatic gains were registered by areas immediately beyond central-city boundaries. For example, during the 1959-1965 period, Oakland lost some 700 jobs (*Table 35*) while the remainder of Alameda County gained jobs at an average yearly rate of 2.9 per cent for a total increase during this six-year period of 47,000 jobs (*Table 36*).

Projections show a striking reversal of the trend in Oakland. Between 1965 and 1975, total jobs are expected to increase at the rate of 1.0 per cent per year; in the 1975-1985 period, the rate will increase to 1.4 per cent per year. Thus by 1985, the number of jobs in Oakland will be larger by some 47,000.

Apart from total jobs, Oakland's economy experienced a transition very similar to the overall national picture in the 1958-1966 period. An absolute decline occurred in Oakland for jobs in manufacturing, wholesaling, and rail and water transportation, while substantial gains appeared in finance, insurance, real estate, services, and government. Jobs in retail trade made only modest gains (*Table 35*).

JOBS IN MANUFACTURING

Alameda County is one of the most heavily industrialized Bay Area counties. And since 1958, the county's manufacturing jobs increased at over twice the rate of the Bay Area as a whole.

Ten years ago Oakland could claim over one-half of all the county's manufacturing jobs. Although the city remains the manufacturing hub, its share today barely exceeds one-third of the county total. Oakland's problem was more than a decreasing growth rate. Between 1959 and 1965, an absolute net loss of manufacturing jobs occurred. A substantial part of this loss happened almost literally overnight with the relocation of the General Motors assembly plant to southern Alameda County.

Other significant but much more grad-

ual losses were experienced in food processing. This industry has long been Oakland's most important manufacturing industry and in addition provides the major source of short-term seasonal employment for both the city and the county. In less than 10 years, the city lost almost 2,000 food processing jobs, while the remainder of the county showed minor gains. County-wide, this industry continues to grow although at modest rates.

As a whole, projections for manufacturing in Oakland show a continuing loss of jobs, but the rate of decline is decelerating significantly (*Tables 37 and 38*). During the 1959-1965 period, manufacturing job losses occurred at a rate of 4.5 per cent per year. But during 1965-1975, the rate of annual job loss is expected to drop to 1.7; and by 1975-1985, the losses will have decreased further to an average 0.8 per cent per year. (This statistical picture is similar to the manufacturing decline in San Francisco.)

For the remainder of the county, projections suggest a continuing gain in manufacturing jobs but at a decreasing rate. These projections show over 18,000 more jobs in manufacturing by 1985. However, annual rates of increase—1.9 per cent for 1965-1975 and 1.2 per cent for 1975-1985—will be substantially below the rate for the 1959-1965 period.

The projected decreasing gains in Alameda County outside Oakland are based in part on the assumption that no single large-scale manufacturing shift (such as General Motors as mentioned above) will take place during the projection period. However, despite the declining rate, projections covering the next two decades for the five-county San Francisco-Oakland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)[1] suggest that the Alameda County area outside Oakland will claim as much as 50 per cent of the SMSA's total increase in manufacturing jobs (*Table 39*).

JOBS IN TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION, AND UTILITIES (TCU)

Long before the turn of the century, Oakland was the firmly established hub of transportation activities in the East Bay. With the completion of the transcontinental railroads and the formation of major Pacific Coast shipping lines during the latter part of the 19th Century, Oakland emerged as a transportation center of national stature.

Today almost one-half of all Bay Area jobs in the motor-freight and warehouse industry are located in Alameda County,

TABLE 35

Total Jobs and Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Jobs by Standard Industrial Classification: Oakland, 1958-1966
(Thousands)

Standard Industrial Classification	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Total Jobs	174.1	179.1	178.9	176.4	178.8	177.4	175.9	178.4	183.0
Agricultural, Self-Employed, Private Household, and Nonclassifiable Jobs	21.1	20.9	20.8	20.6	20.4	20.3	20.1	20.0	19.8
Total Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Jobs	153.0	158.1	158.1	155.8	158.3	157.1	155.8	158.5	163.2
Contract Construction	8.3	8.9	8.6	8.3	9.1	9.8	9.9	9.3	9.3
Manufacturing	39.2	40.8	40.4	36.5	37.0	34.8	31.1	30.9	30.3
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities	17.6	18.2	17.9	17.9	18.0	17.7	17.1	18.1	19.1
Wholesale Trade	12.2	12.5	12.6	12.2	12.1	11.8	11.6	11.6	11.7
Retail Trade	26.1	26.6	26.0	26.9	27.2	27.0	28.0	27.9	28.9
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	7.2	7.4	7.8	8.1	8.2	8.5	9.1	9.5	9.1
Services	18.5	19.3	20.3	20.7	21.0	21.8	22.3	23.6	24.5
Government	22.7	23.4	23.6	24.2	24.8	24.8	25.5	26.5	29.6
Mining	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.6
All Other	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

Source: SRI-3.
a. "Government" included jobs in public education.

1. The SMSA as used in the 1960 Census consisted of Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Marin Counties.

TABLE 36

Total Jobs and Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Jobs by Standard Industrial Classification: Alameda County Excluding Oakland, 1958-1966
(Thousands)

Standard Industrial Classification	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Total Jobs	152.3	167.3	173.2	179.9	187.6	192.6	206.1	214.7	234.2
Agricultural, Self-Employed, Private Household, and Nonclassifiable Jobs	22.9	23.5	23.9	24.3	24.0	24.4	26.0	25.9	26.8
Total Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Jobs	129.4	143.8	149.3	155.6	163.6	168.3	180.1	188.8	207.4
Contract Construction	10.7	11.3	10.8	10.4	11.3	12.1	12.1	11.2	11.1
Manufacturing	30.7	36.5	36.6	37.6	39.7	40.1	45.7	48.9	53.4
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities	7.3	6.8	7.5	7.8	8.2	8.4	8.5	9.4	10.5
Wholesale Trade	6.0	6.9	7.1	6.9	8.1	8.4	8.7	9.0	9.8
Retail Trade	16.5	18.6	20.0	19.2	20.0	20.5	22.1	23.7	25.6
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	3.8	4.0	4.4	5.3	5.8	5.0	4.3	4.3	4.9
Services	15.2	17.1	17.5	18.0	18.9	20.5	21.6	22.7	25.6
Government[a]	38.9	42.2	44.9	49.9	51.1	52.7	56.2	58.9	65.7
Mining	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3
All Other	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4

Source: SRI-3.

a. "Government" includes jobs in public education.

and within the county Oakland is clearly the center of this activity. The city accommodates the Pacific Coast terminals of the Southern Pacific and Western Pacific railroads, 60 domestic and foreign shipping lines, a region-serving international airport, and the convergence of two transcontinental highways.

In spite of Oakland's dominant role as a transportation center, data for the 1959-1965 period show that the total TCU sector almost came to a standstill in terms of new jobs created. The total number of jobs available was in slow but steady decline even though job growth did not stop entirely for some industries within the category. Both rail and water transportation industries did experience net losses. These losses reflect the influence of productivity increases and a strengthening of the trucking industry at the expense of rail.

Overall, the TCU projections suggest that in Oakland, this industry may have recently reached a tipping point in the number of jobs produced. Fundamental reversals are anticipated during the next two decades, so that by 1985 some 12,000 new jobs will have been added to the city's total. The rate of job increase is expected to jump from —0.3 per cent per year during the 1959-1965 period to 1.4 per cent during 1965-1975. By 1975-1985, the TCU category will be Oakland's fastest growing major type of industry with an average per-year increase of 3.6 per cent. However, job increases will not be distributed evenly among industries within the TCU category — most of the gain will be related to the rapidly growing Metropolitan Oakland International Airport complex.

In recent years, the area of Alameda County outside Oakland has experienced a significant and steady increase of TCU jobs. This trend is expected to continue during the next two decades, with some slowdown coming after 1975. In decided contrast to Oakland, these TCU gains are predominantly the result of growth in the trucking industry.

JOBS IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE

In 1966 Oakland could claim more than half of all Alameda County jobs in wholesale and retail trade. However, in recent years the city's importance in these industries, relative to the remainder of the county, has shown a sharp decline despite only small absolute job losses. The causes of this are interrelated and complex — at one and the same time, the city experienced the benefits of increased productivity and the

penalties of suburbanization.

Wholesale Trade. During the 1958-1966 period, rapid growth occurred in wholesale trade in the area of Alameda County outside Oakland, primarily in the southern part and closely related to population increase. Most new wholesale development located outside the Oakland city limits. However, unlike manufacturing, an exodus from the city by wholesaling activities did not occur. Most of Oakland's job losses resulted from a shift to less labor-intensive activities and increases in productivity. In fact, between 1948 and 1963, total wholesale trade sales increased steadily in Oakland, although the rate of increase lagged below the remainder of the county.

Projections for the next two decades show a continuing loss of wholesale jobs within Oakland, with the rate of loss expected to decline. During the 1959-1965 period, the losses averaged 1.3 per cent per year. This loss rate will decrease to 0.4 per cent during 1965-1975 and to about 0.9 per cent by 1975-1985. For the remainder of the county, continued vigorous job gains are projected but at decreasing rates.

Retail Trade. Changes in the retail trade pattern are closely related to population growth. In recent years Oakland has continued to register job gains, but, as a result of faster population growth outside the city, the balance of the county (especially southern Alameda County) has enjoyed greater increases.

In 1959 Oakland could claim almost 60 per cent of all retail jobs in the county. Six years later the remainder of the county contained nearly half the jobs. Within the city proper, significant shifts occurred during the 1959-1965 period in the location of retail jobs. Between the late 1940's and the early 1960's, retail sales increased only slightly within the Central District but grew much faster in the remainder of Oakland.

City-wide projections suggest modest but continuing job increases in retail trade. The rate of increase during the 1959-1965 period averaged 0.3 per cent annually and is expected to remain constant for the next 20 years. During the 1965-1985 period, Oakland can anticipate some 4,000 additional jobs in this category.

Growth in retail trade for the remainder of the county is expected to continue at a higher rate than in Oakland. However, as with almost all other industries, a tapering-off is expected in the rate of job increase in the decade preceding 1985.

TABLE 37

Total Jobs by Standard Industrial Classification:
Oakland and Alameda County Excluding Oakland, 1959, 1965, 1975, and 1985

Standard Industrial Classification	Oakland							Alameda County Excluding Oakland						
	Total Jobs (Thousands)				Annual Per Cent Change			Total Jobs (Thousands)				Annual Per Cent Change		
	1959	1965	1975	1985	1959-65	1965-75	1975-85	1959	1965	1975	1985	1959-65	1965-75	1975-85
Total	179.1	178.4	195.0	225.0	—0.1	0.9	1.4	168.0	213.4	300.0	383.0	4.1	3.5	2.5
Contract Construction	10.1	10.4	11.0	12.0	0.5	0.6	0.6	12.8	12.9	14.0	15.0	0.1	0.6	0.6
Manufacturing	42.1	31.9	27.0	25.0	—4.5	—1.7	—0.8	36.8	50.5	61.0	69.0	5.3	1.9	1.2
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities	18.6	18.3	21.0	30.0	—0.3	1.4	3.6	7.9	9.7	17.0	25.0	3.5	5.8	3.9
Wholesale Trade	13.5	12.5	12.0	11.0	—1.3	—0.4	—0.9	7.1	9.4	14.0	19.0	4.8	4.1	3.1
Retail Trade	31.1	31.7	33.0	35.0	0.3	0.4	0.3	23.2	28.3	37.0	46.0	3.4	2.7	2.2
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	9.3	11.0	14.0	18.0	2.7	2.4	2.5	4.7	5.5	10.0	16.0	2.7	6.2	4.8
Services	30.5	35.1	44.0	55.0	2.4	2.3	2.3	25.4	33.6	60.0	89.0	4.8	6.0	4.0
Government[a]	23.4	26.5	32.0	38.0	2.1	1.9	1.7	42.2	57.6	83.0	101.0	5.3	3.7	2.0
Other[b]	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	c	c	c	7.9	5.9	4.0	3.0	—3.0	—4.0	—4.9

Source: SRI-3.

a. "Government" includes jobs in public education.
b. "Other" includes jobs in agriculture, mineral extraction, private households, and nonclassifiable establishments.
c. Not applicable due to rounding.

TABLE 38

Total Jobs by Standard Industrial Classification (Percentages): Oakland and Alameda County Excluding Oakland, 1959, 1965, 1975, and 1985

Standard Industrial Classification	Oakland				Alameda County Excluding Oakland			
	1959	1965	1975	1985	1959	1965	1975	1985
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Contract Construction	5.6	5.8	5.6	5.3	7.6	6.0	4.7	3.9
Manufacturing	23.5	17.9	13.8	11.1	21.9	23.7	20.3	18.0
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities	10.4	9.1	10.8	13.3	4.7	4.5	5.7	6.5
Wholesale Trade	7.5	7.0	6.2	4.9	4.2	4.4	4.7	5.0
Retail Trade	17.4	17.8	16.9	15.6	13.8	13.3	12.3	12.0
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	5.2	6.2	7.2	8.0	2.8	2.6	3.3	4.2
Services	17.0	19.7	22.6	24.4	15.1	15.7	20.0	23.2
Government[a]	13.1	14.9	16.4	16.9	25.1	27.0	27.7	26.4
Other[b]	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.4	4.7	2.8	1.3	0.8

Source: SRI-3.

a. "Government" includes jobs in public education.
b. "Other" includes jobs in agriculture, mineral extraction, private households, and nonclassifiable establishments.

JOBS IN FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE (FIRE)

Consistent with national and Bay Area economic changes, one of the fastest growing major categories, both in Oakland and the county, is the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) group of industries. Employment in this category is growing faster than the population. This growth can be largely accounted for by an increasing demand for these services, an average industry growth exceeding the growth of the Gross National Product, and low susceptibility to rapid increases in per-worker productivity.

In 1959 two-thirds of all Alameda County jobs in these three industries were concentrated in Oakland; in 1965 the city continued to maintain this proportion. Both the city and the remainder of the county recorded job increases at the average rate of 2.7 per cent per year between 1959 and 1965. By 1965 these industries accounted for more than 16,000 jobs in the total economy of Alameda County.

Projections for the next two decades in Oakland indicate that FIRE jobs will continue to increase at rates between 2.4 and 2.7 per cent annually.

Although recent years have seen similar growth rates for both the city and the balance of the county, during the 1965-1985 period the remainder of Alameda County is expected to show much faster rates of job increase. Certain subcategories within the FIRE industries closely parallel population growth and can be expected to increase more rapidly in the areas outside Oakland which continue to experience a rapid upswing in population.

JOBS IN THE SERVICE INDUSTRIES

In recent years, steady gains have been evident in Oakland's service industries. By 1965 this group was providing 10 per cent more jobs than its nearest competitor industry. During the early 1960's, the growth rate averaged 2.4 per cent per year—second only to the FIRE group. However, since many services are particularly responsive to population growth, total service jobs between 1959 and 1965 grew twice as fast in the remainder of the county as in Oakland.

Among all the services, the medical industry is the largest employer in both the city and the remainder of the county. By the mid-1960's, half of all persons employed in Oakland's service industries were in medical service. Whereas Oakland was the obvious medical center of the county

TABLE 39

Total Jobs by Standard Industrial Classification and County:
San Francisco Bay Area, 1965 and 1985

Standard Industrial Classification	Total 9-County Bay Area			Alameda			Contra Costa			San Francisco		
	Total Jobs (Thousands)		Per Cent	Total Jobs (Thousands)		Per Cent	Total Jobs (Thousands)		Per Cent	Total Jobs (Thousands)		Per Cent
	1965	1985	Change	1965	1985	Change	1965	1985	Change	1965	1985	Change
Total	1,668	2,816	68.8	392	608	55.1	128	259	102.3	494	638	29.1
Contract Construction	102	117	14.7	23	27	17.4	14	16	14.3	20	22	10.0
Manufacturing	312	415	33.0	82	94	14.6	28	35	25.0	61	52	—14.8
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities	131	197	50.4	28	55	96.4	7	9	28.6	54	53	—1.9
Wholesale Trade	96	121	26.0	22	30	36.4	3	6	100.0	46	37	—19.6
Retail Trade	252	384	52.4	60	81	35.0	22	47	113.6	63	60	—4.8
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	106	223	110.4	16	34	112.5	4	10	150.0	58	88	51.7
Services	331	755	128.1	69	144	108.7	22	69	213.6	110	198	80.0
Government[a]	292	579	98.3	84	139	65.5	22	64	190.9	82	127	54.9
Other[b]	47	25	—46.8	7	4	—42.9	5	3	—40.0	1	1	0.0

Standard Industrial Classification	San Mateo			Santa Clara			Marin			Napa, Solano, and Sonoma		
	Total Jobs (Thousands)		Per Cent	Total Jobs (Thousands)		Per Cent	Total Jobs (Thousands)		Per Cent	Total Jobs (Thousands)		Per Cent
	1965	1985	Change	1965	1985	Change	1965	1985	Change	1965	1985	Change
Total	162	309	90.7	326	682	109.2	43	97	125.6	125	223	78.4
Contract Construction	14	15	6.7	21	24	14.3	4	5	25.0	7	8	14.3
Manufacturing	30	40	33.3	95	174	83.2	3	5	66.7	12	15	25.0
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities	21	44	109.5	13	24	84.6	2	3	50.0	6	9	50.0
Wholesale Trade	11	22	100.0	11	19	72.7	1	2	100.0	3	5	66.7
Retail Trade	27	50	85.2	46	86	87.0	10	19	90.0	23	41	78.3
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	6	13	116.7	12	50	316.7	2	6	200.0	6	22	266.7
Services	31	79	154.8	69	175	153.6	9	28	211.1	22	62	181.8
Government[a]	19	45	136.8	42	121	188.1	9	28	211.1	34	55	61.8
Other[b]	3	1	—66.7	17	9	—47.1	2	1	—50.0	12	6	—50.0

Source: SRI-3.

a. "Government" includes jobs in public education.
b. "Other" includes jobs in agriculture, mineral extraction, private households, and nonclassifiable establishments.

in 1958, recent trends suggest a decline in the city's share of county-wide employment in this field.

Projections to 1985 suggest continued growth of the service industries in Oakland. Job increases are expected to hold constant at rates of growth similar to those in recent years—between 2.3 and 2.4 per cent per year. By 1985 the service category will be Oakland's most important group of employers—some 55,000 jobs, nearly 25 per cent of the city's total jobs, will be in these industries.

For the remainder of Alameda County, a trend of strong, constant growth is expected to continue throughout the projection period. In the medical services, increased population plus the impact of Medicare, expressed particularly through new construction of convalescent hospitals, will cause a significant expansion of job opportunities in southern Alameda County.

JOBS IN GOVERNMENT

In Oakland during the 1959-1965 years, jobs in most governmental levels increased steadily at rates only slightly below the fast-growing service industries. For Alameda County as a whole, non-Federal jobs generally increased faster than the population. Some of the basic causes of rapid growth in the service industries also strongly influence the rate of job increase in government. These include:

- a general increase in the demand for government services exceeding the rate of population growth;
- low susceptibility to increases in per-worker productivity.

During the 1959-1965 period, total government jobs in Oakland increased at an average rate of 2.1 per cent per year. However, the growth pattern varied widely between the different governmental jurisdictions. No real increase in Federal jobs occurred in Oakland during that period until the Vietnam conflict began to make its impact in 1965 and 1966. By contrast, jobs in special district government increased steadily at an average 4.4 per cent per year. Jobs in State government showed substantial gains while only modest increases were recorded for public education.

In the remainder of Alameda County, total jobs in government increased during the 1959-1965 period at a rate two and a half times faster than in Oakland.

Projections to 1985 suggest that the total number of governmental jobs is expected to grow, but at a decreasing rate, in both Oakland and the balance of Alameda County. In Oakland, the annual per cent increase is projected to decline from 2.1 in 1959-1965, to 1.9 in 1965-1975, to 1.7 in 1975-1985. However, in 1985 government will be the city's second largest employer with some 38,000 jobs. In the remainder of the county, government was the largest source of employment in 1959. This predominance is expected to continue on through 1985, when one out of every four jobs will be in government.

GENERAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Virtually all aspects of Oakland are affected by changes in the structure of the city's economy. The operation of this economy can be described in many ways, but "jobs" is possibly its most important expression.

In terms of the city's physical form and operations, the impact of job gains or losses is difficult to determine with precision. However, the implications of these changes can be related in a gross way to land and floor-space requirements and to demands placed upon the circulation system.

OVERALL ECONOMIC GROWTH

Projections to 1985 indicate that although certain economic sectors will lose jobs, Oakland can expect overall to provide 26 per cent, or 47,000, more jobs than in 1965.

To accommodate this growth, a sizable increase in the total amount of nonresidential floor space will be necessary. When combined with the overall trend toward more floor space per worker, the projected job growth suggests that between 1965 and 1985, occupied nonresidential floor space must expand by more than one-quarter. Enough land should be available to accommodate both net growth and the replacement and relocation of much of the existing space.

In addition, job increases in Oakland will raise the number of daily work trips traversing the city and place further burdens on the street system.

Job gains and losses can also be translated into labor force and occupational changes—a subject which will be explored in the next chapter. The total resident labor force will continue to be less than the number of jobs available in the city, although its rate of increase will exceed the rate of job formation by a slight margin. However, almost all the job gains can be expected in white collar occupations. The only substantial gain in blue collar occupations will occur outside the city. The occupational profile of Oakland's resident labor force suggests that commuting both into and out of the city can be expected to increase. Much of this increase is likely to place additional demands on the freeway system.

CHANGES IN WHOLESALE TRADE AND MANUFACTURING

Consistent with recent trends, the city's total number of jobs in manufacturing is expected to continue its decline so that 22 per cent, or over 5,000, fewer jobs may be available in 1985 than in 1965. Wholesale trade will probably also continue its decline in total jobs; by 1985 this industry could be 12 per cent, or 1,500 jobs, below its 1965 level. Much of this job loss is expected to result from mechanization and may not imply a proportionate reduction in space requirements. It is conceivable, however, that these two industries—particularly manufacturing—may in the future require less floor space and possibly less land than they now occupy within Oakland's industrial belt.

The manufacturing category, however,

includes not just factories but also the detached administrative offices of manufacturing firms, and major growth is expected for these offices in the Central District. Between 1965 and 1985, such offices are expected to add well over 5,000 new jobs to the Central District, and an addition of over 1,000,000 square feet of occupied floor space. A large part of this growth is associated with Kaiser Industries. The Central District will probably also see growth in some types of wholesaling—mainly wholesaling without stock and business supply.

CHANGES IN TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION, AND UTILITIES

By contrast with other industries relevant to Oakland's industrial belt, the transportation, communication, and utilities (TCU) category is projected to increase in total jobs by approximately 12,000, or 64 per cent, between 1965 and 1985. A large part of this increase will be due to growth in the transportation industry. The Metropolitan Oakland International Airport area is projected to accommodate a large share of this growth. As a consequence, continued demand for land and floor space can be expected in this area.

In the Central District, the number of jobs and the floor space required for TCU purposes (largely administrative) are projected to increase by 19 and 24 per cent, respectively, by 1985. This could mean an addition of about 900 jobs and some 400,000 square feet of occupied floor space.

CHANGES IN OTHER INDUSTRIES

The rest of the major economic categories are projected to grow fairly steadily in Oakland through 1985—although at different rates. Between 1965 and 1985, the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector is expected to increase in total jobs by about 7,000—a gain of nearly 64 per cent. The biggest share of this increase can be expected to locate in the Central District where about 600,000 square feet in additional occupied floor space may be required.

Between 1965 and 1985, city-wide employment in the service industries is projected to grow by 57 per cent. Approximately 3,000 new jobs are projected to locate within the Central District requiring an increase of perhaps 1,400,000 square feet of occupied floor space. In the remainder of the city, sizable floor-space increases will probably be needed to take care of the approximately 17,000 additional jobs projected for service industries.

The total number of government jobs is expected to grow by nearly 43 per cent between 1965 and 1985. In the Central District, an increase of some 1,000,000 square feet of occupied floor space may be necessary to accommodate 2,500 new jobs. In the remainder of the city, the government sector is expected to add 9,000 jobs.

Retail trade is expected to enjoy substantial job increases; however, its rate of growth will be far below those of FIRE, services, and government. Between 1965 and 1985, retail trade is projected to increase in total jobs by 10 per cent. Within the Central District, this category will probably add about 2,500 new jobs. This growth suggests a need for an increase of over 1,000,000 square feet of occupied floor space. In the balance of the city, retail trade is expected to add 1,000 jobs by 1985.

Chapter 6

THE LABOR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The apparent failure of many public agencies and private institutions to solve the unemployment problem is not peculiar to Oakland. Throughout the United States, the central cities suffer from variations of the unemployment tragedy; the solutions-in-progress are elusive and laggard, never complete.

Finding ways to reduce Oakland's high unemployment rate requires a knowledge of the city's labor force, of the unemployment pattern, and of existing manpower programs and their shortcomings. All of these topics are explored in this chapter.

THE LABOR FORCE

The collective character of a labor force varies over time and from one city to another. Just as individual persons can be described in terms of certain basic characteristics, so does Oakland's labor force represent a set of characteristics in collective form. These characteristics, when compared with other social and economic data, provide the basis for arriving at possible solutions to Oakland's problems of employment and unemployment.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Oakland's total civilian labor force in 1966 stood at approximately 163,000—lower than in 1950 but higher than 1960. This undulating pattern roughly paralleled the city's population declines and gains during the same period. More important than the total number, however, were the changes taking place within the labor force.[1]

While the total number of males in the labor force declined steadily since 1950, the number of females increased quite dramatically (*Table 40*). Two important factors contribute to this trend.

1. Oakland's economy has veered away from an emphasis on manufacturing toward the service industries and administrative functions in general.

2. Women are entering the labor force at an increasing rate.

The overall rate of labor force participation is somewhat higher for black males than for *white*[2] males (*Table 41*) because of an increasingly young black and elderly *white* population. By contrast, the labor force participation rate among women varies widely. Spanish-surname women are less frequent participants because, perhaps, of limited educational attainment and a high frequency of childbearing. Black women have a much higher rate of participation than *white* women. The lower average income of black families suggests that the average black woman, more often than her *white* counterpart, is

TABLE 40

Civilian Labor Force by Sex: Oakland, 1950, 1960, and 1966

Sex	1950	1960	1966
Total	170,550	157,020	163,120
Male	115,620	98,640	94,590
Female	54,930	58,380	68,530
Per Cent Female	32.2	37.2	42.0

Source: SRC-4.

compelled to supplement her family's income.

OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Occupational trends since 1950 show that Oakland is increasingly becoming a city of service workers, clerical workers, technicians, and professionals (*Table 42*). Declines have been evident in the number of Oaklanders employed as craftsmen and foremen, operatives, laborers, and sales workers.

This shift in Oakland's occupational profile is not unlike that in many other cities. It is due largely to increasing technological efficiency, automation, and the changing economic character of Oakland.

The increase of commuters both into and out of the city, as discussed in the next section, suggests that basic shifts in the economy and corresponding job relocation are occurring faster than changes in the occupational pattern of Oaklanders. Of all occupations held by the city's residents, the professional and technical category contains the highest percentage of commuters. However, because of extensive industrial development outside the city, a high proportion of Oakland's craftsmen, operatives, and laborers are also commuters. On the other hand clerical, sales, and service workers include the lowest percentage of commuters.

Differences in occupational characteristics and ethnicity are closely related (*Table 43*). *White* men are mainly employed in the craftsmen or the nonmanual occupations while black men work predominantly in the lower skilled or the manual occupations. In 1966, 76 per cent of *white*, 42 per cent of Spanish-surname, and 35 per cent of black males in the labor force held either nonmanual or craft jobs. A similar situation occurred among women.

Although great differences continue to exist, the rate of black men moving into nonmanual and craft occupations is somewhat greater than the rate for *white* men. As a group, black women show the fastest rate of entry into the nonmanual occupations. However, the disparity between *white* and black women continues to be extremely severe.

TABLE 41

Labor Force Participation by Ethnicity and Sex (Percentages): Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Ethnicity	Per Cent in the Labor Force[a]			
	Male		Female	
	1960	1966	1960	1966
Total Persons 14 Years Old and Over	77.4	77.8	39.5	45.9
White	77.3	76.5	38.9	42.9
Without Spanish Surname	77.1	76.5	39.1	43.8
With Spanish Surname	79.1	76.8	35.7	36.1
Nonwhite	78.1	80.7	41.6	52.8
Black	[b]	80.6	[b]	54.1

Source: SRC-4.

a. Figures include members of the Armed Forces.
b. Not available for 1960.

COMMUTING PATTERNS

Oakland, like all central cities, is a source of jobs for an area which extends well beyond its boundaries. In 1966 the city provided over 30,000 *more* jobs than the total number of employed Oakland residents. However, far more workers than this number suggests were actually commuting into the city. Almost 40 per cent of all employed persons residing in Oakland were commuting to jobs outside the city (*Table 44*). The net result of total commuter movement into and out of the city was that less than half of all Oakland jobs were filled by its residents.

Between 1960 and 1966, there apparently were sizable increases in the number of both in- and out-commuters. Dur-

1. A labor force is usually defined as the total of all persons over the age of 14 who are available for employment at any one time. Such a definition includes the unemployed as well as the employed, but excludes people who do not want and are not seeking jobs. By Census Bureau definition, members of the Armed Forces are included in the labor force, but in this chapter, only the *civilian* labor force is generally considered.
2. *White* (as italicized in this chapter) refers to whites without Spanish surnames.

ing these years the number of jobs in Oakland increased by 4,000. While this growth occurred, the number of workers residing outside Oakland but employed within the city increased by more than three times this number. By contrast, the number of Oakland residents employed within the city actually decreased while substantial increases were being registered in the number of Oakland residents employed outside the city.

Recent studies of the origins of commuter traffic into Oakland suggest that in-commuters are disproportionately *white*. By contrast, a larger proportion of blacks than *whites* leave the city for employment. Thus the overall relationship between commuter patterns and ethnicity indicates that Oakland is increasingly providing a home for blacks and a place of employment for *whites*.

EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY

Between 1960 and 1966, the number of Oakland residents employed in the service industries, public administration, and finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) increased while the number employed in construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and transportation, communication, and utilities (TCU) remained constant or declined (*Figure III*). Changes in Oakland jobs in these industrial sectors. as discussed in Chapter 5, followed a broadly similar pattern, but there were significant exceptions.

Between 1960 and 1966, the number of jobs available in the manufacturing industries in Oakland dropped sharply. However, during the same period, the number of Oakland residents employed in these industries remained almost unchanged. This suggests that increasing numbers of Oakland residents employed in manufacturing find it necessary to commute to their jobs beyond the city's boundaries (*Figure IV*).

By contrast with manufacturing, the combined pattern of change in the wholesale, retail, and TCU industries is entirely reversed. While the total number of jobs in these categories increased slightly in Oakland between 1960 and 1966, the number of Oakland residents employed in these industries declined. This imbalance suggests that many persons employed in these industries are moving out of Oakland but retaining their jobs in the city.

For both the service industries and public administration, substantial gains were registered between 1960 and 1966 in both the number of jobs in the city and the number of employed Oakland residents. The total number of Oaklanders who found employment in these two categories increased by 25 per cent, or 12,000 jobs, between 1960 and 1966. Most of the increase in public administration occurred in Federal employment.

The number of Oakland residents actually employed by government—local, state, and national—increased substantially between 1960 and 1966. During this same period, the number of Oakland residents employed by the private sector showed some decline (*Table 45*).

Evidence suggests that if substantial growth in government employment opportunities had not occurred, the rate of unemployment in Oakland would have been considerably higher. In Oakland, almost one of every three employed black residents held jobs in government in 1966. By contrast, less than one of every five *whites* found employment in government. This pattern, common throughout the

TABLE 42

Civilian Employed Residents by Occupation: Oakland, 1950, 1960, and 1966

Occupation	Number			Per Cent		
	1950	1960	1966	1950	1960	1966
Total Civilian Employed	154,170	144,620	149,430	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers	15,950	17,910	18,980	10.3	12.4	12.7
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors	18,260	13,760	16,920	11.8	9.5	11.3
Clerical and Kindred Workers	27,290	28,930	33,650	17.7	20.0	22.5
Sales Workers	14,690	12,210	9,740	9.5	8.4	6.5
Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred Workers	24,360	19,140	16,650	15.8	13.2	11.2
Operatives and Kindred Workers	23,690	22,570	20,160	15.4	15.6	13.5
Private Household Workers	3,320	4,750	6,710	2.2	3.3	4.5
Service Workers Except Private Household	15,250	15,010	16,620	9.9	10.4	11.1
Laborers	11,360	10,340	10,000	7.4	7.2	6.7

Source: SRC-4.

country, is largely the result of the more effective anti-discrimination policies of governmental agencies.

UNEMPLOYMENT

It is often asserted that unemployment can never be eliminated entirely. Nor is the total elimination of unemployment necessary. Unemployment would continue to exist even under ideal circumstances since a man is considered unemployed the moment he voluntarily leaves his job and begins the search for a new one. Unemployment, however, becomes a serious social problem when people face inordinate difficulties in the search for jobs.

THE LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN OAKLAND

Unemployment rates in central cities of large metropolitan areas tend to be substantially higher than the national average (*Table 46*). In the early 1950's, Census tabulations generally confirmed these tendencies, but in Oakland the Census revealed a situation far more critical than was anticipated. At the time the 1950 Census was taken, 9.6 per cent of the city's civilian labor force was unemployed. By 1960 Oakland's rate of unemployment had dropped little more than 1 per cent since 1950, but it stood at a level nearly double the unemployment rate for the nation as a whole. Recent research shows that, overall, the situation has not improved significantly. The 701 Household Survey, conducted during the spring and summer of 1966, showed that, after adjustment for seasonal unemployment, some 12,500 residents or 7.7 per cent of Oakland's civilian labor force were unemployed. During this same period, the national rate was 4.0 per cent (*Table 47*).

Since 1967, nationwide unemployment rates have continued to decline. If Oakland's rate followed patterns similar to those in other central cities during 1968, it would have declined to about 6.5 per

TABLE 43
Civilian Employed Residents by Sex, Occupation, and Ethnicity: Oakland, 1966

Sex and Occupation	Total[a]	Ethnicity: White without Spanish Surname	Ethnicity: White with Spanish Surname	Ethnicity: Black
Male				
Total Number (Equals 100 Per Cent)	88,320	53,670	7,940	21,920
Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers	12.1%	16.2%	4.5%	5.0%
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors	14.7	19.2	10.1	3.8
Clerical and Kindred Workers	10.9	11.2	9.4	9.1
Sales Workers	6.2	8.0	4.2	2.8
Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred Workers	18.3	21.0	13.4	14.3
Operatives and Kindred Workers	17.5	11.7	31.4	26.9
Private Household Workers	0.2	0.0	2.7	0.4
Service Workers Except Private Household	9.3	6.2	9.6	15.6
Laborers	10.8	6.5	14.7	22.1
Female				
Total Number (Equals 100 Per Cent)	61,110	37,310	3,380	17,890
Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers	13.6%	17.0%	4.9%	8.3%
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors	6.5	8.7	6.3	2.1
Clerical and Kindred Workers	39.3	45.3	31.5	27.9
Sales Workers	7.0	9.4	7.0	2.7
Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred Workers	0.8	1.0	0.0	0.7
Operatives and Kindred Workers	7.7	4.9	27.9	8.5
Private Household Workers	10.6	5.2	12.4	22.6
Service Workers Except Private Household	13.8	8.3	10.0	25.0
Laborers	0.7	0.2	0.0	2.2

Source: SRC-4.
a. Total includes "other nonwhites" not shown separately.

TABLE 44

Employed Residents by Place of Work: Oakland, 1960 and 1966[a]

Place of Work	Number		Per Cent	
	1960	1966	1960	1966
Total	147,340	151,330	100.0	100.0
Oakland	101,640	91,860	69.0	60.7
Other Alameda County	27,470	32,070	18.7	21.2
San Francisco	11.960	17,640	8.1	11.7
Contra Costa County	3,300	5,840	2.2	3.9
Marin, San Mateo, and Solano Counties	1,140	2,040	0.8	1.3
Elsewhere	1,830	1,890	1.2	1.2

Source: SRC-4.

a. Figures include members of the Armed Forces.

cent—a 20 per cent drop since the 701 Household Survey. In 1968 the national rate stood at 3.6 per cent.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT DEFINED

An unemployed person is generally defined as one who is 14 years of age or over, does not have a job but wants to be employed, and is actively seeking employment. The brevity and simplicity of such a definition, although useful for many observations, is inadequate for describing the total depth and extent of unemployment; and it overlooks completely the problem of "underemployment," which covers other forms of manpower waste.

Problems of definition can be particularly critical when studying the employment problems of disadvantaged persons. For example, a very important characteristic of unemployment, which also emphasizes the seriousness of the problem in Oakland, is the "duration of unemployment." During 1966, for the nation as a whole, the average unemployed person went without work for about 10 weeks. In Oakland the average duration exceeded 20 weeks. But how many apparently able-bodied men, living in circumstances of poverty, are not even listed among the unemployed because they are too exhausted by repeated discouragement to continue searching? This is often referred to as "hidden" or "disguised" unemployment. It also occurs during periods of reduced job opportunities when many persons, whose income may be important but not essential to family maintenance, may stop searching for employment. This effect is particularly evident among teenagers, older men, and, to a lesser extent, women in prime-working-age groups. Recent studies suggest that nonwhites are particularly susceptible to all forms of "hidden unemployment."

One form of underemployment involves part-time workers who want full-time employment. During the summer of 1966, of Oakland's total labor force, 5 per cent or well over 8,000 were part-time workers in this category. This situation is most often experienced by the unskilled, the less educated, the young, and the black worker.

Underutilization of skills is still another type of manpower waste. Specific data on this problem in Oakland are not available. However, general evidence suggests that, particularly among minorities and in areas of severe unemployment, many persons find it necessary to work at jobs well below their highest skill level. For these reasons, it is likely that this is a probem of considerable extent in Oakland.

Evidence from studies made in other cities in the United States suggests that as much as 40 per cent of the labor force in Oakland's Target Areas (compared with its 13 per cent unemployment rate) would meet criteria reflecting an overall underutilization of human resources.

TABLE 45

Civilian Employed Residents by Class of Worker: Oakland, 1960 and 1966

Class of Worker	Number		Per Cent	
	1960	1966	1960	1966
Total Civilian Employed	144,620	149,430	100.0	100.0
Private Wage and Salary Workers	108,590	107,380	75.0	71.9
Government Workers	22,980	29,390	15.9	19.7
Self-Employed Workers	12,240	11,890	8.5	7.9
Unpaid Family Workers	810	770	0.6	0.5

Source: SRC-4.

GENERAL CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Economists generally agree that much unemployment results from malfunctions of the local and national economy; several of these factors are discussed here.

Economic Cycles. In all highly complex economic systems, growth does not occur as a smooth continuum. Rather, growth tends to be cyclical, typically marked by undulations and erratic stops and starts. Almost any significant dip in the rate of economic growth also means a temporary drop in overall production. And unhappily, as production continues to drop and the demand for labor declines, the rate of unemployment increases. A return to the same or higher levels of employment usually can be effected by widespread spending by government, business, or the consumer.

Seasonality. Seasonal unemployment occurs in certain industries whose level of activity (and job opportunities) fluctuates according to seasonal factors—such as the growing cycle for food processing, the rainy season for construction, and holiday periods for trade. Such unemployment is usually brief and typically predictable. No decrease generally occurs in the overall demand for the skills of those temporarily unemployed.

Structural Unemployment. Another cause of unemployment consists of basic changes in the structure of the economy which leave unemployed workers with skills that have been made obsolete and are no longer wanted. Called "structural unemployment," this condition is extremely difficult to combat effectively and is particularly resistant to simple solutions. One of its dimensions, technological change, causes an increasing demand for high skills and a decreasing demand for low skills. As a result, the low-skilled person is the first to be laid off. Further, the lower his skill, the poorer his chances of re-employment in another, but similar, occupation.

FIGURE III

Civilian Employed Residents by Industry of Employment: Oakland, 1960 and 1966[a]
(Number of Persons in Thousands)



Source. SRC-5.

a. The small employment in agriculture and mineral extraction is not shown here.
b. "Services" includes jobs in public education and private households.
c. "Public Administration" is equivalent to "government" as used elsewhere but excluding public education.

Racial Discrimination. One basic cause of unemployment, which is fundamentally independent of the demands of the economy, can be traced to racial discrimination. According to recent studies, unemployment because of race persists quite independently of such factors as age, sex, education, or experience. Only about half of the excess of nonwhite over white unemployment rates can be explained in terms of these nonracial factors.

CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN OAKLAND

Most of the unemployment found in urban areas can be traced to one or more of the above general causes. However, Oakland's unemployment problems require additional analysis because its rate of unemployment is considerably higher than that in other large cities.

In recent years, several factors which contribute to the city's unemployment have been identified as being somewhat peculiar to Oakland. However, it is not clearly understood which of these factors are primarily responsible for the unusually high rate of unemployment.

Oakland has felt the impact of all the general economic and social factors causing unemployment. Chapter 5 noted that substantial job losses occurred between 1959 and 1965 in manufacturing—an activity

FIGURE IV

Commuters to and from the City and Residents Working within the City by Industry: Oakland, 1966[a]



Source: SRC-5.

a. See Footnotes to Figure III.

which traditionally employs large numbers of low-skilled workers. Oakland lost over 10,000 jobs. San Francisco was the only other Bay Area city which showed comparable losses. However, even in this instance San Francisco, with two and one-half times the population, lost a smaller number of jobs in manufacturing than Oakland did. In other blue collar industries (TCU and wholesale trade), Oakland also experienced some loss while most areas in the region registered gains. All these job losses were the combined result of technological change and the relocation of establishments from Oakland to county areas outside the city (*Table 48*).

This problem was further complicated because most of the vigorous industrial growth in Alameda County during this period located in the southern part of the county. This placed many jobs beyond reasonable commuting range for Oakland's unemployed who traditionally depend heavily upon public transportation.

One example of seasonal, and to some extent of structural, unemployment in Oakland is the gradually declining food processing industry. Food processing is traditionally one of the most important industries for both the city and the county as a whole. The nature of this industry's basic products causes a seasonal variation in the levels of operation. Recent studies suggest that the periodic rise and fall in the Welfare Department's caseload is strongly influenced by this industry.

In recent years, the overall job gain in Oakland, when compared with other areas in Alameda County, has been very slight (*Table 49*). Projections for the next two decades, however, show a steady increase in total jobs at the rate of 1 to 1.5 per cent per year. But Oakland's economic role is also in a state of transition—away from manufacturing and blue collar jobs toward the service industries and white collar jobs. Since a low rate of unemployment for Oakland appears to be closely related to the availability of blue collar jobs, this transition may blunt the beneficial effects that an increase in total jobs might otherwise suggest.

Racial discrimination, one of the basic causes of unemployment, is clearly at work in Oakland. Precise documentation of direct discrimination is difficult to assemble. However, considerable general evidence suggests that the problem is an important factor in unemployment.

Thus all of the basic economic and social causes of unemployment which have been identified in most of the nation's large cities are also present in Oakland. However, the answer to Oakland's unusually high rate of unemployment remains unclear. Is the high rate tied to a greater abundance of these basic problems, or does the high rate stem from conditions unique to Oakland? The answer may lie somewhere in between—an interwoven combination of basic causes and unique susceptibility.

Within the Bay Area, Oakland has suffered more severely than any other area because of at least one of the basic economic factors—structural unemployment caused, in this case, by the out-migration of manufacturing. As to other basic factors, with the possible exception of "seasonality," Oakland may not have much more of a problem than other large Bay Area cities.

However, Oakland may be unusual within the Bay Area because an uncommonly high percentage of its citizenry are *susceptible* to these basic economic and social causes of unemployment. Oakland has a disproportionate share of the poor,

the low-skilled, and the minorities. This situation probably began during World War II. Government war industries, particularly shipbuilding, attracted large numbers of out-of-state persons. These migrants were often poorly educated and low-skilled. With the end of the war and the contraction of industry, many of the migrants remained stranded. Handicapped by inadequate training, they were unable to transfer to new jobs. Since then, the ranks of the low-skilled have expanded steadily.

One reason for the disproportionate growth of the potentially unemployed is that a pattern of migration may persist long after the opportunities which initially encouraged it have disappeared. Also, a broad range of Federal programs in general (Indian training programs in particular) may have contributed to attracting low-skilled persons to Oakland. The inability of these programs to achieve 100 per cent success would increase even further the number of unemployed in the city.

TABLE 47

Unemployment Rates by Sex and Age: Oakland and the United States, May Through August, 1966

Rates	Per Cent of Civilian Labor Force Unemployed	
	Oakland	United States
Crude Rates		
Total (All Civilian Workers)	8.4	4.1
Males 20 Years and Over	4.8	2.3
Females 20 Years and Over	8.3	3.9
Both Sexes, 14 to 19 Years	30.5	13.0
Seasonally Adjusted Rates		
Total (All Civilian Workers)	7.7	4.0
Males 20 Years and Over	4.6	2.5
Females 20 Years and Over	7.5	3.9
Both Sexes, 14 to 19 Years	26.7	12.4

Source: SRC-4.

TABLE 46

Average Annual Unemployment Rates by Color: 10 Central Cities, 1967

City	Total	White	Nonwhite
Total United States	3.8	3.4	7.4
New York	4.1	3.9	5.3
Los Angeles-Long Beach[a]	6.6	6.0	9.1
Chicago	4.3	2.8	8.2
Philadelphia	4.4	3.2	7.5
Detroit	5.2	2.9	9.8
San Francisco-Oakland[a]	6.3	4.9	9.6
Washington, D.C.	2.1	[b]	2.8
St. Louis	6.6	3.5	11.3
Cleveland	5.8	3.4	10.1
Baltimore	5.5	3.3	8.0

Source: SRI-2.

a. Total for two cities combined.
b. Not shown separately where unemployment level is less than 5,000.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OAKLAND'S UNEMPLOYED

Young people are particularly susceptible to unemployment. For those persons between the ages of 20 and 24, Oakland's unemployment rate in 1966 was nearly twice as great as that found in the prime working years between 35 and 44. Below the age of 19, the rate of joblessness in Oakland (and most other central cities) is over five times the rate for the prime working years (*Table 50*).

The high rate of unemployment among young people is the result of a number of interrelated factors. The supply of low-skilled entry-level jobs continues to decline. And the corresponding increase in jobs requiring higher skills particularly affects the young, who are less able to compete successfully because of inadequate training, experience, or general education.

Inadequate training or education, although primarily associated with the young, represents a severe handicap to

TABLE 48

Percentage Change in Number of Jobs by Standard Industrial Classification: Oakland and Alameda County Excluding Oakland, 1960-1966

Standard Industrial Classification	Oakland	Alameda County Excluding Oakland
Total, All Industries	2 3	35.3
Construction	8.1	3.1
Manufacturing	—25.0	45.6
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities	6.7	40.3
Wholesale Trade	—7.1	39.2
Retail Trade	10.8	27.5
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	15.4	10.1
Services	20.7	46.8
Government[a]	25.4	46.3

Source: SRI-2.

a. "Government" includes jobs in public education.

persons of *all* ages. Oakland's serious and widespread structural unemployment suggests that inadequate education or training also is widespread among the unemployed. In 1966, the median educational attainment of Oaklanders 25 years of age and over was 12.4 years. For the unemployed in the same age groups, the median educational level was one year less. This one-year differential may be far less important than the qualitative differences in education which probably exist between the average employed and unemployed person.

For both whites and nonwhites, unemployment rates in Oakland are substantially above the average for the nation's large cities. However, in Oakland—as is common throughout the country—a much larger proportion of black and Spanish-surname than *white* persons are unemployed (*Table 50*).

Although the black person is more likely to be low-skilled or inadequately trained, the possibility of his becoming unemployed continues to be greater than for his *white* counterpart even with identical educational attainments. The difference in the rates of unemployment is particularly evident for those persons with educational attainments below the college level. In general the higher the educational attainment, the smaller the disparity between *white* and black unemployment rates (*Table 51*). For example, in 1966 four per cent of all *white* male high school graduates in Oakland were counted among the unemployed while 10 per cent of all black males with equal educational attainment went without work. However, for those males who had achieved some college education, the rates were 5 and 6 per cent for *whites* and blacks respectively.

For the city's labor force as a whole, the unemployment rate among men has declined steadily since 1950. Unemployment among women also declined during the 1950's. However, since 1960, unemployment among women has increased a significant 60 per cent. This gain may reflect the rapidly growing number of women entering the labor market rather than a relative decline in the number of jobs. Only slightly more than half of all unemployed women came from families without other working members. By contrast, nearly three-quarters of the unemployed men came from families whose support appeared to depend entirely on his income. These findings suggest that a large proportion of women searching for work are doing so for the purpose of supplementing the family income. However, in 1966 the unemployment rate of 14 per cent for black women was substantially higher than the 8 per cent rate for *white* women. The burden of unemployment among black women may be even more severe than the percentage difference indicates because of their higher probability of having a lower total family income.

When the unemployed in Oakland are

TABLE 49

Total Jobs by Subarea: Alameda County, 1960 and 1966

Subarea	1960	1966	Per Cent Change
Total	352,100	417,200	18.5
Oakland	178,900	183,000	2.3
Emeryville-Berkeley-Albany	65,000	80,000	23.1
Alameda	18,500	22,200	20.0
San Leandro	27,000	38,300	41.9
Southern Alameda County	62,700	93,700	49.4

Source: SRI-2.

TABLE 50

Unemployment Rates by Ethnicity, Age, and Sex: Oakland, 1966

Ethnicity and Age	Per Cent of Civilian Labor Force Unemployed		
	Total	Male	Female
Total	8	7	11
Ethnicity			
White without Spanish Surname	6	4	8
White with Spanish Surname	12	10	15
Black	12	11	14
Other Nonwhite	8	4	a
Age			
14 to 19 Years	31	29	32
20 to 24 Years	10	9	12
25 to 34 Years	7	6	9
35 to 44 Years	6	4	9
45 to 64 Years	5	4	6
65 Years and Over	5	1	9

Source: SRC-4.

a. Not reported due to inadequate sample size.

TABLE 51

Unemployment Rates by Education, Sex, and Ethnicity: Oakland, 1966

Educational Attainment	Per Cent of Civilian Labor Force Unemployed						
		Males			Females		
	Total[a]	Total[a]	Black	White without Spanish Surname	Total[a]	Black	White without Spanish Surname
Total	8	7	11	4	11	14	8
College Graduation	3	2	b	2	4	b	4
Some College	6	5	6	5	7	10	6
High School Graduation	7	6	10	4	9	17	6
Some High School	15	11	15	7	20	22	18
Grade School or Less	9	8	12	4	11	8	15

Source: SRC-4.

a. Total includes other ethnic groups not shown separately.

b. Sample size is too small for a meaningful estimate.

described in terms of occupation, the resulting pattern suggests that, here too, inadequate educational attainment is an important underlying factor. Typically, those occupations which require the greatest amount of education sustain the lowest average unemployment rates. And, conversely, the highest rates of unemployment appear in occupations which require the least education or training (*Table 52*).

Some minor variations occur in this relationship. For example, an unusually high rate of unemployment occurs in the semi-skilled occupations because of the seasonal nature of the large food processing industry. The situation is reversed in the category of managers and proprietors; many of these positions are highly individualized and tend to be filled through promotion within firms.

As a group, the unemployed in Oakland carry an additional handicap beyond the problems of inadequate training, age, or race. Most persons who are unemployed held their previous jobs for relatively short periods of time. In 1966, more than three-fourths had held their last job less than one year, while almost one-third were previously employed for a period less than one month in duration.

FUTURE EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Structural unemployment has been and will continue to be the most widespread form of unemployment in Oakland. Since the end of World War II, Oakland has continued to lose jobs in the manufacturing industries, primarily because of plant relocation but also because of technological change. The increase of jobs in the service industries has partially offset the loss of manufacturing jobs but did not fully compensate for those unemployed as a result of the loss. The new jobs appearing in the service industries often required skills the unemployed did not possess.

Projections into the next two decades

suggest that the number of jobs in manufacturing will continue to decline, although at decreasing rates. At the same time, jobs in the service industries and in government will continue to increase at rates sufficient to more than offset job losses in other sectors. By 1985, total jobs in Oakland can be expected to increase by 41,000 over the 1966 level—a 22 per cent increase. By contrast, total jobs in Alameda County during this period are projected to increase by 190,000—a 46 per cent jump.

Forecasts of these jobs by occupation show substantial upswings in the professional, managerial, services, and clerical fields in both Oakland and Alameda County. Slower growth rates or even declines are anticipated for sales workers and blue collar workers—particularly the lesser skilled and repetitive occupations in manufacturing (*Table 53*).

Translating projections of Oakland's future population into labor force projections results in 213,000 potential workers by 1985—a 29 per cent increase over the 1966 level. However, these figures show a significant increase in the number of young nonwhites in the labor force, the very group most likely to be unemployed today because of a combination of inadequate experience, training, education, and racial discrimination (*Table 54*).

Although Oakland can expect a substantial net increase in the number of jobs, overall changes in the national economy, combined with Oakland's shifting role, suggest that entry-level jobs in the future will require workers with higher skills or higher educational attainment than at present (*Table 55*). Thus, if these projections prove correct, Oakland can expect unemployment problems of greater magnitude than at present unless public policy effectively mitigates many of the fundamental causes.

TABLE 53
Jobs by Occupation:
Alameda County and Oakland, 1966, 1975, and 1985
(Thousands)

Occupation	1966	1975	1985
Alameda County			
Total	417.2	495.0	607.1
Professional, etc.	79.7	98.7	123.9
Managers, etc.	26.0	33.0	43.6
Clerical, etc.	71.5	93.0	126.7
Sales	35.2	39.7	43.7
Service (Including Private Household)	55.6	67.1	81.3
Blue Collar (All Other)	149.2	163.5	187.9
Oakland			
Total	183.0	194.3	224.1
Professional, etc.	26.3	31.8	40.7
Managers, etc.	14.4	15.4	17.6
Clerical, etc.	37.6	42.7	52.5
Sales	18.7	18.3	18.0
Service (Including Private Household)	24.6	26.5	30.1
Blue Collar (All Other)	61.4	59.7	65.2

Source: SRI-2.

TABLE 52
Unemployment Rates (for Experienced Civilian Labor Force Only)
by Occupation: Oakland, 1966

Occupation	Per Cent of Civilian Labor Force Unemployed		
	Total	Male	Female
Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers	2.3	2.7	1.8
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors	1.8	1.4	3.1
Clerical and Kindred Workers	6.4	3.6	7.6
Sales Workers	5.7	5.5	6.0
Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred Workers	6.4	6.2	[a]
Operatives and Kindred Workers	11.4	7.2	22.8
Private Household Workers	10.7	[a]	11.0
Service Workers Except Private Household	10.3	7.3	13.0
Laborers	13.0	13.3	[a]

Source: SRC-4.

a. Not reported due to inadequate sample size.

MANPOWER PROGRAMS

At present there are in Oakland a wide range of programs aimed at reducing unemployment. The basic techniques available for such programs include job creation through economic development, job placement, and job training. Other techniques include various ways to improve access to the new job opportunities being created in outlying areas.

Training programs have received particular attention in recent years. The extent and variety of these programs are at least partially a response to the recognition that structural unemployment due to inadequate education, training, or experience is a particularly widespread problem in Oakland.

The major programs and local agencies involved in combatting unemployment are described below.

MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING ACT (MDTA)

The Federally-supported occupational training programs under this 1962 Act are generally designed to equip the unemployed with skills which are in local demand.

MDTA (Institutional). MDTA's Institutional programs provide occupational training in a classroom setting, using either public or private educational facilities. The State Department of Employment—which determines whether a need exists for a specified number of workers with a particular skill and whether workers who receive training in that skill will have a reasonable chance of finding employment in the local labor market—initiates the training programs. In Oakland, this training is given at the East Bay Skills Center and administered by the Peralta Junior College District.

MDTA (OJT). The OJT (on-the-job training) program combines instruction with work experience to qualify a trainee for a particular occupation. Trainees are hired by local industry at entry wages and are trained at the job site by fellow employees or special instructors.

MDTA (241). Because Oakland is an area

TABLE 54

Total Labor Force by Age, Sex, and Color: Oakland, 1966, 1975, and 1985
(Thousands)

Age and Sex	1966			1975[a]			1985[a]		
	Total	White	Nonwhite	Total	White	Nonwhite	Total	White	Nonwhite
Total Labor Force 14 and Over	165.0	111.2	53.9	170.8	86.9	83.9	212.8	66.2	146.6
Male									
Total 14 and Over	96.5	66.5	30.0	96.5	51.2	45.3	120.1	39.7	80.4
14-19	7.1	4.2	2.9	10.2	3.7	6.5	13.9	3.1	10.8
20-24	11.5	8.1	3.4	15.8	5.7	10.1	20.9	5.1	15.8
25-34	19.5	12.6	6.9	24.5	12.3	12.2	39.1	9.6	29.5
35-44	18.0	11.8	6.2	14.0	8.0	5.9	21.9	8.3	13.6
45-64	37.3	26.9	10.3	29.2	19.1	10.1	21.9	11.9	10.0
65 and Over	3.2	2.9	0.3	2.9	2.4	0.5	2.4	1.7	0.7
Female									
Total 14 and Over	68.5	44.7	23.8	74.3	35.7	38.6	92.7	26.5	66.2
14-19	7.4	5.0	2.3	7.9	3.1	4.8	11.2	2.6	8.7
20-24	9.7	6.4	3.3	12.3	4.1	8.2	16.6	3.8	12.9
25-34	12.5	7.8	4.7	16.8	7.1	9.7	25.3	4.7	20.6
35-44	12.2	6.2	5.9	9.8	4.3	5.6	17.8	4.6	13.2
45-64	24.0	16.9	7.1	24.0	14.5	9.5	18.5	8.6	9.8
65 and Over	2.7	2.3	0.4	3.4	2.7	0.7	3.2	2.2	1.0

Source: SRI-2.

a. These 1975 and 1985 figures are based on the low-white/high-black (LWHB) population projections discussed in Chapter 3.

TABLE 55

Experienced Civilian Labor Force by Occupation: Oakland, 1966 and 1975 (Thousands)

Occupation	1966	1975	Per Cent Change
Total	160.0	168.6	5.3
Professional, etc.	19.3	20.8	7.4
Managers, etc.	17.1	19.1	11.3
Clerical, etc.	35.8	41.0	14.6
Sales	10.3	8.9	—13.9
Craftsmen, etc.	17.7	16.2	—8.6
Operatives, etc.	22.5	24.2	7.5
Private Household Workers	7.5	6.5	—13.2
Service Workers Except Private Household	18.4	22.0	19.5
Laborers	11.4	10.0	—12.7

Source: SRI-2.

with persistently high unemployment, unemployed persons residing in the city may be eligible for training and allowances under Section 241 of MDTA without restrictions that apply to other sections of the Act.

CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM (CEP)

CEP is an outreach program aimed at finding hard-core unemployed persons in the Target Areas and providing them all the help needed to return them to gainful employment. Enrollees are referred either to schools, training programs, or jobs. Where necessary, support services such as medical aid, child care, and legal aid are provided. This program also is Federally-funded.

JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN THE BUSINESS SECTOR (JOBS)

Through the independent and nonprofit National Alliance of Businessmen, efforts are made to increase the rate of employment and training of the hard-core unemployed. Job pledges are obtained from industry while Federal support is provided in the form of reimbursements for training, counselling, and transportation.

WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM (WIN)

The newly-created Federal WIN program is designed to reduce family dependence on welfare assistance by returning family members to productive employment. This goal is pursued through a coordination of social and manpower services. Persons are typically referred to one of the previously mentioned programs.

NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS (NYC)

The NYC program, aimed at persons under 21, provides work experience in summer and other temporary jobs. It tries to help make it possible for young people to return to or remain in school, or at least to prepare them for useful and substantive vocational training. This program is also Federally-financed.

JOB CORPS (JC)

The Job Corps, also Federally-supported, provides basic and vocational education to out-of-school, unemployed persons aged aged 16 through 21. Recruitment and screening are provided through the Department of Employment. Trainees from this area typically have been enrolled at Camp Parks in southern Alameda County.

OAKLAND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, INC. (OEDCI)

OEDCI is Oakland's Community Action Agency, funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. As part of its responsibility for administering the City's anti-poverty programs, this organization runs the Neighborhood Youth Corps Program and is also the prime contractor in Oakland for the Concentrated Employment Program.

OAKLAND MANPOWER COMMISSION

The Oakland Manpower Commission was established by the City Council for the purpose of coordinating Federal, State, and local employment programs and to develop a comprehensive program for recruitment, training, and placement of the unemployed.

COOPERATIVE AREA MANPOWER PLANNING SYSTEM (CAMPS)

The CAMPS program is an effort to foster coordination in planning and action at the local level among Federal, State, and local agencies that have responsibility in the manpower field. Eight Federal agencies are signatory to the CAMPS agreement. The program has received only limited Federal support in the form of funds, staff, or legislative mandate.

GENERAL PROGRAM EVALUATION

Although attempts at retraining have given many persons the new skills required for employment, only minimal success has been achieved in returning Oakland's hard-core unemployed to work. Some $20 million is authorized for 1969 (*Table 56*); yet it has been estimated that not more than 2,000 persons will return to full-time employment as a result. This represents only half the number required to bring Oakland's level of unemployment down to the national average. Some of the problems which have prevented the manpower training and placement programs from achieving better results include the following.

The frequent lack of literacy among trainees, and the reluctance or low motivation of many persons these programs attempt to reach, often works against success.

A lack of accurate information on alternative career choices seems to be prevalent among potential young workers from poverty families. They know too little about the level of personal investment required or the returns once an occupation is achieved.

Inertia or vested interests in some institutions (including schools and particularly unions) which are concerned with jobs and training cause them to resist participation or cooperation.

The widespread reluctance of private industry to hire trainees in general and young workers from poverty backgrounds in particular can be partially traced to the following reasons.

1. Lack of information necessary to make accurate judgments of a job applicant's potential is typical with many firms. As a result, hiring standards often depend upon criteria which may be unrealistic or wholly arbitrary—a high school diploma, a clean police record, good grooming and diction, and white skin.

2. Tradition or inertia may prevent employers from redefining jobs to fit available young applicants.

3. Racial prejudice is persistent among the managers, workers, and customers of many firms in which young workers are likely to seek employment.

4. Foremen and supervisors often are unable to cope with young workers from different cultural backgrounds.

5. The level of legal minimum wages causes employers to expect an unreasonable degree of productivity which these young workers may initially be unable to achieve.

Although many of the programs and most of the funds directed toward unemployment originate with the Federal Government, the problem of unemployment is obviously and overwhelmingly a personal one for the City.

High unemployment rates correlate with high rates of family separation, prison incarceration, suicide, and mental illness. On the other hand, improved job opportunities can be expected to reduce the need for public subsidy of housing, health services, and welfare payments.

Economic and demographic projections for Oakland strongly suggest that the number of residents susceptible to unemployment will continue to increase, and the number of accessible lower skilled entry-level jobs will continue to decrease. Problems associated with unemployment can be expected to intensify unless there is vigorous public action to intervene in the basic processes which contribute to unemployment.

Earnest attempts at reducing unemployment are often undermined because of program inefficiencies and the reluctance of certain sectors of the community to commit themselves more fully to the program objectives. Much of the community reluctance stems from the dissimilar interests of business, labor, and minorities in general. There is no overall framework to relate specific program efforts to city-wide manpower and development objectives and to the special requirements of various sectors of the community.

What is sorely needed is effective coordination of the multitude of programs and agencies which focus on the problem of unemployment. Stanford Research Institute suggests that the output of these programs and agencies—in returning persons to full-time employment—would have to double to keep joblessness in Oakland

TABLE 56

Federal Budget for Manpower Programs: Oakland and the United States, Fiscal 1969 (Millions of Dollars)

Program	Oakland	United States
Total	$20.1	$2,105
Employment Service	$ 2.0	$ 315
MDTA Institutional	2.7	210
MDTA OJT	0.9	23
MDTA 241	1.7	22
CEP	3.6	495
JOBS	6.4	244
WIN	0.5	100
NYC	0.5	361
JC	1.2	295
Adult Basic Education	0.6	40

Source. SRI-2.

below the five per cent level. Unless a great increase in funds becomes available very soon, any significant increase in this output must be achieved through greater efficiency and better coordination. At present no level of government—local, state, or national—is in fact performing the kind of coordinative function which the problem demands.

Though much is known about unemployment, a wide range of difficult but important questions still remain unanswered—questions which concern not only Oakland's problems of unemployment but also the city's total human resources.

1. What are Oakland's human resource objectives?

2. Where are the specific points of conflict between training program objectives, city-wide economic development objectives, and the special requirements of different sectors of the community?

3. What are the implications of labor and job market trends on specific current and proposed methods for reducing unemployment?

4. How might limited local, State, and Federal resources best be deployed within Oakland?

5. What are the reasons for duplication and inefficiency in current unemployment programs within Oakland?

6. Who should be responsible for preparing and carrying out an overall plan for the full development of Oakland's human resources?

GENERAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Oakland's widespread unemployment is caused by factors both within and beyond its boundaries. But whatever the causes, the overwhelming fact of *excessive* unemployment remains to confront the public and private sectors.

The following implications often cross the lines of public and private interest. Indeed, total community interest, rather than separate interests, is the real concern.

CHANGING JOB-ENTRY REQUIREMENTS

A continuing decrease is expected in the number of entry-level jobs which require minimal education and training. Projections suggest that while most jobs will continue to be held by persons without specialized training, the majority of jobs will increasingly require greater preparation in basic education.

Accordingly, a greater emphasis in manpower training programs should be placed on basic educational instruction. Ways must be found to increase the proportion of young people who achieve basic educational skills at the secondary school and junior college levels. In the future, a full college education will become increasingly important.

DECLINE OF MANUFACTURING IN OAKLAND

A continuing decline in manufacturing is anticipated, with the city becoming increasingly characterized by white collar occupations in the service and administrative industries. In both basic educational and occupational training programs, young people in particular should be directed toward the expanding white collar occupations—sales, clerical, subprofessional, managerial, and professional.

EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Anti-discrimination policies appear to be more effective in government than in the private sector. A high proportion of Oakland's growing black population finds employment in government service. If in recent years the rapid increases in government jobs had not occurred, the unemployment rate in Oakland might have been much higher.

GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING OUTSIDE OAKLAND

While jobs in manufacturing are declining in Oakland, they are gaining in the outlying areas of Alameda County. This has produced a corresponding relocation of the jobs that many of Oakland's low-income and nonwhite workers previously held and which many of the unemployed may be qualified to fill.

In recent years, more and more workers have been forced to commute to jobs outside the city. However, the lack of a fully effective regional transportation network, coupled with other factors, strongly suggests that many new job locations are particularly inaccessible to the low-skilled or the nonwhite worker. Public, private, or cooperative transportation programs should be developed which are designed to help the potentially unemployed reach selected employment centers beyond the city's boundaries.

CONCENTRATION OF THE POTENTIALLY UNEMPLOYED IN OAKLAND

The low-skilled and the potentially unemployed continue to concentrate in Oakland. This is caused partly by the general lack of low-cost housing and the either intentionally or unintentionally restrictive housing policies in the remainder of Alameda County and the Bay Area as a whole. General open housing policies and programs to provide low-cost housing should

be instituted in Alameda County and throughout the region. Oakland should assume leadership in implementing this recommendation.

UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG MANY POPULATION GROUPS

In Oakland, persistent and serious unemployment is not just a problem facing the young. Many population groups are affected. Unemployment is common among nonwhite adults in general and nonwhite women in particular, persons of any age or race who are undertrained or undereducated, and persons of any race who have lost their jobs and are beyond their prime working years. Unemployment among black women is especially serious because a significant proportion of the black women searching for work are family heads. Proposals of any type which seek to solve the problems of unemployment should recognize the extent and seriousness of the problem among all these population groups.

OVER-GENERALIZED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

A public policy which encourages simple, unqualified industrial development may increase city revenues but also may make only slight contributions to the reduction of unemployment. The development of a new industry can, however, have a positive impact on unemployment if the unemployed can meet the industry's specific job requirements. Oakland should establish industrial development policies which especially encourage those industries which are not only economically viable but which *also* provide a high proportion of low-skilled entry-level jobs and opportunities for upward mobility within the industry.

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION EFFORTS

Racial discrimination continues to persist as a fundamental cause of unemployment and underemployment in Oakland. Current efforts by the Fair Employment Practices Commission to combat discrimination are often limited and indirect. It may be possible, and necessary, for the City of Oakland to become directly involved in the problem. The City already has certain unique powers which could be directly applied to combat employment discrimination in selected circumstances. By insisting upon maximum utilization of jobless residents and affirmative actions to recruit racial minorities, the City could increase opportunities for the unemployed through its capacity as an employer and a pruchaser of goods and services, and possibly through its licensing powers.

In addition, Stanford Research Institute has recommended that the City assume active leadership in combating discrimination through the establishment of a Human Relations Agency as part of the City government. The Agency could review local compliance with State and Federal provisions for equal opportunity in employment. Thus, its work would supplement the existing activities of Federal and State anti-discrimination agencies. The Agency's central purpose, however, would be to deal with discrimination through education and mediation. It would be responsible to a broadly representative Human Relations Commission which would include the poor, the unemployed, and racial minorities among its membership.

MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

In view of the magnitude and complexity of the unemployment problem, Stanford Research Institute concluded that current manpower programs are seriously inadequate. In addition, many questions continue to go unanswered which are important to the full utilization of Oakland's human resources.

SRI has recommended that the City of Oakland assume extensive involvement and leadership in employment and manpower development programs. This leadership might best be exercised by establishing a Human Resources Planning and Coordinating Agency. The Agency would be directly concerned with the overall problem of manpower development and would function within and be part of the City's administrative structure. As an important first step toward a truly comprehensive assault on the problems of manpower development, the Agency could engage in research, planning, and the coordination of the wide range of agencies and programs which focus on manpower training.

A Human Resources Plan would be a logical and necessary extension of these efforts. Such a Plan could provide an analysis of the total human resources problem and present an explicit set of goals and objectives. If possible, the goals would be expressed quantitatively so that a valid basis would be available for estimating costs and time requirements, and for measuring progress. The Plan could identify the proper governmental structure for achieving the goals as well as the public organizations and private groups which could contribute to their realization. Finally, the Plan could identify specific projects which would relate directly to the established goals.

PART IV

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND CIRCULATION

Chapter 7

PHYSICAL FORM

Oakland has a tremendous growth potential, but this growth must be balanced. Adequate land must be provided for all the city's different activities, and each activity must be located properly relative to the others. Further, the healthy development of each part of Oakland—and the quality of life there—rests largely on the presence of open space and other amenities and on the area's general visual quality.

Today much of Oakland's physical environment is shabby or dull, and the man-made city lacks clear "structure." Yet major changes in the physical environment are certain as rapid transit and other powerful factors become operative. To meet this challenge, effective "urban design" is essential.

The function of urban design is to mold a city's physical form creatively—through a continuing process—into a more efficient, more livable, more beautiful, and more dramatic urban environment.

Under the principles of good urban design, the City has the responsibility to see that all streets and other public facilities—in addition to their being individually well designed—provide in the aggregate a logical, visible framework which organizes and stimulates private development.

THE CITYSCAPE TODAY

Oakland's land-use pattern generally follows the topography in a series of strips parallel to the shoreline. Almost the entire waterfront is claimed by industry and transportation terminals. Next, on this industrial belt's inland side, is a long residential stretch (largely old and deteriorating houses) followed by downtown and the San Pablo Avenue-East 14th Street commercial strip.

Above this line, residential areas—interrupted by smaller commercial strips and clusters and (in the Hills) by remaining vacant lands—extend up to the ridgeline where a long band of regional parkland and institutions forms Oakland's northeasterly edge. Except for the high-quality, high-density Lake Merritt area, the quality of housing generally improves, and its age and density decrease, as elevation and distance from the shore increase.

Across this pattern, freeways and railroads have imposed strong barriers, isolating neighborhoods and separating the city's residents from their waterfront.

Except for this basic strip pattern, though, man-made Oakland lacks clear form. By-and-large it is still a sprawling, low-density city with centers that fail to look like centers and diffuse neighborhoods without strong physical identity.

However, new transportation facilities and other factors are creating enormous opportunities for restructuring and improving the physical environment. New freeways and arterials and the upcoming Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system will radically change movement patterns. General population growth and rising incomes—reflected already in the new high-rise apartments around Lake Merritt—will make it more and more feasible to create environmental variety and stronger form.

Oakland has a magnificent natural setting of hills, Bay, and wooded creeks, but all these are gradually succumbing to the corrosive effects of urbanization. The hills have been slashed by subdivision

MAP B

LAND USE, 1969

BERKELEY

ALAMEDA

PIEDMONT

SAN LEANDRO

SAN PABLO AVE.

TELEGRAPH AVE.

COLLEGE AVE.

BROADWAY

WARREN FWY.

GRAND AVE.

7th ST.

14th AVE.

FRUITVALE AVE.

REDWOOD RD.

FOOTHILL BLVD.

MAC ARTHUR BLVD.

HIGH ST.

SAN LEANDRO ST.

73rd AVE.

E. 14th ST.

98th AVE.

MAC ARTHUR FWY.

NIMITZ FWY.

- Low - Density Residential
  Less Than 8 Housing Units / Net Acre
- Low - Medium - Density Residential
  8 - 14 Housing Units / Net Acre
- High - Medium - Density Residential
  15 - 24 Housing Units / Net Acre
- High - Density Residential
  25 or More Housing Units / Net Acre
- Institutional or Governmental
- Commercial
- Park or Recreational
- Industrial, Utility, or Transportation
  Including Military Supply Depots and Wholesaling
- Vacant or Agricultural

Net residential acreage refers to parcels in actual residential use, and excludes streets, schools, etc.

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

MAP C

OBSERVED MAJOR PROBLEMS

BERKELEY

EMERY-VILLE

PIEDMONT

ALAMEDA

SAN LEANDRO

SAN PABLO AVE.

ADELINE ST.

TELEGRAPH AVE.

BROADWAY

WARREN FWY.

S.F.-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE

MAC ARTHUR BLVD.

FRUITVALE AVE.

FOOTHILL BLVD.

73rd AVE.

HIGH ST.

SAN LEANDRO ST.

98th AVE.

E. 14th ST.

MAC ARTHUR FWY.

NIMITZ FWY.

- Deteriorating Housing
- Unsightly New Apartments
- Deteriorating Commercial Area
- Scrap Yard or Derelict Industrial
- Severe Lack of Open Spaces
- Unsightly Streets
- Barrier
- Noise
- Power Line
- Quarry or Excessive Grading

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

grading and scarred in places by quarries. Along the shoreline, tidal marshes and open water have been replaced over the years by thousands of acres of fill. Many fine stretches of wooded creek still flow, but these are neglected and scheduled for massive reshaping for flood-control purposes.

Most of Oakland's residential areas are vast expanses of detached clapboard or stucco houses which, in sections east of Lake Merritt, are characteristically one-story. Within any given area, most of the lots and buildings are usually about the same size and height, resulting in a monotonous, uneventful texture with little local contrast.

Environmental choice is severely lacking. There are almost no row houses or true garden apartments or planned housing clusters with generous, car-free open spaces. In the flatter residential areas, hundreds of poorly designed and visually depressing apartment buildings have been constructed in recent years. Outside the Lake Merritt area, though, there are few apartment structures higher than two stories, and scarcely any hillside apartments with fine views.

The majority of residential streets below the MacArthur Freeway are drab, overly wide, and virtually treeless. Many neighborhoods have large amounts of housing in deteriorating or dilapidated condition. Many residential streets are seriously impaired by nearby signs and industrial and commercial uses. Noise from freeway traffic, airports, and other sources is very evident in much of Oakland. Nearly everywhere, overhead utility poles and wires mar the skyline; indeed, high-tension transmission lines slice across several neighborhoods.

Despite all these drawbacks, many fine opportunities exist for new residential development—for single-family houses on the big vacant sections of the Hills and for apartments in a great variety of locations.

Most of the commercial and industrial environment is visually chaotic and lacking in amenities. Most of the commercial areas are disorderly yet monotonous, and a great proportion of the industrial district is dingy and depressing. The assortments of competing signs and billboards result in chaos instead of communication. In the shopping districts, parking is often inadequate; usable plazas, exhibit areas, and similar amenities scarcely exist. Faced with changing traffic patterns, competition from new shopping centers, and other factors, some commercial areas are visibly decaying.

But new commercial development is a good possibility in a wide variety of locations. In the industrial belt, the existing scrapyards, derelict areas, and vacant or underused sections present opportunities for new industrial development or modern ship terminals. There also are possibilities for a research and conference center at Peralta Oaks, and a medical training center next to Medical Center Hill.

Vast sections of Oakland are severely lacking in parks, recreation areas, and other open space.

Yet the creeks offer great opportunities—simply through conservation of their natural quality—for the development of linear parks or clusters of creekside garden apartments. The shoreline has excellent potential for parks and marinas at many places. Other open space opportunities are offered by needed school expansions and new schools, and by underused or surplus land such as that under the Grove-Shafter/MacArthur Freeway interchange.

Many of Oakland's important streets are unsightly in the extreme, and the great majority are dreary and uneventful. Only a few have any significant planting.

However, obvious opportunities to improve the travel experience—through strategic planting and special design treatment—are offered by needed street widenings and new trafficways, and by certain existing streets with an unusual width, cross-section, or location.

GENERAL FORM ALTERNATIVES

Five factors contribute most significantly to Oakland's overall form:

1. residential densities;
2. the commercial pattern;
3. industry and the shoreline;
4. the open-space pattern;
5. the major circulation system.

Broad alternative policies for each of these factors are explained below, together with implications.

RESIDENTIAL DENSITIES

Alternative A: Concentric-Circle Pattern. This traditional pattern of highest density near the Central District Core would extend with rings of decreasing density out to the edge of the city. The current Oakland General Plan is based on this concept. The policy takes advantage of Core accessibility, but it rejects high-density develop-

FIGURE V: Residential Density Alternatives



MAP D

OBSERVED MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES

BERKELEY

EMERYVILLE

PIEDMONT

ALAMEDA

SAN LEANDRO

SAN PABLO AVE.

ADELINE ST.

TELEGRAPH AVE.

BROADWAY

WARREN FWY.

S.F.-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE

MAC ARTHUR BLVD.

FRUITVALE AVE.

FOOTHILL BLVD.

73rd AVE.

HIGH ST.

SAN LEANDRO ST.

98th AVE.

E. 14th ST.

MAC ARTHUR FWY.

NIMITZ FWY.

- Rapid Transit Station
  Under Construction
- High-Priority New Public School
  Schematic
- High-Priority Public School Site Expansion
- New or Widened Trafficway
  Planned or Needed

Opportunities for:

- New Apartment Buildings
- New Houses
- New Commercial Uses
- Medical Center
- Research and Conference Center
- New Industrial Development
- New Ship Terminal
- New Marina
- Creek Park or Conservation
- Other New Major Park
- Planting or Other Special Trafficway Treatment

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

ment in other locations. Its pattern would not encourage environmental variety *within* broad sections of the city.

Alternative B: Access and Amenity Corridors. Under this alternative, the highest density would still be near the Core, but there would also be an emphasis on other clusters and corridors of high density related to major transportation routes, open spaces, and creeks and other topographic amenities. Densities would decrease as distance from these corridors increased. However, this alternative would permit a wider choice of densities and housing types in all parts of the city, including the Hills.

Alternative C: Unstructured. Under this alternative, density increases would occur wherever the current market demanded, reflecting permissive zoning controls. The resulting dispersed pattern would offer a wide range of sites for development, but it would lead to a monotonous sameness between neighborhoods.

THE COMMERCIAL PATTERN

Alternative A: Sole Emphasis on Central District. Shopping and commercial employment would be concentrated in the Central District, with only moderate-sized centers permitted in the rest of the city. This policy, on which the present Oakland General Plan is based, assumes that the successful functioning of the Central District requires discouraging major commercial growth in other parts of the city.

Alternative B: Central District plus Other Major and Specialized Areas. Although the Central District would still be emphasized as the dominant center, three or four other *designated* major clusters (or "subregional centers") would also be encouraged. The functions in these centers would be planned and controlled to complement, rather than weaken, the Central District's functions. In smaller commercial areas and strips, a much clearer differentiation of functions and scale than exists today would be encouraged.

FIGURE VI: Commercial Pattern Alternatives



Alternative C: Unstructured. Unplanned changes in the commercial pattern would be permitted, with the location and scale of centers depending solely on market factors. Unforeseeable changes in shopping and traffic patterns could result, as well as a continued lack of specialization among commercial districts and a possible decline in the importance of the Central District.

INDUSTRY AND THE SHORELINE

Alternative A: Major Expansion of the Industrial Belt. Major horizontal expansion of the industrial belt would be emphasized, both inland (replacing adjacent old neighborhoods with factories and warehouses) and into the Bay (through extensive fill). Uncontrolled industrial expansion might leave little room for shoreline recreation.

Alternative B: Containment of the Industrial Belt. Under this alternative, only minor horizontal expansion of the industrial belt would take place, and little effort would be made to intensify use of existing industrial areas.

Alternative C: Intensification of the Industrial Belt. This policy could provide for some modest horizontal expansion, but the emphasis would be on making more intensive use of vacant, derelict, and underused lands *within* the industrial belt. Obsolete factories and docks would be replaced by modern facilities.

THE OPEN-SPACE PATTERN

Alternative A: Large Parks in the Hills. This alternative—really a continuation of the present pattern—would place empha-

FIGURE VII: Industry and Shoreline Alternatives



sis on extensive parks in the Hills, as well as a few large open-space opportunities in the flatter areas.

Alternative B: Large Parks in the Flatlands. This policy would emphasize creating large parks in the flats and lower hills, primarily continuous linear open spaces along neglected topographic resources such as creeks and the shoreline.

Alternative C: Small Parks in the Flatlands. Emphasis would be on a wide distribution of many small neighborhood and community parks in the flats and lower hills. In built-up areas, these parks would require acquisition and clearance of developed land.

THE MAJOR CIRCULATION SYSTEM

Alternative A: Continuation of Present Pattern. Under this alternative, only limited trafficway improvements would be made wherever unusual congestion occurred. Many bottlenecks and confusing intersections would remain. Visually, the trafficway pattern would remain essentially undifferentiated except for the freeways.

Alternative B: Freeway Emphasis. New freeway construction would be strongly emphasized, with many of the city's streets serving mainly as connectors between freeways. Car movement would dominate; no special effort would be made to encourage bus or rapid transit patronage.

Alternative C: Balanced, Hierarchical System. A clearly differentiated, hierarchical system of several trafficway levels would be developed. Freeway expansion would be limited, and a secondary and presently nonexistent level of expressways would be encouraged. Each trafficway level would have its own identifiable form and be connected to the next higher and lower levels in a recognizable pattern. In addition, patronage of public transportation would be strongly encouraged.

FIGURE VIII: Open-Space Pattern Alternatives



FIGURE IX: Major Circulation Alternatives



PROPOSED CHOICES

The alternative proposed below for each factor takes best advantage of Oakland's unique opportunities. At the same time, these recommendations are mutually supporting and would add up to an efficient, clear structure for the city.

Factor	Recommended Alternative
Residential densities.	Access and amenity corridors (B).
Commercial pattern.	Central District plus other major and specialized areas (B).
Industry and the shoreline.	Intensification of the industrial belt (C).
Open-space pattern.	Emphasis on expansion in the flats and lower hills — both in the form of small neighborhood and community spaces (related as much as possible to topographic opportunities) and in the form of major parks along selected creeks and shoreline sections (combination of B and C).
Major circulation system.	Balanced, hierarchical system (C).

PROPOSED GENERAL FORM

The development of a proposed city structure from the alternatives selected above involved setting forth certain basic design concepts, to be followed, and preparing a Design Structure map and a map of Illustrative Future Land Use.

BASIC DESIGN CONCEPTS

Intensity and Accessibility. The intensity of activity at each point should be related to the degree of accessibility there, and vice versa. For example, the largest concentration of shopping facilities should be served by freeways and rapid transit. (Application of this principle will take best advantage of transit and major-street facilities, and minimize through traffic in low-density areas.) Further, the intensity of activity at each point should be made clear by the scale, height, and spacing of buildings.



The Central District and Other East Bay Centers. The Oakland Central District—hub of all transportation modes—should be strengthened as the dominant functional and symbolic center of the East Bay. Its core will be linked by BART directly to San Francisco, to the downtown Berkeley-University of California cluster, and to important subregional centers at West MacArthur Boulevard, Fruitvale Avenue, 73rd Avenue, and downtown San Leandro. The crucial link to Berkeley along the Grove-Shafter Freeway/Telegraph Avenue spine should be accompanied by high-intensity corridor development.

Secondary Corridors. Secondary corridors of medium-high or high intensity are already beginning to form along important routes perpendicular to the intercity BART lines. They should be strengthened and clarified, serving as community activity spines and routes for convenient feeder bus service to the BART stations (thereby vastly extending the benefits from rapid transit). These corridors should be utilized as locations for higher density housing, which in turn will support adjacent commercial and recreational facilities.

Creeks as Activity Spines. The creek systen should be capitalized on as a positive element in the physical environment. Apartments should be encouraged to develop in corridors along important streams. Schools, recreation areas, and libraries should relate to creek channels in a recognizable and connected system of community facilities.

Public Use of the Waterfront. The almost-total industrial hold on the waterfront should be loosened, and recreational (and in some cases residential) use made of several large sections. To facilitate this, pedestrian routes and important trafficways such as Madison Street should be extended attractively to the water-edge. Indeed, the narrowness of the industrial belt at several places makes it practical to accompany these routes with an actual extension of residential or commercial facilities right down to the water.



DESIGN STRUCTURE

All these concepts translate into the pattern of three-dimensional forms shown in Map E. This Proposed Design Structure map suggests a future image (definite in its broad pattern, only illustrative in its details) toward which Oakland's physical form should evolve.

MAP E

PROPOSED DESIGN STRUCTURE

Only the dominant elements are shown—a coherent, city-wide network of major open spaces, the main circulation channels, and the highest intensity clusters and corridors of buildings. This skeleton provides an organizing framework within which growth—or "filling out"—can occur.

As discussed in the next chapter, certain freeways may be needed beyond those shown in Map E. These additional routes are not depicted here because their possible location remains uncertain. However, any such freeway should be carefully planned to fit into the design structure as a *positive* feature. It could, for example, run through one of the corridors of open space and high-intensity development shown in the Proposed Design Structure map.

LAND USE

These concepts are further translated into the future land-use pattern shown in Map F[1] (which can be compared directly with the existing pattern illustrated by Map B). For each area, a basic future use is suggested which would serve to achieve the policies proposed in this report and which represents the best thinking of the City Planning Department at this time. Obviously, changes in the map's detailed pattern may become desirable as conditions change.[2]

The approximate direction and magnitude of the proposed changes between the existing and future land-use patterns are suggested by Table 57. The future allotment of land provides scope for very substantial growth. Analysis suggests that the proposed pattern could comfortably accommodate a population of at least 600,000—well above the probable 1985 "high" projection of 547,000 discussed in Chapter 3.

TABLE 57

Land Use by Major Category (Percentages)[a]: Oakland, Existing and Proposed

Category[b]	Existing Land Use		Proposed Land Use
	Occupied	Total	Total
Total	100	100	100
Commercial	9	8	8
High-Density Residential	5	4	8
High-Medium-Density Residential	8	7	9
Low-Medium-Density Residential	18	16	12
Low-Density Residential	22	20	24
Industrial, Utility, or Transportation	23	21	21
Institutional or Governmental	4	4	5
Park or Recreational	12	11	13
Vacant or Agricultural	—	9	—

Source. UDT-1.

a. In absolute numbers, the city's existing total land area is 53.4 square miles.

b. Each category includes streets. "Residential" areas include the elementary schools and small neighborhood parks located in them. "Vacant" includes only large unoccupied tracts; scattered vacant lots are included in the other categories.

RESIDENTIAL AREAS

The first component of the Proposed Design Structure is formed by groups and areas of residential buildings.

Today a very high proportion of the city's neighborhoods exhibit:

- physical decay—gradual in most cases; or
- density increases—gradual in most areas, rapid in a few.

Accelerating population growth, code enforcement, public improvements requiring housing demolition, and many other factors will continue to cause extensive change.

Despite all this, many residential areas seem to be basically stable—neither decaying nor increasing in density. And every major part of Oakland has a heritage of well-maintained homes. Many of the city's individual houses are prime visual resources which should be preserved.

Because of such physical characteristics as unique architecture or interesting topography, a few neighborhoods have a strong feeling of identity. Unhappily, many areas have at best a very weak visible identity. A major objective in the design of both private and public facilities should be to increase each neighborhood's identifiability by strengthening its distinguishing characteristics.

In the future pattern proposed in Map F, nearly all existing residential areas remain in residential use. New areas are also recommended, notably in vacant sections of the Hills and at some shoreline locations.

THE DENSITY PATTERN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE

The monotonous evenness of texture, absence of local contrast, and lack of en-

1. The future land use shown in adjacent cities is based primarily on their adopted general plans or current planning studies.
2. As of this writing, the City is reviewing the Port of Oakland's Shoreline Plan. The Plan calls for major harbor and airport expansion into the Bay. The areas designated by the Port are schematic only and would require additional feasibility and engineering studies before they could be meaningfully mapped.
   In addition, there are three areas where an alternative land use would be highly desirable if the right circumstances arise:
   a. the area near West MacArthur Boulevard and Telegraph Avenue, next to Medical Center Hill, where a major medical training center could be located;
   b. portions of the Tidal Canal frontage, especially near the 29th Avenue bridge, where waterfront apartments might be built;
   c. the site of the existing General Motors plant on East 14th Street (shown as industrial in the map only because of this facility), which should be developed with housing if the plant should ever close.

vironmental choice across broad sections of Oakland have already been mentioned. Except in the areas near Lake Merritt, no strong, clear pattern of higher density centers or corridors exists.

Today the expensive, newer homes in the almost exclusively single-family hills contrast sharply with the cheaper, older houses and two-story apartments that characterize the flats. This contrast compounds the topographic and social differences between hills and flats. Enriching the mix of housing types within these broad areas would have both visual and social benefits.

In Map F a future pattern of residential densities is suggested which could accommodate very sizable population growth, while minimizing disruption to Oakland's existing stable lower density areas. At the same time, it would allow for a wider range of housing choice than exists today within each broad section of the city.

The proposed pattern would channel higher density development into a wide variety of locations offering accessibility and amenity.

The "accessibility" principle carries this meaning:

- Densities should be highest in the areas with the best accessibility.

Particularly high densities should be encouraged at or near *each* of the city's eight BART stations. Corridors of high or high-medium density (desirably several blocks wide_rather than just parcels on the major street itself) should develop along major trafficways. These should include especially a Grove-Shafter/Telegraph Avenue/Broadway corridor and several corridors across the areas east of Lake Merritt along routes such as 73rd Avenue. There should also be several high-medium- or high-density corridors in the Hills.

The "amenity" principle means, especially, that:

- As many people as possible should be allowed to live near such features as parks, creeks, and shorelines and on hillsides with good views.

Certainly, little advantage is now taken of such features. One answer should be the encouragement of apartment or townhouse clusters around public open spaces.

Special care is needed for hillside apartment construction which, while taking advantage of the view, should not block the view for others. At the same time, such construction must sensitively reflect the topography.

In the less accessible areas *between* the major corridors, densities should remain relatively low. In the flatlands, these are predominantly single-family, though often zoned to allow apartment construction. Some of these flatland sections should be retained as exclusively single-family areas. In others, while they would remain low or low-medium in density and predominantly single-family, a controlled admixture of well-designed town houses, small apartment buildings, and true garden apartments should be built.

LOW-RISE APARTMENT BUILDINGS

Cheaply thrown together on a small lot, the typical low-rise apartment building of recent years presents an environment dominated by parked cars and asphalt and is painfully short on planting, privacy, and livability. Little concern is shown for existing neighborhood character; a two-story tan "shoebox" insults its proud Victorian neighbor. Whether Victorian, shingle, or clapboard bungalow, the nearby homes soon succumb to demolition, and more shoeboxes sprout up.

The banning of low-rise apartments is not suggested. Rather, zoning amendments and review criteria should be developed (and *enforced*) to ensure that these buildings are more livable and that they are visually harmonious with their neighborhoods. For example, buildings with long exterior-access balconies should be discouraged. Incentives might be offered for developments which include specified amenities.

THE STREET SCENE AND TREE PLANTING

Most of the residential areas below the MacArthur Freeway are characterized by too-wide streets, a shortage of street trees, and an abundance of utility poles. The sketch below portrays this dreary, all-

MAP F

ILLUSTRATIVE FUTURE LAND USE

Certain details shown on this map are at variance with shoreline policies adopted by City Council subsequent to printing. For these differences, see "Oakland General Plan Additions and Revisions, 1966-1969."

BERKELEY

EMERYVILLE

PIEDMONT

ALAMEDA

SAN LEANDRO

SAN PABLO AVE.

TELEGRAPH AVE.

COLLEGE AVE.

BROADWAY

WARREN FWY.

GROVE ST.

GRAND AVE.

7th ST.

14th AVE.

FRUITVALE AVE.

REDWOOD RD.

FOOTHILL BLVD.

MAC ARTHUR BLVD.

KELLER AVE.

HIGH ST.

SAN LEANDRO ST.

73rd AVE.

E. 14th ST.

98th AVE.

HEGENBERGER RD.

MAC ARTHUR FWY.

NIMITZ FWY.

Area Reserved for Shipping-Facilities and Marine-Park Expansion

Area Reserved for Shipping-Facilities Expansion

Area Reserved for Airport and Marine-Park Expansion

- Low-Density Residential
  Less Than 8 Housing Units / Net Acre
- Low-Medium-Density Residential
  8 14 Housing Units / Net Acre
- High-Medium-Density Residential
  15 24 Housing Units / Net Acre
- High-Density Residential
  25 or More Housing Units / Net Acre
- Institutional or Governmental
- Commercial
- Park or Recreational
- Industrial, Utility, or Transportation
  Including Military Supply Depots and Wholesaling

Net residential acreage refers to parcels in actual residential use, and excludes streets, schools, etc.

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

too-common scene.

Obviously, massive tree-planting programs are called for in these areas, carefully formulated to serve the design objectives suggested in this chapter. As an idea, different species of trees could be used to differentiate whole neighborhoods.

Oakland should also vigorously pursue its policy of eventually undergrounding all utilities.

Look closely at the sketch above, which illustrates improvement of a typical flatlands minor street. The present dominance of asphalt is lessened by narrowing the roadway through new curbs and widened planter strips. These strips in turn provide generous space for street trees, planted at no more than 40-foot intervals on both sides of the street. Utilities go underground.

THE STREET PATTERN

In most of Oakland's flatter residential areas, the street pattern is a confusing patchwork quilt of mismatching, variously angled grids—with no evident focus but allowing through and rapid travel nearly everywhere.

The ideal solution calls for fast arterial streets which circumscribe residential areas of varying sizes. Each of the "precincts" so defined would contain a limited number of collector streets designed for relatively slow traffic. Off these collectors would be minor local streets which were either loops or cul-de-sacs.

From a practical standpoint, this ideal should be the model toward which gradual improvements in neighborhood street patterns are directed. A moderately successful effort in this direction was the Clinton Park Urban Renewal Project's installation of traffic diverters and narrowed roadways at intersections. The street patterns in many other areas would lend themselves to improvements of this type.

COMMERCIAL, CIVIC, AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS

The second component of the city's Design Structure takes in groups and areas of commercial, civic, and industrial buildings—places where people work and shop.

To help Oakland achieve its commercial and industrial growth potential, a variety of identifiable functional areas —which are strong enough to compete for Bay Area growth—is suggested. Toward this end, several principles should be followed.

1. Specialization of commercial and industrial areas should be encouraged through the grouping of similar or mutually supporting establishments into "financial centers," "auto rows," and so on.

2. A clear hierarchical structure of several different levels of commercial and civic areas—from the Central District Core to the neighborhood centers—should be established.

3. The visual quality of all commercial and industrial areas should be vastly improved; open spaces, planting, and similar amenities should be added to create more humane shopping and working environments.

4. Obsolete facilities and decaying areas should be removed, but old buildings should not be torn down merely because they are old; Oakland's many fine old commercial and industrial structures should be retained, wherever possible, and adapted to new functions.

THE GREATER CENTRAL DISTRICT

The 701 Project's urban design consultant recommends that the concept of the Oakland Central District be expanded—

- *from:* the area bounded by the Grove-Shafter Freeway, Lake Merritt, the Estuary, and 27th Street (that is, the area covered by the Central District Plan adopted in 1966),
- *to also include:* the areas on the northern and eastern sides of Lake Merritt, most of the land extending up to the MacArthur Freeway, and perhaps parts of West Oakland.

This "Greater Central District" is shaped in part by the topographic amenity of Lake Merritt and by the inner freeway network now taking definition.

Within this larger district, the high-intensity, retail-and-office Core along Broadway from 11th Street to Grand Avenue should be clearly dominant. Floor-area ratios and large-scale commercial development elsewhere in the city should be controlled to ensure this dominance.

The district should also include a variety of specialized, complementary commercial, civic, and recreational centers, as well as important close-in residential areas.

An "inner ring" of medium-intensity commercial development and close-in residential accommodations should surround the Core to provide services which support or supplement it. Beyond this, lower-intensity offices and business and consumer services should locate on the inner portions of Seventh, Grove, East 12th, and East 14th Streets and Telegraph, Grand, and West Grand Avenues.

The Civic Center should expand and intensify, with the addition of new public facilities and the stimulus provided by the adjacent BART station.

Auto Row, along Broadway from 24th Street to the MacArthur Freeway, is a long-established automotive district with a prominent central location and interesting surroundings. It should be preserved and, if possible, expansion room made available.

SUBREGIONAL CENTERS

Certain locations in Oakland *outside* the Central District also have important assets for major commercial investment. These assets include both visual amenity (parkside location, for example) and good accessibility (particularly the outlying rapid transit stations).

The proper development of several major subcenters within Oakland could so enhance the city's general image as to benefit, rather than weaken, the Central District Core itself. To safeguard the Core, however, the allowable intensity of development in these subregional centers should be less than in the Core.

West MacArthur and Pill Hill. Intensive commercial development, primarily offices, should cluster around the MacArthur BART station and extend along West MacArthur Boulevard to include the present MacArthur/Broadway shopping center. All this should be linked visually with the hospitals and doctors' offices of nearby Medical Center Hill ("Pill Hill"). As suggested earlier, the land between existing Pill Hill and the BART station offers an excellent site for some kind of medical training center.

Fruitvale. This center, along East 14th Street from about 28th to 36th Avenue, should include both retail and office facilities.

Eastmont. The nucleus of this primarily retail center would be the Eastmont Mall Shopping Center now expanding at 73rd and Bancroft Avenues.

Coliseum. This center would include a tight cluster of office and other facilities around the Coliseum rapid transit station. This development should be closely linked to the Coliseum Complex itself and to the adjacent commercial strip along Hegenberger Road leading to the Metropolitan Oakland International Airport. This strip is already becoming an airport-oriented corridor of large, freestanding "showcase" structures, especially motor hotels and office buildings.

SMALLER COMMERCIAL CENTERS

In addition to the Central District and the subregional centers, Oakland will continue to need many smaller commercial centers. The location and scale of these centers should be determined by their relative accessibility and trading-area population as well as by local amenities and established development patterns. Based on these principles, Map G suggests a tentative hierarchy of "neighborhood" and "community" centers.

A *neighborhood* center offers primarily convenience goods: those normally purchased on a daily or weekly basis. A food market is usually its biggest establishment. Examples are the present Glenview shopping district and the Lincoln Square Shopping Center.

By contrast, a *community* center provides a much wider variety of goods and services. Typically, its biggest establishments are junior department stores and supermarkets. Present examples include the Dimond and Montclair shopping districts.

Most of these centers shown on Map G would be primarily retail shopping areas. A few would specialize in nonretail activities—notably Jack London Square (restaurants, entertainment, and motels). However, a wide variety of commercial establishments—as well as apartments—should be encouraged in *each* center, to ensure activity both in the daytime and evening.

In form, the retail shopping areas should be either planned shopping centers (groups of buildings developed under single control on a large site) or the traditional shopping district (individually owned buildings with continuous storefronts along the sidewalk). In any case, the size and layout of each area should be determined by convenience and interest to pedestrian shoppers. Randomly located parking lots and open uses should not be allowed to disrupt important shopping frontages.

Each center should have some form of attractive plaza or usable open space; all should have adequate off-street parking.

COMMERCIAL STRIPS

By far the largest mileage of commercial streets outside the Central District is occupied by long strips of noncompact development along major trafficways. These consist largely of freestanding commercial buildings, separated from each other by parking lots, driveways, and even houses and apartments.

These areas serve many purposes. They offer less expensive land, space for drive-in facilities, and high-visibility sites for billboards and businesses oriented to passing auto traffic.

Their usual problems are poor visual quality—seeming endlessness, excessive paving unrelieved by any planting, gaudy and self-defeating signs, squalid back yards and overpowering rooftop billboards that blight nearby residential streets—and many sections of vacancy and obsolescence.

Several steps should be taken to improve these long, monotonous stretches:

- windrow buffer planting along rear property lines, especially right next to side streets;

MAP G

PROPOSED COMMERCIAL AND CIVIC AREAS

- strategic major planting along the streets themselves;
- breaking up the strips, by intensifying some portions of them and decommercializing others (with residential or office buildings or with public facilities such as schools and parks);
- developing specialized clusters of related activities, as another way to create "structure."

THE INDUSTRIAL AND TRANSPORTATION-TERMINAL BELT

Stretching along the total shoreline of Oakland, the great belt of industry, military supply depots, and ship and air terminals accounts for a third of the city's employment. Visually, this district's most striking aspect is its fantastic variety of forms, patterns, and environmental quality, in which the ugly and the elegant sit side-by-side.

The industrial belt's ragged boundary with the adjacent residential neighborhoods is a serious problem, depressing long stretches of housing.

Land-use changes should be made (employing urban renewal powers where necessary) which will simplify and stabilize this boundary. Local street patterns should be modified to keep industrial traffic out of residential sections. Along the border itself, adequate buffering should be provided through some combination of heavy planting and landscaped parking lots.

Within the industrial belt, large sections of vacant land still exist, particularly near San Leandro Bay. But more than this, there are several areas of spotty or seedy development which could be utilized far more intensively for industry or terminals —present clusters of open or vacant lots, old or dilapidated houses, or small-scale or derelict industrial buildings. Examples include parts of the Kennedy Tract (in Fruitvale below East 14th Street) and the underdeveloped area around Ernie Raimondi Field in West Oakland.

OPEN SPACES, CREEKS, AND THE SHORELINE

The third element of the proposed design structure is the open-space network — not only public parks, plazas, and recreation areas but also such park-like lands as college campuses and reservoirs, as well as wooded creeks and other natural open spaces.

Today the pattern of open spaces is heavily oriented to the Hills. Here, huge semi-wilderness parks occupy whole valleys, extending far out behind Oakland and descending through Joaquin Miller down to Dimond Park. There are challenging opportunities for making more intensive use of these spaces, as well as for adding to the park system. As an example: A continuous park strip could be woven through the Portuguese Flats area between Redwood Road and Oak Knoll Naval Hospital, linking up with Skyline Boulevard and the new Merritt College campus.

Unfortunately, this great park system ends at the foothills. Except for the beautiful and nationally acclaimed park around Lake Merritt, Oakland's ten-mile belt of flatlands and lower slopes is relieved only by school playgrounds and a handful of old-style rectangular city parks.

This glaring imbalance between the Hills and the flats must be corrected, and the needs of *all* Oaklanders for park and recreation space fulfilled. Map H suggests an open-space system intended to achieve this.[1]

THE SHORELINE

One of Oakland's greatest natural assets and recreational opportunities is its shoreline, yet little of this potential has been realized.[2] Of 19 miles of waterfront, barely more than a mile is accessible to the public.

Unquestionably, public access to the waterfront must be improved, and a wide range of activities should be encouraged to develop there — including public and commercial recreation, restaurants, marinas, and residential use. However, bay fill — to accommodate either these activities or industrial expansion — should be undertaken only upon clear and convincing evidence that its benefits will outweigh its resulting environmental and other costs.

Major recreational development should be concentrated in several large sections. These shoreline segments (most of them now vacant or underused) should include:

1. the section north of the Bay Bridge Approach;
2. the Central District shoreline;
3. Brooklyn Basin;
4. San Leandro Bay.[3]

In addition, smaller scale facilities should be provided at a variety of other locations, such as small fishing areas or plazas at ship terminals and the bridges.

Section North of Bay Bridge Approach. The shoreline north of the Bay Bridge Approach is indeed unique — undeveloped, semi-natural, with bright green tidal islands and strong-of-the-sea mud flats supporting a large wild bird population.

The vast sweep of water "open space" at this highly dramatic but strangely neglected gateway to the East Bay must be preserved. Nature's gift should be continued for wildlife preservation; and for man, a sizable "natural" shoreline park should be provided.

Central District Shoreline. The Central District's Estuary shoreline is a vital link in the continuous park which should be developed between Jack London Square and Lake Merritt. This portion of the shoreline should include a waterside pedestrian promenade, along with residential, recreational, and commercial facilities.

Brooklyn Basin. Farther southeast along the Estuary, Brooklyn Basin could be an excellent recreation area. The potential exists for adding to its present boating, restaurant, and marine-sales activities and for including some public park space and, perhaps, waterfront apartments. A shoreline pedestrianway would also be very

1. Small neighborhood parks and school playgrounds are omitted from the map because of their small scale, but should be understood as a vital part of the open-space system.
2. This fact is recognized in the Port of Oakland's Shoreline Plan, adopted in 1968, which contains proposals for public and commercial recreation areas at many places, alternating with industrial sections and expanded marine terminals.
3. The Port of Oakland's Shoreline Plan shows major recreational use in these same segments.

MAP H

PROPOSED OPEN-SPACE SYSTEM

Certain details shown on this map are at variance with shoreline policies adopted by City Council subsequent to printing. For these differences, see "Oakland General Plan Additions and Revisions, 1966-1969."

appropriate. (It would be highly desirable to connect such a pedestrianway, via an overpass across the Nimitz Freeway, to 14th Avenue and the San Antonio Park neighborhood close by.)

San Leandro Bay. San Leandro Bay should be preserved as a spacious body of water, with as much as possible of the bordering salt marshes retained in their natural state. The entire shoreline and a large amount of adjacent land should be devoted to park and recreation use. Finally, strong ties should be worked out to the Coliseum area and to San Leandro Creek.

THE CREEKS

Although Oakland possesses an extensive creek system, the streams have been ignored, and obliterated at many points, by unsentimental and unimaginative land development. The creeks have been viewed mainly as a flood hazard, a dumping ground, a breeding place for rodents and insects, and a police problem.

Yet the creek system, so badly neglected, is a precious natural resource. Its physical form and open-space opportunities must be recognized, and appropriate action taken to capitalize upon them.

Fortunately, the section-by-section program of the Alameda County Flood Control District will help remedy the flood and health hazards. At the same time, this positive action should open up the door for park and other programs to get under way. Flood-control designs, which tend to be single-purpose, should be re-examined and modified for multipurpose opportunities. Designs which preserve existing trees and natural character should be encouraged.

Quiet, wooded park strips with creekside walks—opening up at intervals to wider park areas—could be developed along several streams, including Sausal and San Leandro Creeks and portions of Temescal and Arroyo Viejo.

Although not necessarily developed as public parks, other creek sections (such as Peralta, Courtland, and Seminary Creeks) should be preserved and enhanced as spines of natural open space along which development that enhances this character should be encouraged.

Many fine sites for garden apartments exist along the creeks. Through special zoning provisions, those who develop creekside apartments should be encouraged to enhance the creek and incorporate it as usable and attractive open space, rather than culvert it or wall it off behind a parking lot. This concept is illustrated in the sketch below.

NEIGHBORHOOD AND COMMUNITY PARKS AND SCHOOLS

In addition to the larger, topography-based open spaces of city-wide significance, Oakland should vastly expand its system of parks and recreation areas at the neighborhood and community levels. Huge areas of the city are almost totally devoid of open space.

Oakland's public schools represent the most promising potential for adding open space and social and visual eventfulness to their respective neighborhoods. Present practice is dismal, for the schools usually do little visually to enhance their surroundings. The school yards are look-alikes—generally barren, treeless reaches of asphalt bounded by chain-link fences unadorned by vine.

With several new schools badly needed in Oakland over the next few years and with half of the existing schools at a bursting point for site expansion, a firm set of open-space principles should be followed.[1]

1. Wherever possible, new neighborhood parks and open spaces should be provided in conjunction with needed new schools and school expansion. Land requirements would be reduced by a sharing of facilities, and a unified, convenient combination of school, neighborhood recreation center, and landscaped park would result.

2. New and expanded schools and parks should "hook into" and enhance the city-wide network of major streets, important open spaces, and such natural features as creeks.

3. The appearance of all school yards, even those not requiring expansion, should be improved through tree planting and other measures.

Here are only a few of the important opportunities for additional neighborhood or community open space.

Merritt Campus. If the existing Merritt College site on Grove Street becomes surplus when the new junior colleges are opened, part of it could be developed into a major park to serve open-space-starved North Oakland.

Grove-Shafter/MacArthur Interchange. A park or recreation area should be created on the "dead" or surplus properties at the Grove-Shafter Freeway's four-level interchange with the MacArthur Freeway.

McClymonds High School. Expansion of McClymonds High School could be coordinated with provision of other local civic facilities and directed to the east, creating a strong community center for West Oakland which would be viewed from and in turn enhance Market Street or San Pablo Avenue.

Other Secondary Schools. Sizable parks could be created in conjunction with needed school expansion at Elmhurst,

1. High-priority new schools and site expansions are from recommendations developed in recent years by the School Building Committee of the Board of Education's Committee on Oakland School Needs. They are shown in Map D, except for a needed new high school even the schematic location of which is undetermined.

MAP I

PROPOSED MAJOR AVENUE PLANTING AND DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS

Frick, Hamilton, and Lowell Junior High Schools and at Fremont and Castlemont High Schools.

EBMUD Reservoirs. Recreation space should be developed above some of the East Bay Municipal Utility District's covered reservoirs.

SMALL, URBAN OPEN SPACES

Oakland has almost none of the small, intensively used plazas and similar "urban" spaces appropriate to major employment and shopping areas. Even City Hall Plaza, in the densest part of the Core, remains a chained-off garden rather than a usable space.

The recommendation is obvious. Usable urban plazas and attractive pedestrianways leading to them should be provided at various places in the Central District and at the outlying BART stations and commercial areas.

MAJOR TRAFFICWAYS

The fourth component of the Design Structure consists of major trafficways—important streets and freeways from which the individual sees most of the city.

Whether resident or visitor, many a person's most vivid impression of Oakland is probably the incessant dreariness of its streetscape. Certainly, major efforts should be made to improve its visual quality.

A massive street-tree planting program—with concurrent undergrounding and improvements in luminaires and other street furniture—should be started in the near future. Map I suggests important routes where major planting and other design improvements would be especially appropriate. Many of these are new streets or street widenings proposed (for traffic purposes) in Chapter 8. Along these streets, many of which will need a median strip, trees could be planted efficiently at the time of construction. Other streets, although not requiring widening, are strategically located or offer a special opportunity for planting because of particularly wide rights-of-way or unique cross-sections.

A DESIGN HIERARCHY

Oakland's existing major trafficway network is a confusing, largely undifferentiated system in which major streets are often barely distinguishable from minor ones. In many instances, neither street width, number of lanes, nor special planting provides a reliable clue to whether a street is intended for long-distance or purely neighborhood traffic. Throughout the city, the need is apparent for stronger visual differentiation of the various kinds of street.

To meet this need, a clearly defined design hierarchy of street types should be established. They should generally coincide with the functional types discussed in Chapter 8, although additional distinctions could be introduced for visual or topographic reasons. (For example, local streets in the flats could be distinguished from local streets in the hills.) Each level in the design hierarchy should be assigned a typical cross-section and a scale and type of planting and lighting appropriate to its purpose.

Streets are really everybody's business; all concerned agencies should work together in preparing such a detailed street-categories design plan.

GENERAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES

In general the design of major trafficways, and of development along them, should be guided by these principles.

1. There should be strong contrasts in the network—for example, between commercial and residential stretches or between intensively built-up sections and lower-density ones. Mile-after-mile of the same deadening pattern should be avoided.

2. While contrasts are important, a trafficway should also have some consistent underlying theme. Planting, street width, or relationship to a shoreline or other natural feature could provide this.

3. In most situations, the buildings along a street should be high enough (in relation to street width) and continuous enough to create a well-defined street channel with some sense of enclosure. Contrasting examples: most of downtown Broadway demonstrates good enclosure, while East 14th Street beyond 73rd Avenue exhibits a weak feeling of enclosure. Exceptions can occur where, for example, lack of enclosure is desirable to open up a good view. Also, the *degree* of enclosure should vary along a street to create contrast between different sections.

4. Trafficways should relate strongly to adjacent landmarks. In particular, major buildings should be encouraged to locate so that they highlight and enhance important intersections. An excellent example is the First Congregational Church at 27th and Harrison.

5. Trafficways should run, where possible, next to open spaces or should take advantage of interesting topography.

6. Almost always, a major trafficway should have street trees or other significant planting.

7. All utility lines and wires should be underground.

8. Light poles should have a uniform, pleasing design. Height and spacing should be appropriate to the type of street.

Best results occur when several of these principles work together. The portion of Grand Avenue from Harrison Street to MacArthur Boulevard is a model against which other streets may be judged.

Chapter 8

CIRCULATION

Unless new or widened trafficways are built, projected traffic growth will increase congestion on much of Oakland's vital circulation system.

With this need for extensive construction, careful planning is required to allocate limited resources among the many different possible projects. In response, the circulation study conducted by the 701 Project's Advance Transportation Planning Team developed a proposed major trafficway system for 1985, a list of specific street improvements needed to achieve this system, and recommendations for ongoing circulation planning.

The basic goal of all these proposals is to provide for the safe, fast, and efficient movement of people and goods—within Oakland and between Oakland and other parts of the region—by an integrated system of streets and highways, public transportation, and other circulation facilities. At the same time, the circulation system should help to achieve the land-use and environmental proposals made in Chapter 7.

EXISTING AND FUTURE TRAFFIC

Traffic can be discussed in many terms. In 1968 Oakland had some 33 miles of freeways and 766 miles of streets. The latter consisted of 167 miles of "arterials," 93 of "collectors," and 506 of "local streets." The important elements of this trafficway system (freeways, arterials, and collectors) are shown on Map J. Traffic flows on most of these elements are shown, for 1967, on Table 58 and Map K. One measure of traffic performance in 1967 is illustrated on Map L: peak-hour automobile travel times outward from 14th and Broadway via surface streets.

In 1965 total vehicle-trips affecting the Oakland Traffic Area—which consists of Oakland, Alameda, Emeryville, and Piedmont—numbered 1,095,000. In 1990 the number of such trips is projected to be 1,830,000—a 67 per cent increase.

For a better insight into overall travel patterns and how they will change, this total traffic flow in the Oakland Traffic Area can be broken down into:

1. external-external traffic (through trips without a stop in the Oakland area);
2. external-internal traffic (trips either beginning or ending in the area);
3. internal-internal traffic (trips both beginning and ending in the area).

External-External Traffic. The Oakland Traffic Area, with its central location in the Bay Region, accommodates a large volume of through trips. A major portion of the travel between the East Bay and West Bay traverses Oakland. Total through traffic crossing the Oakland area was an estimated 106,000 daily vehicle-trips in 1965. By 1990 vehicle-trips passing through the area are expected to double, jumping to 220,000 daily.

Figures X and XI show the major directional pattern of external-external traffic now and in the future. Although

MAP J

TRAFFICWAY SYSTEM, 1969

BERKELEY
EMERY-VILLE
PIEDMONT
ALAMEDA
SAN LEANDRO

SAN PABLO AVE.
SHATTUCK AVE.
TELEGRAPH AVE.
COLLEGE AVE.
CLAREMONT AVE.
ASHBY AVE.
HOLLIS ST.
STANFORD AVE.
GROVE ST.
GROVE-SHAFTER FWY.
(UNDER CONSTRUCTION)
BROADWAY
51st ST.
PIEDMONT AVE.
40th ST.
OAKLAND AVE.
ADELINE ST.
MARITIME ST.
27th ST.
HARRISON ST.
LAKE SHORE AVE.
ASCOT DR.
JOAQUIN MILLER RD.
14th ST.
MARKET ST.
GRAND AVE.
PARK BLVD.
WARREN FWY.
7th ST.
PERALTA ST.
CYPRESS ST.
MACARTHUR BLVD.
5th AVE.
14th AVE.
23rd AVE.
REDWOOD RD.
SKYLINE BLVD.
E. 8th ST.
E. 21st ST.
35th AVE.
FRUITVALE AVE.
E. 12th ST.
FOOTHILL BLVD.
KELLER AVE.
SEMINARY AVE.
HAVENSCOURT BLVD.
73rd AVE.
FONTAINE ST.
HIGH ST.
66th AVE.
GOLF LINKS RD.
90th AVE.
SAN LEANDRO ST.
98th AVE.
DOOLITTLE DR.
HEGENBERGER RD.
E. 14th ST.
BANCROFT AVE.
MACARTHUR FWY.
NIMITZ FWY.

Freeway
Freeway Connection with Surface Street
Arterial Street
Collector Street
All Streets in This Area Collectors Unless Otherwise Shown

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

FIGURE X

Vehicle-Trips per Day to, from, and through the Area by Direction: Oakland Traffic Area, 1965

Source: CS-3.

a. The Oakland Traffic Area consists of Oakland, Alameda, Emeryville, and Piedmont.

the majority of through trips use freeways rather than surface streets, this directional pattern may suggest where traffic could increase on these streets if and when the affected freeways reach capacity.

External-Internal Traffic. In 1965 travel to and from the Oakland Traffic Area amounted to an estimated 403,000 vehicle-trips daily, almost four times the number of through trips. The significance of this travel is greater to the City because all of these trips utilize the surface street system. In 1990 these trips are expected to reach 880,000 daily, more than double the 1965 number.

Areas north and south of Oakland are the largest generators of external-internal traffic. In 1965 flows from these directions were over three times as great as those involving areas to the east and west (*Figure X*). This pattern is expected to prevail in 1990, although the ratio will probably be even larger (*Figure XI*).

Internal-Internal Traffic. In 1965 about 586,000 vehicle-trips per day, or roughly 900,000 person-trips, had both their origin and destination within the Oakland Traffic Area. By 1990 these entirely-within-the-area trips will total 730,000—a 25 per cent increase.[1]

1985 Traffic on Major Streets. In order

TABLE 58

Average Daily Traffic on Freeways: Oakland, 1967

Freeway	Screenline	Average Daily Traffic (Vehicles per 24 Hours)
Nimitz	32nd Street	102,000
	14th Street	88,000
	Eighth and Cypress Streets	76,000
	Market Street	99,000
	Jefferson Street	83,000
	Broadway	97,000
	Jackson Street	105,000
	Oak Street	91,000
	Fifth Avenue	114,000
	Embarcadero	120,000
	23rd Avenue	118,000
	29th Avenue	114,000
	High Street	115,000
	Hegenberger Road	114,000
	98th Avenue	104,000
MacArthur	San Pablo Avenue	96,000
	Market Street	59,000
	West Street	74,000
	Webster Street	83,000
	Harrison Street	75,000
	Grand Avenue	100,000
	Lake Shore Avenue	91,000
	Park Boulevard	110,000
	Bruce Street	87,000
	Fruitvale Avenue	100,000
	35th Avenue	94,000
	High Street	82,000
	Warren Freeway	67,000
	Golf Links Road	74,000
	106th Avenue	76,000
Warren	Broadway	42,500
	Broadway Terrace	42,500
	Moraga Avenue	44,000
	Park Boulevard	38,500
	Lincoln Avenue	33,500
	Redwood Road	20,600
	Carson Street	20,600
	MacArthur Freeway	24,400
Route 24	Caldecott Tunnel	71,900
Bay Bridge	Toll Plaza	151,000

Source: CS-3.

1. 1965 figures are based on data from the Bay Area Transportation Study; 1990 figures are based on data from the Route 61 Trip Generation Study by the California Division of Highways.

MAP K

AVERAGE DAILY TRAFFIC, 1967

BERKELEY
EMERY-VILLE
PIEDMONT
ALAMEDA
SAN LEANDRO
SAN PABLO AVE.
SHATTUCK AVE.
TELEGRAPH AVE.
COLLEGE AVE.
CLAREMONT AVE.
ASHBY AVE.
HOLLIS ST.
STANFORD AVE.
GROVE ST.
GROVE-SHAFTER FWY.
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
BROADWAY
51st ST.
PIEDMONT AVE.
40th ST.
OAKLAND AVE.
ASCOT DR.
ADELINE ST.
MARITIME ST.
27th ST.
HARRISON ST.
LAKE SHORE AVE.
JOAQUIN MILLER RD.
14th ST.
MARKET ST.
GRAND AVE.
PARK BLVD.
7th ST.
PERALTA ST.
CYPRESS ST.
MACARTHUR BLVD.
WARREN FWY.
5th AVE.
14th AVE.
E. 8th ST.
E. 23rd AVE.
E. 21st ST.
FRUITVALE AVE.
35th AVE.
REDWOOD RD.
SKYLINE BLVD.
E. 12th ST.
FOOTHILL BLVD.
KELLER AVE.
SEMINARY AVE.
HAVENSCOURT BLVD.
73rd AVE.
FONTAINE ST.
HIGH ST.
66th AVE.
GOLF LINKS RD.
90th AVE.
SAN LEANDRO ST.
98th AVE.
DOOLITTLE DR.
EGENBERGER RD.
E. 14th ST.
BANCROFT AVE.
MACARTHUR FWY.
NIMITZ FWY.

0-5,000 vehicles per 24 hours
5,000-15,000 vehicles per 24 hours
Over 15,000 vehicles per 24 hours
Volume not known

See Table **58** for freeway volumes

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

MAP L

TRAVEL-TIME CONTOURS, 1967

BERKELEY

SAN PABLO AVE.

ADELINE ST.

TELEGRAPH AVE.

EMERY-VILLE

BROADWAY

WARREN FWY.

PIEDMONT

S.F.-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE

MAC ARTHUR BLVD.

FRUITVALE AVE.

ALAMEDA

FOOTHILL BLVD.

73rd AVE.

HIGH ST.

SAN LEANDRO ST.

98th AVE.

E. 14th ST.

MAC ARTHUR FWY.

NIMITZ FWY.

SAN LEANDRO

2 4 6 8 10 12 16 20

Outbound P.M. peak-hour travel time on city streets by automobile in 1967.

Contour lines indicate minutes from 14th and Broadway.

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

TABLE 59
Average Daily Traffic and Street Capacity by Selected Street Segments: Oakland, 1967 and 1985

Street	Limits		Average Daily Traffic (Vehicles per 24 Hours)		Street Capacity 1967[a]
	From	To	1967	1985	
98th Avenue	Nimitz Freeway	San Leandro Street	18,250	22,000	19,000
	San Leandro Street	East 14th Street	18,950	23,000	15,300
	East 14th Street	Bancroft Avenue	12,500	16,000	15,300
	Bancroft Avenue	MacArthur Freeway	11,150	17,000	15,600
Golf Links Road	MacArthur Freeway	Elysian Fields Drive	5,200	10,000	10,000
	Elysian Fields Drive	Scotia Avenue	2,250	7,500	10,000
73rd Avenue[b]	East 14th Street	Bancroft Avenue	7,600	35,000	8,500
	Bancroft Avenue	MacArthur Boulevard	6,700	35,000	8,500
73rd Avenue/Hillmont Drive[b]	MacArthur Boulevard	Seminary Avenue	6,100	40,000	8,500
Seminary Avenue	San Leandro Street	East 14th Street	6,450	10,000	7,500
	East 14th Street	Foothill Boulevard	8,000	12,000	7,500
	Foothill Boulevard	MacArthur Boulevard	8,000	12,000	8,800
High Street	Tidal Canal	San Leandro Street	14,200	17,000	17,000
	San Leandro Street	Courtland Avenue	12,900	15,000	18,400
	Courtland Avenue	Brookdale Avenue	17,500	33,000	24,500
	Brookdale Avenue	MacArthur Boulevard	17,800	33,000	18,300
35th Avenue	San Leandro Street	Foothill Boulevard	5,300	9,000	7,000
	MacArthur Freeway	Warren Freeway	12,900	20,000	15,000
23rd Avenue[c]	Foothill Boulevard	East 21st Street	3,600	8,000	6,800
	East 24th Street	MacArthur Freeway	3,400	8,000	6,800
Claremont Avenue	Berkeley City Limits	Alvarado Road	7,000	7,500	7,000
	Alvarado Road	Grizzly Peak Blvd.	7,000	7,500	7,000
51st Street	Broadway	Telegraph Avenue	5,800	20,000	6,000
Skyline Boulevard	Parkridge Drive	Grass Valley Road	4,000	12,000	10,000
Embarcadero	Filbert Street	Fallon Street	3,000	8,000	6,000
	Fallon Street	Fifth Avenue	2,400	11,000	10,000
	Fifth Avenue	Dennison Street	5,900	12,000	10,000
	Fruitvale Avenue	High Street	6,600	12,000	10,000
Lake Shore Avenue	Lake Park Avenue	Mandana Boulevard	16,900	20,000	16,800
Harrison Street	27th Street	Oakland Avenue	21,000	25,000	22,000
Market Street	10th Street	18th Street	12,500	16,000	17,000
	18th Street	West Grand Avenue	12,500	16,000	17,000
	West Grand Avenue	San Pablo Avenue	10,000	14,000	16,000
(Overpass)	Third Street	Middle Harbor Road	10,500	15,000	12,000
14th Street	Nimitz Freeway	Grove-Shafter Freeway	11,500	24,000	17,600
Telegraph Avenue	MacArthur Boulevard	Claremont Avenue	30,700	28,000	26,800
Seventh and Eighth Streets	Cypress Street	Market Street	14,300	24,000	23,200
	Market Street	Fallon Street	20,000	24,000	18,000
Ascot Drive	Mountain Boulevard	Scout Road	4,400	6,000	10,000
Edes Avenue	Hegenberger Road	98th Avenue	6,000	10,000	8,500
	98th Avenue	105th Avenue	6,200	7,000	8,500
Coliseum Way	46th Avenue	50th Avenue	6,800	7,500	10,000
Golf Links Road	Fontaine Street	MacArthur Freeway	2,900	5,000	8,000
38th Avenue	MacArthur Freeway	Penniman Avenue	3,800	4,500	5,000
Mountain Boulevard	Ascot Drive	Sequoia Park	3,300	4,500	10,000
Third Street	Union Street	Peralta Street	2,000	8,000	[d]
17th Street	Castro Street	Grove Street	700	20,000	3,000
18th Street	Cypress Street	Market Street	3,000	18,000	5,000
Grass Valley Road	Golf Links Road	Skyline Boulevard	1,100	6,000	10,000
18th Street	Castro Street	Jefferson Street	1,000	20,000	5,000

Source: CS-3.

a. Street traffic capacity is based on California Division of Highways standards for level of service "C."
b. 1985 figures for 73rd Ave. and Hillmont Dr. assume these streets will be widened but not to expressway standards.
c. For 1985, it is proposed that the arterial function shift from 23rd to 22nd Ave.
d. Capacity is not available.

to prepare a 1985 circulation plan, average daily traffic on the city's major streets had to be projected for the target year. This was done by arriving at a control figure for total traffic in Oakland for 1985 and then assigning this traffic to the city's major streets. This whole process involved a number of separate studies of the factors influencing future traffic.[1] Table 59 shows these resulting 1985 volumes (in addition to 1967 volumes and street capacity) for most of those segments of the street network which pose serious problems.[2] The factors creating these problems, not necessarily obvious from the table, will be discussed later in this chapter.

PROPOSED CIRCULATION SYSTEM

Map M shows the circulation system proposed to meet the projected needs in 1985.[3]

Its main focus is on the trafficway system, over which the City exercises major control and fiscal responsibility. No public transportation routes are shown other than Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) lines, partly because the number and complexity of such routes is too great for a map of this scale. However, a strong system of mass transit should be understood as an essential part of the proposed circulation plan.[4]

Also omitted from the map are the city's local streets.[5] The improvement needs of local streets should be explored in future studies at the district level.

These studies should also determine locations for special "pedestrianways." Attractive routes of this type should be provided in areas of heavy foot traffic and in locations of unusual visual, community, or historic significance. The pedestrianway network should consist partly of redesigned and possibly widened sidewalks along certain streets, and partly of paths cut through the middle of blocks or leading through parks and along creeks and other topographic features.

FIGURE XI

Vehicle-Trips per Day to, from, and through the Area by Direction: Oakland Traffic Area, 1990

Source: CS-3.

a. The Oakland Traffic Area consists of Oakland, Alameda, Emeryville, and Piedmont.

THE TRAFFICWAY SYSTEM

The trafficway system should consist of a hierarchy of several different levels, each of which is designed to perform one of three principal functions:

1. carrying through traffic;
2. collecting and distributing traffic; *or*
3. providing access to abutting property.

Freeways. Freeways should be designed to handle extremely heavy volumes of long-distance through traffic. They should have full control of access, grade separation at all street crossings, and physical separation of opposing lanes.

Freeway on- and off-ramps should tie in with surface streets of adequate capacity. They should *not* connect directly with local residential streets.

Expressways. Expressways should be developed to carry heavy through traffic along routes where full freeway treatment is not justified. They should have full or partial control of access, restriction of cross traffic to major intersections, and physical separation of opposing lanes.

Arterial Streets. Arterial streets should serve as the principal network for through traffic flow and should connect areas of

1. The 1985 projections and assignment of traffic done by the Advance Transportation Planning Team were based on forecasts of trip volume and distribution from the Division of Highways; forecasts of the number and location of jobs, employed persons, and housing; data on vehicle occupancy; estimates of the transit-automobile split from the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) and the Northern California Transit Demonstration Project; data on trip volume and distribution from BART; and past trends and system capacities.
2. To provide improved projections, the Advance Transportation Planning Team has also developed and tested a new computerized traffic-simulation model. Data were not available in time to employ this model in making the projections shown in Table 59. By early 1970, though, it is anticipated that the model can be used with the required data to yield new projections. This means that the projections in Table 59 are subject to change. However, the streets listed as having critical problems are unlikely to substantially change.

major traffic generation. They should be coordinated with existing and proposed freeways and expressways so as to provide for the distribution and collection of through traffic to and from collector and local streets.

Arterial streets, properly designated and developed, should help define—and not sever—residential neighborhoods, industrial sites, and commercial areas. Their capacity should be sufficient to prevent the undesirable diversion of through traffic to local streets.

Collector Streets. Collector streets should link residential neighborhoods and other areas of homogeneous land use with arterial streets. They should serve traffic movement between arterial and local streets, as well as through traffic within a local area. These streets should also provide direct access to abutting properties.

They should be so planned that they do not attract large volumes of through traffic and do not disrupt the activities within the areas they serve.

Local Streets. Local streets—which account for about two-thirds of all street mileage—should be used primarily for access to abutting property; all through traffic on them should be discouraged. As local streets are generally more pedestrian-oriented, the planning of these streets should reflect this fact.

NEW FREEWAYS?

Where serious deficiencies were found in the capacity of arterial streets in a particular corridor, the circulation study looked at the construction of a freeway as a possible alternative to major street improvements.

Excessive volumes of traffic already exist in four general corridors:

1. Nimitz/MacArthur Freeway;
2. Broadway/Telegraph/Grove-Shafter Freeway;
3. Fruitvale/High Street (Route 77); and
4. Seminary/106th Avenue (Route 13).

In the future, excessive traffic could also develop in the Warren Freeway corridor.

It appears that, even with the expected diversion of significant numbers of motorists to BART (as discussed later), there probably will be a need for one or more freeways beyond those now adopted by the State. However, the question of which of these specific corridors—especially controversial Routes 13 and 77—will require freeways has not yet been firmly answered. The City's new computerized traffic-simulation model will be helpful in resolving this question. By early 1970, it is expected that the model can be used to test alternative trafficway networks and aid in evaluating the impact of future freeways. Until this can be done, any final decision on the need for additional freeways should be postponed.[6]

In any case—because of the critical impact of freeways on surface streets, the tax base, and the urban environment—the City should work very closely with the State Division of Highways in determining precise routes and design. In doing so, the City should seek further analysis of proposed freeway routes, particularly in view of local needs and the development of alternative circulation modes.

Nimitz/MacArthur Corridor. The existing Nimitz and MacArthur Freeways carry daily volumes of 75,000 to 120,000 and 60,000 to 100,000 vehicles, respectively (*Table 58*). Peak-hour congestion is acute on several sections; relief through widening or diversion to other routes is obviously necessary. In most segments, however, widening would appear impractical since the routes are already built to eight-lane standards.

Some relief for the Nimitz can be expected when BART becomes operational and when the Southern Bay Crossing is constructed.

As an example of BART benefits in this corridor, by 1975 about 50,000 transit riders per day are projected at a screenline point between the Fruitvale and Lake Merritt stations. If, as anticipated, one-third are passengers diverted from (Nimitz) automobiles, this would represent a vehicle reduction of roughly 20 to 25 per cent during peak hours and about half as much during off-peak times. Traffic on the MacArthur Freeway is not expected to be affected this much by BART competition, but some of it may be diverted to a less congested Nimitz Freeway.

The State Division of Bay Toll Crossings intends to complete the Southern Crossing in 1975. Freeway connections from the Southern Crossing to Alameda are planned for Main Street and Bay Farm Island (the southern segment of Route 61). The former connection will extend under the Inner Harbor to link up with the Grove-Shafter Freeway. The other route will continue southerly through the Airport and San Leandro, paralleling the Nimitz. Early completion of these routes should be encouraged to relieve congestion on the Nimitz and, indirectly, to ease the pressure on streets which parallel it.

Further relief for both the Nimitz and the MacArthur may result from eventual construction of another freeway segment for which the State's highway master plan shows a schematic line running north from Alameda toward Berkeley west of the Nimitz (the northern segment of Route 61).

Broadway/Telegraph/Grove-Shafter Corridor. By 1970 the Grove-Shafter Freeway will be open between Caldecott Tunnel and West Grand Avenue, relieving the strain on some arterial streets in this corridor. The portion below West Grand will be completed by 1975, further relieving the traffic pressure. Freeway expansion beyond that now scheduled is not considered necessary in this corridor.

Fruitvale/High Street (Route 77) Corridor. The State's Master Plan shows a schematic freeway (Route 77) running from Contra Costa County to the Nimitz Freeway and consisting of two possibly offset sections:

3. The map also shows certain additional major streets which will probably be needed some time after 1985, as well as the general location of certain freeways the alignment and need for which (as discussed later) is not yet clearly established.
4. As suggested below, the City should give continuing attention to mass-transit needs, a topic which the 701 circulation study did not examine in depth. Future planning should also consider the problems and requirements of rail, ship, and air transportation.
5. The omission of these streets from the 701 circulation study is probably not too significant in an evaluation of city-wide traffic patterns. By their very nature, most local streets are not plagued by such problems as excess traffic volume and high accident rates.
6. As of this writing, BATS had just published a long-range regional freeway plan. The timing of publication did not allow the 701 Project to review the plan's proposals. However, Oakland should carefully review the BATS plan and suggest changes in it which would further the policies recommended in this report.

1. a route from Moraga through the Hills to the MacArthur Freeway in the general vicinity of Fruitvale Avenue;
2. a route, generally near High Street, between the MacArthur and the Nimitz Freeways.

Map M shows two existing or State-adopted freeway segments which could become part of a total Route 77 freeway: a Shepherd Canyon Freeway between Moraga and the Warren Freeway, and a freeway spur near High Street between East 14th Street and the Nimitz. The need for a freeway in this corridor beyond these segments has not been conclusively established.

Major improvements of some sort, however, are warranted in this corridor. Both High Street and Fruitvale Avenue are even now at full capacity during peak hours. State forecasts for an assumed freeway range from 45,000 to 70,000 vehicles per day by 1990, a level of usage appropriate to freeway consideration.

If a Route 77 freeway is *not* built, rather extensive improvements to Fruitvale, High, and other parallel arterial streets may eventually be required. Large-scale street widenings—as with a freeway—might have severe environmental effects on this area; in addition, of course, they result in high cost to the City.

If a Route 77 freeway is the preferred alternative, it should have a single, continuous alignment rather than offset segments. A location generally near (east or west of) Fruitvale Avenue would provide good traffic service and a reasonable network configuration. If desired, the construction of such a freeway could not be anticipated for 10 to 15 years.

Until this question is resolved, the City should not undertake any improvements to major streets in this corridor.

Seminary/106th Avenue (Route 77) Corridor. The State's highway master plan contemplates an eventual Route 13 freeway linking Route 61 at the Airport with the Warren Freeway.

For such a route, a variety of alignments are possible—from a freeway in the vicinity of Seminary Avenue to one that would connect the Airport and the MacArthur Freeway near 106th Avenue. In its *Route 61 Trip Generation Study*, the State assumed an alignment along Hegenberger Road and 73rd Avenue; it also projected the following traffic on such a freeway by 1990: 109,000 vehicles per day north of the Nimitz, 65,000 north of San Leandro Street, and 82,000 north of MacArthur Boulevard.

However, the City is presently committed to a high-capacity arterial rather than a freeway in this corridor and has designed an East Oakland Cross-Town Arterial along the same alignment assumed by the State in its study. Of the total arterial—which will vary from eight to six to four lanes—a portion has already been completed and another is under construction.

Assuming that no Route 77 freeway is built before 1985, traffic volumes on such a facility might conservatively be expected in 1985 to be: 80,000 north of the Nimitz, 45,000 north of San Leandro Street, and 50,000 north of MacArthur Boulevard.[1] If, as presently planned, the arterial has only four lanes north of MacArthur Boulevard, its practical capacity will be only 25,000 to 35,000 vehicles per day, depending on the degree of interruption to traffic flow at intersections. It thus appears that the planned arterial will have insufficient capacity in this segment.

Clearly, some additional relief will need to be provided in this corridor—either by increasing the new cross-town arterial's capacity along with the widening of other major streets, or by planning for a freeway along one of the alignments already discussed.

In considering the need for a freeway in either the Route 13 or the Route 77 corridors, it should be obvious that a freeway built in one of them might greatly affect the situation in the other. A second freeway would be unnecessary if enough excess traffic were diverted to the first. Possibly the demands of both corridors could be met by a single freeway linking the Warren and Nimitz Freeways, with suitable connections to Route 61 and the Airport. This coupled with the widening of Warren Freeway and the linking of the Grove-Shafter Freeway with the Southern Crossing might provide the needed relief without the necessity of building two separate freeways.

Warren Freeway Corridor. Current traffic volumes on the Warren Freeway range from 21,000 to 44,000 daily, still within this route's existing capacity. Widening of this freeway, most of which is now only four lanes, appears practicable and may be necessary in the future.

The Division of Highways foresees very heavy 1990 traffic volumes (70,000 to 118,000) along the Warren Freeway, based partly on its connection with an assumed freeway through Berkeley near Ashby Avenue. If such an Ashby Freeway is not built, a portion of this heavy traffic load will probably use 55th, Grove, and other nearby Oakland streets, as well as the Grove-Shafter Freeway.

Thus it will be in the City's best interest to urge the ultimate construction of an Ashby Freeway linked to the Warren Freeway. To date, however, Berkeley has been opposed to such a freeway. The 701 circulation study has therefore assumed, in planning for major street improvements, that the Ashby Freeway may not be built in the next 20 years.

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

To promote a balanced circulation system, Oakland should make every effort to encourage and facilitate the use of public transportation. Further study of transit needs by the City is clearly called for, especially in neighborhood planning where the relationship of transit lines to local development patterns should be explored.

The first section of BART is scheduled for operation in 1971. As noted above, a certain diversion of travel from automobiles to this system has been projected. The actual amount of this diversion will be monitored as BART goes into

1. The projections are by the Advance Transportation Planning Team.

MAP M

PROPOSED 1985 CIRCULATION SYSTEM

EMERYVILLE
PIEDMONT
ALAMEDA
SAN LEANDRO
SAN PABLO AVE.
SHATTUCK AVE.
TELEGRAPH AVE.
COLLEGE AVE.
CLAREMONT AVE.
ASHBY AVE
HOLLIS ST.
STANFORD AVE.
GROVE ST.
GROVE-SHAFTER FWY.
BROADWAY
WARREN FWY.
51st ST.
PIEDMONT AVE.
40th ST.
OAKLAND AVE.
ADELINE ST.
MARITIME ST.
PERAL ST.
CYPRESS ST.
MARKET ST.
HARRISON ST.
GRAND AVE.
LAKE SHORE AVE.
PARK BLVD.
ASCOT DR.
JOAQUIN MILLER RD.
MACARTHUR BLVD
7th ST.
EMBARCADERO
5th AVE.
14th AVE.
E. 21st ST.
23rd AVE.
E. 8th ST.
E. 12th ST.
FRUITVALE AVE.
35th AVE
REDWOOD RD.
SKYLINE BLVD.
ROUTE 61 FREEWAY
HIGH ST.
FOOTHILL BLVD.
SEMINARY AVE.
HAVENSCOURT BLVD.
73rd AVE.
66th AVE.
KELLER AVE.
FONTAINE ST.
GOLF LINKS RD.
90th AVE.
98th AVE.
SAN LEANDRO ST.
DOOLITTLE DR.
HEGENBERGER RD.
E. 14th ST.
BANCROFT AVE.
NIMITZ FWY.
MACARTHUR FWY.

Freeway
Freeway Connection with Surface Street
Possible Freeway
Need and Alignment Uncertain
Arterial Street or Expressway
Post-1985 Arterial Street or Expressway
Collector Street
BART Line
BART Station

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

MAP N

MAJOR STREET IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED BY 1985

BERKELEY

EMERY-VILLE

PIEDMONT

ALAMEDA

SAN LEANDRO

Phase 1

Phase 2 or 3

Phase 4

See Table **60** for key numbers and definition of phases.

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

operation, and adjustments in Oakland's proposed trafficway system may be required.

The impact of BART will depend very largely on the configuration, speed, frequency, and cost of feeder transit service. This concern led to the Northern California Transit Demonstration Project (NCTDP)—a joint study sponsored by BART, the Alameda-Contra Costa (AC) Transit District, and the San Francisco Municipal Railway with financial aid from the Federal Government. In October 1967, NCTDP produced a final report which recommended far-reaching operational, route, and fare changes to achieve maximum coordination of the three agencies' services.

AC Transit, which runs the buses in Oakland, has been evaluating the NCTDP proposals and the results of some later studies of its own. Some service changes will be instituted by the time BART is in operation, but others will be made on a wait-and-see basis. Unfortunately, AC and BART have so far been unable to resolve some basic issues raised by the NCTDP study, especially the fare structure and arrangements for revenue sharing.

Obviously, coordination of transit service is of enormous importance to Oakland. Accordingly, the City should develop a strong and explicit statement of its goals in this area and work closely with AC and BART to see that the necessary steps are taken to achieve these goals. The City should also support legislation for improved financing of public transportation —both for capital and operating costs.

Various special studies of public transportation are now being undertaken, especially to examine and improve access to employment areas. One particular concern is the improvement of access for people and goods to and from the industrial belt.[1] AC Transit, BART, the City, Coliseum, Inc., and the Port of Oakland plan to submit a joint application for Federal aid for a feasibility study of a rapid transit link between the Coliseum BART station, the Airport, and points in between.

NEEDED MAJOR STREET IMPROVEMENTS

The 701 circulation study concentrated especially on developing objective measures of the relative need for different street improvements. Each possible major improvement was evaluated—and given a priority index—through a system which judged the performance of each street segment by the following factors:

1. the ratio between peak-hour traffic volume and the segment's practical traffic-carrying capacity;
2. the travel-time delay rate, based on the difference between prevailing and desirable peak-hour speeds;
3. the accident rate;
4. a rating of street-surface condition and maintenance cost;
5. projected vehicle-miles per day (forecast traffic times length of the segment); and
6. the cost of the proposed improvement.

These priority indices were then adjusted, where applicable, by "timing and coordination factors" which related the street improvements to such events as planned urban renewal actions and freeway openings. Proposed improvements were then compared with available funding, and final priority ratings were established.

(This evaluation process should be refined and extended and become an ongoing program. This will ensure that the total trafficway system continues to work well and that improvements in it are programmed to maximize the effectiveness of the money spent. In determining street needs, all the factors listed above should be considered; however, a balance should continue to be maintained between objectively determined needs and factors of timing and coordination. The new traffic-simulation model mentioned earlier should play a key role in this continuing evaluation process.)

Using this evaluation system, existing and future traffic volumes were compared with the existing capacity of major-street segments. Many sections were found which are already congested or which show a potential for future congestion. The possibility of increasing capacity through such measures as the prohibition of parking and improved signal progression was considered, but many segments still remain which will require a significant amount of improvement.

Table 60 and Map N show the nature, timing, cost, and location of the major street improvements needed to accommodate the forecast traffic flows in 1985. Some 37.7 miles of major improvements are indicated—either in the building of new trafficways or in the widening, realignment, or reconstruction of existing ones. The total cost (in 1967 dollars) of these improvements is estimated at some $64.3 million.

These proposals assume that no freeways will be built before 1985 in the Route 77 corridor below the Warren Freeway or in the Route 13 corridor. If such a freeway is built, *some* of the street improvements shown in these corridors may not be needed.

The most significant improvements depicted in Map N are the following:

1. the creation of a continuous "Embarcadero" route through the industrial belt, running from Seventh and Maritime Streets to the Port of Oakland Industrial Park;
2. the widening of several lateral (southwest-to-northeast) streets across the areas east of Lake Merritt—23rd Avenue, 35th Avenue, High Street, Seminary Avenue, 73rd Avenue, and 98th Avenue-Golf Links Road;
3. the widening of several existing streets and opening of some new street connections in West Oakland and the Central District —to tie in with urban renewal activities and the Grove-Shafter Freeway.

Unfortunately, as Table 60 shows,

1. The Advance Transportation Planning Team has been taking a leading role in a joint technical study exploring ways in which public transportation improvements could reduce geographical obstacles to employment. Other participants are AC Transit, BART, the Oakland Economic Development Council, Inc., and the California State Employment Service.

TABLE 60

Needed Major Street Improvements: Oakland, 1969-1985

Key Number on Map N	Location			Nature			Right-of-Way Required	Number of Lanes (d Means Divided Street)		Cost (Thousands of Dollars)[a]	Phase[b]
	Street	From	To	New Street	Reconstruction or Realignment	Widening		Existing	Proposed		
1	Claremont Avenue	Grizzly Peak Blvd.	Alvarado Road			X	X	2	4	$ 638	4
2	Claremont Avenue	Alvarado Road	Berkeley City Limits			X		2	4	535	4
3	51st Street	Telegraph Avenue	Broadway			X	X	2	4d	1,690	1
4	Telegraph Avenue	Claremont Avenue	West MacArthur Blvd.		X			6	6	302	4
5	Market Street	San Pablo Avenue	West Grand Avenue			X	X	4	6d	845	4
6	Market Street	West Grand Avenue	18th Street			X	X	4	6d	880	1
7	Market Street	18th Street	10th Street			X		4	6d	400	1
8	18th Street	Cypress Street	Market Street		X	X		4	4	303	1
9	(Connection)	18th Street	17th Street	X			X	0	2	109	1
10	18th Street	Castro Street	Jefferson Street			X	X	2	3	456	1
11	17th Street	Castro Street	Clay Street		X	X	X	2	3	575	1
12	14th Street	Nimitz Freeway	Grove-Shafter Fwy.			X	X	4	6d	608	1
13	10th Street	Peralta Street	Poplar Street	X	X	X	X	0 and 2	2	227	1
14	(Connection)	11th Street	12th Street	X			X	0	4	100	1
15	Seventh Street	Cypress Street	Market Street			X	X	4	6d	407	1
16	Seventh Street	Market Street	Fallon Street			X	X	4	6d	1,350	3
17	Third Street	Peralta Street	Union Street	X		X	X	0 and 2	4	280	4
18	Harrison Street	Hamilton Place	Bay Place			X	X	4	6	286	1
19	Lake Shore Avenue	Lake Park Avenue	Mandana Boulevard		X			4	4	75	3
20	Beaumont Avenue	Park Boulevard	East 38th Street		X	X	X	2	4d	241	2
21	Ascot Drive	Scout Road	Mountain Boulevard		X		X	2	2	124	2
22	Mountain Boulevard	Ascot Drive	Sequoia Park		X			2	2	28	4
23	Lincoln Avenue	MacArthur Blvd.	Champion Street	X			X	0	2	298	1
24	23rd Avenue	MacArthur Freeway	East 24th Street			X	X	2	4	1,708	4
25	(Connection)	East 24th Street	East 21st Street	X			X	0	4	657	4
26	22nd Avenue	East 21st Street	Foothill Boulevard			X		2	4	128	4
27	Redwood Rd. and 35th Ave.	Warren Freeway	MacArthur Freeway			X	X	2	4d	3,300	1
28	35th Avenue	Foothill Boulevard	San Leandro Street			X	X	2	4d	2,166	4
29	38th Avenue	MacArthur Freeway	Penniman Street		X	X	X	2	2	74	2
30	High Street	MacArthur Blvd.	Brookdale Avenue			X	X	2	6d	2,640	2
31	High Street	Brookdale Avenue	Courtland Avenue			X	X	2	6d	1,702	3
32	High Street	Courtland Avenue	San Leandro Street			X	X	2	4	677	4
33	High Street	San Leandro Street	Tidal Canal			X		4	6	265	4
34	Coliseum Way	46th Avenue	50th Avenue		X			2	2	113	1
35	Seminary Avenue	MacArthur Blvd.	Foothill Boulevard			X	X	2	4d	1,497	2
36	Seminary Avenue	Foothill Boulevard	East 14th Street			X	X	2	4d	2,714	2
37	Seminary Avenue	East 14th Street	San Leandro Street			X	X	2	4d	930	2
38	73rd Avenue and Hillmont Drive	Seminary Avenue	MacArthur Blvd.			X	X	2	4	2,486	3
39	73rd Avenue	MacArthur Blvd.	Bancroft Avenue			X	X	2	6d	654	1
40	73rd Avenue	Bancroft Avenue	East 14th Street			X	X	2	6d	2,022	1

TABLE 60 (Continued)

Needed Major Street Improvements: Oakland, 1969-1985

Key Number on Map N	Location			Nature			Right-of-Way Required	Number of Lanes (d Means Divided Street)		Cost (Thousands of Dollars)[a]	Phase[b]
	Street	From	To	New Street	Reconstruction or Realignment	Widening		Existing	Proposed		
41	74th Avenue	East 14th Street	Spencer Street	X			X	0	8d	$ 2,920	1
42	82nd Avenue	MacArthur Blvd.	Bancroft Avenue			X	X	2	4d	1,056	2
43	Golf Links Road	MacArthur Blvd.	Fontaine Street			X	X	2	4	825	1
44	Keller Avenue	Rilea Way	Hansom Drive	X			X	0	4d	163	1
45	Keller Avenue	Hansom Drive	Skyline Boulevard	X			X	0	4d	473	1
46	Skyline Boulevard	Parkridge Drive	Grass Valley Road			X		2	4d	1,380	3
47	Grass Valley Road	Skyline Boulevard	Golf Links Road			X		2	4d	271	2
48	Golf Links Road	Scotia Avenue	Elysian Fields Drive			X	X	2	4d	666	1
49	Golf Links Road	Elysian Fields Drive	MacArthur Freeway			X	X	2	4d	766	1
50	98th Avenue	Mountain Boulevard	Bancroft Avenue			X	X	2	4d	1,520	1
51	98th Avenue	Bancroft Avenue	East 14th Street			X	X	2	4d	2,043	2
52	98th Avenue	East 14th Street	San Leandro Street			X	X	2	4d	1,687	3
53	98th Avenue	San Leandro Street	Nimitz Freeway			X	X	2	4d	1,422	3
54	(Connection)	98th Avenue	Hegenberger Road, Doolittle Drive, and Earhart Drive	X			X	0	4	1,316	2
55	Edes Avenue	Hegenberger Road	98th Avenue			X	X	2	4	788	3
56	Edes Avenue	98th Avenue	105th Avenue			X		2	4	635	4
57	Embarcadero	Maritime Street	Middle Harbor Road	X			X	0	4	1,200	4
58	(Overpass)	Middle Harbor Road	Third Street	X			X	0	4	3,000	2
59	Embarcadero	Filbert Street	Fallon Street			X	X	2	4	770	3
60	Embarcadero	Fallon Street	Fifth Avenue			X	X	2	4	1,285	2
61	Embarcadero	Fifth Avenue	Dennison Street			X	X	2	4	600	2
62	Embarcadero	Dennison Street	Fruitvale Avenue	X		X	X	0 and 2	4	1,795	2
63	Embarcadero	Fruitvale Avenue	High Street	X		X	X	0 and 2	4	1,724	2
64	Embarcadero	High Street	66th Avenue	X			X	0	4	1,494	2
65	Doolittle Drive	Hegenberger Road	Davis Street			X	X	2	4d	55[c]	1

Source: CS-3.

a. Costs are in 1967 dollars.

b. "Phase" refers to the time period when the improvement should be made, given current City revenue projections. All the projects in this table are needed by 1985 to handle the traffic but, unless additional money is found, many cannot actually be built.

Phase 1: 1969-1974 Phase 2: 1975-1979 Phase 3: 1980-1984 Phase 4: after 1984

c. This is the City's share of the cost. The State would pay the balance.

much of the needed construction may not actually get done by 1985. Under presently foreseeable fiscal constraints, at least $13.3 million worth of improvements—or 7.6 miles, about 20 per cent of the mileage of needed improvements—would remain unbuilt. Serious to moderate congestion would result along various routes.

An obvious implication is the necessity for new funding sources, perhaps additional State aid. Other implications might be the need to expedite freeway construction or—more basically—to accelerate instead the improvement of public transportation, thereby reducing street congestion and needed street improvements and expanding the range of circulation choices.

Chapter 9

PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Enormous changes in the physical environment are needed during the coming decades, as the last two chapters have demonstrated. Expensive efforts will be required by a multitude of developers, both public and private. Fortunately, a wide range of devices are available for achieving and coordinating the necessary changes. These include both new concepts for programming public action and improved zoning and other controls over private development.

RENEWAL AND PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS

To provide for balanced change, a city-wide program for urban renewal, code enforcement, and public improvements must concern itself with the *total* process by which the physical city grows and renews itself.

Within the city's developed areas, both private development (new apartments, homes, stores, offices, factories) and public construction (streets, parks, schools, playgrounds, utilities) will occur over the coming years. Collectively, these will result in a radical amount of rebuilding in some areas, only very gradual changes in others. In addition, the city's now-vacant districts are likely to be developed.

In many areas, the necessary changes can be accomplished by individual private actions accompanied by more or less routine public improvements. But in some sections there are widespread conditions of blight—such as substandard or obsolete buildings, incompatible land uses, or inadequate streets and public facilities—that discourage private investment. Here there is little incentive for an individual to develop or maintain his property when he knows the poor condition of neighboring properties will remain unchanged. In these seriously blighted areas, public intervention is generally required through what has become known as "urban renewal."

FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Since the Housing Act of 1949, the Federal Government has made an extensive commitment to helping cities renew areas which meet certain criteria of blight. During this period, the concept and scope of urban renewal have been steadily broadening; it is becoming much more a matter of conserving and reinvigorating existing neighborhoods than of tearing down slums. It is also concerned with adding

to the supply of good housing, creating employment opportunities, and providing new parks and other public facilities.

At first there were only "redevelopment" (or slum clearance) projects, which involved demolishing all or most existing structures and rebuilding a whole area at a time. It was soon recognized that, rather than clearing a slum, the problem often called for making substantial, but more gentle, improvements to a blighted area (in addition to taking steps to prevent blight *before* it occurs). So in 1954, provision was made for "rehabilitation" projects to be applied to areas which, although threatened, are still salvable. These projects emphasize preserving or renovating an area's existing structures, spot clearance of individual buildings which cannot be saved or are a blighting influence, and providing parks, street improvements, and other needed public facilities.

For either type of project, if approved, the Federal Government pays a large part of the net cost. The City's share of the cost is made up either in cash or (more often) in the form of necessary public improvements or services directly benefiting the area. These expenditures are called "local credits."

The increasing emphasis on rehabilitation and conservation was reflected in 1965 Federal legislation providing financial aid to cities for "concentrated code enforcement" projects within specific areas threatened by blight. All these projects involve door-to-door housing inspection and intensive follow-through activities to remove code violations. City improvements such as street repairs, curbs and gutters, and street trees may be counted as local credits for the project.[1] Parenthetically, such a project area does not need to be blighted to the same degree as an urban renewal project area. On the other hand, a concentrated code enforcement project usually does not allow for clearance and renewal of uses which are structurally sound but incompatible with the neighborhood.

In both urban renewal and concentrated code enforcement projects, grants and low-interest loans are available to low-income homeowners who are required to make improvements to their dwellings.

The Neighborhood Development Program (NDP) set forth in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 provides cities with a more flexible alternative to the conventional project-by-project approach. Under this programming concept, a city designates any number of "urban renewal areas." Each has to be a reasonable area for planning purposes and must meet the same criteria of blight as a traditional project area. The city then applies to the Federal Government *each year* for financial assistance covering a series of discrete "renewal actions" to be undertaken in the coming year within any or all of its designated areas.[2] Funding on an annual basis frees money that would otherwise have been tied up for years in capital-grant reservations for traditional renewal projects and allows this money to be spent for more immediate use in more places. It also allows a quick and flexible response to current market and land-availability opportunities. Interestingly, the funding granted each year is predicated on the city's past performance—that is, on how promptly and effectively the city actually carried out its renewal actions in preceding years.

The 1968 Act also authorized a program of "interim assistance" for blighted areas which are planned for later renewal or code enforcement but in which some immediate public action is needed. The interim code enforcement done in these situations is aimed at eliminating only the most immediate dangers to health and safety. Public improvements can include, among other things, urgently needed street repairs and creation of temporary playgrounds on vacant lots.

In contrast to these urban renewal and code enforcement tools, there are other Federal assistance programs which can be used in *any* part of a city. These provide grants to help build civic facilities (the Neighborhood Facilities Program); acquire or preserve land for parks and open space (the Open-Space Land Program); and add trees, landscaping, and other amenities (the Urban Beautification Program).

RECENT RENEWAL ACTIONS AND PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS

Map O shows the urban renewal and concentrated code enforcement projects which have been completed or are now underway in Oakland. Also shown is Oakland's "Model City" area which may, depending on the results of the planning to be done there, require extensive renewal action.[3]

The Clinton Park Project, just southeast of Lake Merritt, was Oakland's first urban renewal project—and in fact the nation's first Federally-assisted rehabilitation project. Carried out between 1958 and 1961, this involved door-to-door housing inspection and subsequent renovation or demolition of noncomplying buildings. It also included extensive tree planting, installation of traffic diverters and narrowed curbs, rebuilding of an elementary school, and other public improvements. This project was originally administered by the Urban Renewal Department whose functions were subsequently transferred to the new Building and Housing Department, which completed the Clinton Park Project, and Redevelopment Agency, which administered subsequent urban renewal projects.

In 1962 the Acorn Project in West Oakland was the next to get underway. The area was totally cleared of its old, blighted housing to make room for new industries, a shopping center, and a large apartment and town-house development (now partly completed).

By contrast, the Oak Center Project just to the north is rehabilitating as many existing houses as possible. Many buildings are, however, being cleared to make room for schools, a park, and street widenings.

A third project—Peralta College near the foot of Lake Merritt—was started in 1967 to help assemble land for a new down-

1. However, under existing law, the types of public improvements that can be counted as local credits in a Federally-assisted code enforcement project are much more limited than in an urban renewal project.
2. A "renewal action" may involve activities ranging from planning and design in one area, to acquiring a site for a neighborhood playground in another, to rehabilitating a deteriorating block of houses in still another neighborhood.
3. As of this writing, the City is awaiting Federal funding approval for activities in "urban renewal areas," under the NDP concept, covering the Central District and significant portions of North Oakland, Fruitvale, and East Oakland. These areas, however, are not indicated on Map O.

MAP O

URBAN RENEWAL AND CONCENTRATED-CODE-ENFORCEMENT PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY 1969

BERKELEY

EMERY-VILLE

PIEDMONT

ALAMEDA

SAN LEANDRO

SAN PABLO AVE.

ADELINE ST.

TELEGRAPH AVE.

BROADWAY

WARREN FWY.

S.F.-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE

MAC ARTHUR BLVD.

FRUITVALE AVE.

FOOTHILL BLVD.

73rd AVE.

HIGH ST.

SAN LEANDRO ST.

98th AVE.

E. 14th ST.

MAC ARTHUR FWY.

NIMITZ FWY.

Urban Renewal Project—Completed or in Execution

Concentrated-Code-Enforcement Project—Completed or in Execution

"Model City" Boundary

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

town junior college campus.

A fourth project is City Center near 14th and Broadway. A three-block project area has been designated (with a three-block extension planned), and property acquisition has begun. According to preliminary plans, this declining shopping area will be cleared to make room for a large multipurpose development including high-rise office buildings, retail space, and hotel facilities.

The City's Building and Housing Department has carried out an area-by-area series of concentrated code enforcement projects. The first of these began in 1959 within the Central District and resulted in the closing down of many substandard hotels and rooming houses. Subsequent projects have followed a pattern of radiating outward from downtown. The most recent projects—in North and East Oakland—began in January 1969. So far all these code enforcement projects have been "unassisted"—that is, carried out by the City without Federal financial aid.

Outside these concentrated project areas, the Building and Housing Department conducts an ongoing program of "district" housing inspection, in which the city is divided into several districts to each of which one or more individual inspectors are regularly assigned. Within these extensive districts, code enforcement necessarily is done largely on a spot or complaint basis.

Overall, only a few areas—in or near the Central District—have received renewal treatment of any depth. The concentrated code enforcement projects *have* corrected the worst housing situations within the areas they have touched. Unfortunately, they have not had the resources to make extensive environmental improvements. They have often left behind them neighborhoods of aging houses without any special amenities—a situation certain to lead to future deterioration.

As for public capital investments, they are badly needed in much of the city. Major improvements have been rare in most of Oakland in recent years. In the developing portions of the Hills, there have been many street openings, and several new schools and recreation facilities have been built. Major expenditures have been made in the industrial belt where the Port of Oakland has opened a jet-age airport and new shipping facilities. But in the vast areas in between, local government—faced with high land costs and limited financial resources—has made few capital improvements except in urban renewal projects. The Oakland Board of Education *did* build, rebuild, or expand a number of schools after the passage of a bond issue in 1956; comparable school improvements are, however, desperately needed now, but the means of financing them have not yet been secured.

POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENT OR RENEWAL BY AREA

Vast portions of Oakland could doubtless meet the criteria for Federal urban renewal assistance.[1]

Certainly deteriorating and dilapidated housing is present, in some amount, in every large section of the city. It is concentrated most heavily in the older areas near San Pablo Avenue and East 14th Street, but it can also be found scattered or in smaller pockets in many other areas including even parts of the Hills. Its pattern is suggested by Table 61, which presents selected blight indices from the 701 Project's Residential Survey. However, these generalized statistics, for each area as a whole, tend to disguise many localized pockets of better- or poorer-than-average housing.[2]

The city-wide "windshield" survey included in the 701 urban design study did provide information by much smaller areas; although nonstatistical and largely impressionistic, the data still helped to define the need for renewal. Also taken into account in defining this need were the desirable changes in land use suggested in Chapter 7.

Based on all these and other factors, Map Q attempts to illustrate the need, or potential, for renewal or development over the coming years. It does this by suggesting the general location and extent of each of five broad area categories, which are discussed below. Boundaries are not meant to be precise. Area designation is illustrative only, and simplified; many small pockets with different needs are not shown.[3]

Vacant-Land Development Areas. These are simply the now-undeveloped portions of the city. In most cases, there are no special obstacles to their development other than difficult topography (in the Hills) and drainage and bearing problems (in some flat areas near the shoreline). Sometimes, however, faulty subdivision and poor street access—as on Panoramic Hill near the University of California—can hinder development.

Maintenance Areas. These are the predominantly built-up portions of Oakland which are in generally good condition and which have amenities that will probably attract enough private investment to ensure that they remain so. This class covers more land than any other area category. It includes most of the Hills, much of North Central Oakland near Lake Merritt, the healthiest parts of downtown and some other commercial centers, and much of the industrial belt.

Conservation-and-Improvement Areas. These areas are generally in good condition today but will require substantial effort to prevent their future deterioration because: (1) the structures are getting older, and many show signs of deterioration and obsolescence; (2) open space and other amenities which might encourage their replacement with new construction are commonly lacking; (3) public facilities are typically inadequate; and (4) individual private action alone probably cannot provide the remedies.

This category includes a vast belt of residential areas extending from one end of Oakland to the other (except for a break near Lake Merritt) as well as many of the city's older commercial and industrial areas.

1. To be eligible, an area usually "must contain deficiencies to a degree and extent that public action is necessary to eliminate and prevent the development or spread of deterioration and blight." Specifically, (a) at least 20 per cent of the buildings in the area must contain "building deficiencies" such as deteriorating siding, inadequate original construction, or unsafe wiring and (b) the area must contain at least two "environmental deficiencies" such as overcrowding or excessive density, incompatible land uses, presence of obsolete building types, unsafe or deficient streets, or inadequate public facilities.
2. Because of the way the 701 Residential Survey was designed, figures can only be given for the areas shown in Map P.
3. The designation suggested for each area is a composite rating based on all facilities there, both residential and nonresidential. The map makes no effort to suggest priorities or timing of treatment.

TABLE 61

Selected Blight Statistics by Residential Area: Oakland, 1966

		City Total	Residential Area[a]																	
			1-3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Total Housing Supply (Numbers)	Total Residential Buildings[b]	88,340	25,390	3,340	5,230	5,840	7,970	1,980	3,790	4,530	2,840	3,800	1,620	2,290	3,960	650	2,860	3,030	1,830	7,400
	Total Housing Units	147,700	29,130	4,840	7,130	8,760	12,700	12,230	9,760	7,160	4,390	6,010	3,940	3,580	7,950	4,330	6,280	5,680	3,180	10,640
Building Deficiencies (Percentages)	Residential Buildings Deteriorating or Dilapidated[c]	18.9	4.4	9.6	12.1	13.1	11.0	17.7	14.4	10.5	36.9	25.8	48.1	69.9	69.9	43.3	26.7	24.5	54.6	21.9
	Residential Buildings Deteriorating with Rehabilitation Probably Not Feasible, or Dilapidated	5.3	0.7	1.0	3.0	2.3	2.9	5.1	1.8	2.8	8.8	4.8	13.4	32.7	29.4	8.9	3.6	3.6	21.0	5.7
	Residential Buildings Dilapidated	2.0	0.3	0.7	0.7	1.2	0.9	2.2	0.6	0.1	3.1	1.1	3.9	12.0	14.2	5.4	0.3	1.0	7.3	2.5
	Housing Units in Deteriorating or Dilapidated Buildings	17.9	4.3	8.7	10.2	11.1	10.4	6.4	10.3	10.8	38.1	24.4	41.8	66.4	62.8	17.9	20.4	19.5	50.1	21.0
	Residential Buildings Containing Units of Questionable Legality[d]	3.2	0.6	2.5	1.5	2.4	0.9	3.1	4.6	1.3	9.4	3.0	6.2	11.1	9.6	5.4	7.1	6.0	9.1	4.0
	Residential Buildings Built Before 1920	36.9	8.8	14.1	11.7	39.7	25.9	56.4	47.7	62.2	76.5	70.7	85.6	94.2	90.4	94.8	60.5	66.4	80.8	21.7
Environmental Deficiencies (Percentages)	Residential Buildings with a Poor or Bad Rating on "Adequacy of Yards and Courts"[e]	6.4	1.1	4.3	3.6	4.3	1.0	6.9	5.6	5.6	11.8	7.2	13.8	32.3	28.7	46.5	9.4	7.2	22.3	2.2
	Residential Buildings with Accessory Structures or Open Areas in Poor or Bad Condition	11.6	1.9	4.3	9.5	10.1	4.8	8.4	10.8	8.3	25.4	17.1	26.9	38.5	34.9	13.0	11.0	15.4	26.5	23.6
	Residential Buildings with Sidewalks in Poor or Bad Condition	5.0	3.2	0.2	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.9	5.0	1.3	4.0	3.0	4.8	32.5	27.2	11.8	1.4	3.4	9.7	8.3

Sources: CS-1 and CS-2.

a. One or more residential areas comprise a household area, as follows:

Household Area	E	F	G	A	B	C	D
Residential Area	1-3	4-7	8-10	11-12	13-16	17-19	20

b. A "residential building" is any structure containing one or more housing units. A row of "attached" units on a single lot is counted as one building.

c. The condition categories used in this table are the same as those used in Table 23.

d. Units of questionable legality are those which may have been created in violation of the Oakland Housing Code or Zoning Regulations.

e. Adequacy of yards and courts is based on degree of conformity to the Oakland Housing Code requirements for comparable new buildings.

MAP P

CONDITION OF HOUSING BY "RESIDENTIAL AREAS," 1966

BERKELEY
SAN PABLO AVE.
ADELINE ST.
TELEGRAPH AVE.
EMERYVILLE
BROADWAY
WARREN FWY.
PIEDMONT
S.F.-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE
MAC ARTHUR BLVD.
FRUITVALE AVE.
ALAMEDA
FOOTHILL BLVD.
73rd AVE.
HIGH ST.
SAN LEANDRO ST.
98th AVE.
E. 14th ST.
MAC ARTHUR FWY.
NIMITZ FWY.
SAN LEANDRO

11 10 12 13 14 15 8 9 1-3 16 17 18 19 6 7 5 20 4

Per Cent of Residential Buildings Deteriorating or Dilapidated in 1966

- 50 Per Cent or More
- 30-49 Per Cent
- 20-29 Per Cent
- 5-19 Per Cent
- Less Than 5 Per Cent
- 15 Residential Area
- Land in Residential Use

Source: 701 Residential Survey

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

Renovation Areas. These areas do not need complete reorganization of their land uses and physical patterns, but they do require major improvement and public intervention because (1) they contain numerous structures which are deteriorating or obsolete, (2) they often contain incompatible land uses, (3) they are severely deficient in amenities and public facilities, and (4) no reasonable expectation exists that individual private action alone can remedy these problems.

Of course, some of these areas need more intensive treatment than others. All, however, require gradual but extensive replacement of older buildings by new construction. To create the right conditions for this, they need a substantially improved environment.

This category covers a long belt of older residential areas running from end to end of Oakland—including most of those within the Target Areas—and a number of declining commercial and industrial sections.

Rebuilding Areas. This category includes areas which require massive rebuilding because (1) most of the structures are blighted or obsolete to a degree warranting clearance, (2) the area as a whole is stagnant and unproductive, or (3) the area has a defective basic layout of streets and lots; in addition, individual private action alone probably cannot make the necessary changes.

This category takes up only a small proportion of Oakland. It includes several of the most dilapidated residential pockets along the edge of the industrial belt, all of them badly mixed with industrial uses.

A number of small nonresidential areas fall into this category, too: sections of obsolete or derelict buildings within the industrial belt and several commercial areas (including parts of the Central District) which have become economically unproductive. Such unproductive areas are found around several of the rapid transit stations where the existing development falls far short of the potential these stations offer.

GENERAL POLICIES FOR RENEWAL AND PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS

The discussion so far has developed a picture of widespread, barely-dealt-with problems. Many areas badly in need of treatment have never been touched by renewal actions, and they continue to decline. In this context, the need is clear for a carefully planned strategy that achieves the greatest possible long-term effect from *each* renewal action and public improvement.

As a start toward such a strategy, the following general policies are proposed.[1]

1. Every area should receive some kind of renewal action or improvements, the type and level depending on the area's specific needs. Table 62 summarizes *in general terms* the main types of action that will be needed in each of the five area categories.[2]

2. Emphasis should be placed upon taking many separate actions scattered across wide areas, rather than concentrated treatment of entire large areas. Hopefully, these actions will stimulate widely distributed private investments, thereby getting a bigger return for the renewal dollar.

3. Emphasis should be given to rehabilitation and conservation rather than clearance, especially in residential areas. There should be early, vigorous preventive measures in areas of incipient blight, such as the conservation-and-improvement areas. This, too, should lower total renewal costs in the long run.

4. To ensure a balanced overall program, renewal actions which create employment, investment, and cultural opportunities should be strongly encouraged.

5. Positive rather than negative actions should be emphasized. This means looking for opportunities for strategic new development or environmental improvements rather than just looking for deteriorating buildings to tear down.

6. Renewal, even within a single area, should be viewed as a continuous process without any real "completion"—a series of actions, over time, which must be sensitive to changing conditions and current market opportunities.

7. Maximum use should be made of the full range of Federal aid programs—including open space, neighborhood facilities, beautification, and housing assistance programs. Their utilization is especially important for sections of the city which would not qualify as Federally-assisted urban renewal areas.

8. To ensure that renewal actions and public improvements meet an area's real needs, direct citizen involvement is indispensable. Citizens should be deeply drawn into the formulation of neighborhood priorities, and close public contact should be maintained throughout the ongoing renewal process.

9. Private or quasi-public groups such as nonprofit development corporations should be encouraged to participate in area renewal and improvement. They could undertake certain projects which are beyond the scope or resources of governmental action or individual private developers. They could act swiftly and take greater risks than an individual developer.

10. Physical renewal should be linked very closely with economic and human-resources development. For example, funds should be provided for job training as well as for land acquisition for industry; for expanded educational programs as well as for new school playgrounds.

11. Areas and individual houses should not be cleared unless and until adequate housing (by condition, size, and cost) is assured for displaced residents. Housing subsidies should be available where the actual price of housing exceeds the income of the residents. (See the fuller discussion in Chapter 4.)

12. Street construction and other capital improvements should be timed and coordinated very closely with urban renewal and concentrated code enforcement actions. Potentially there are very important local credits in the rebuilding, renovation, and conservation-and-improvement areas—including rapid transit stations, badly needed new schools and parks, and

1. See Chapter 4 for additional policy implications affecting housing.
2. Some overlap between these will, of course, occur; some spot clearance, for example, may be needed within the conservation-and-improvement areas.

MAP Q

GENERALIZED POTENTIAL FOR RENEWAL AND DEVELOPMENT

BERKELEY
EMERY-VILLE
PIEDMONT
ALAMEDA
SAN LEANDRO
SAN PABLO AVE.
ADELINE ST.
TELEGRAPH AVE.
BROADWAY
WARREN FWY.
S.F.-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE
MAC ARTHUR BLVD.
FRUITVALE AVE.
FOOTHILL BLVD.
73rd AVE.
HIGH ST.
SAN LEANDRO ST.
98th AVE.
E. 14th ST.
MAC ARTHUR FWY.
NIMITZ FWY.

Maintenance
Conservation and Improvement
Renovation
Rebuilding
Development

Note: This map shows neither precise designations nor suggested timing.

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

street improvements.

13. New construction, wherever it takes place in the city, should incorporate a high quality of design which will resist future deterioration.

14. Among individual renewal actions, priority should be given to those which are "strategic"—that is, with high leverage to stimulate private improvements.

15. Priority should be given to those individual actions which would take advantage of the development potential afforded by major public projects like rapid transit or freeways, or to ones which would offer protection against the adverse consequences of certain public works (such as tree planting to soften the visual effects of a new major street).

THE NEXT STEPS

In developing an overall strategy for renewal and public improvements, the first step should be public discussion leading to the refinement, revision, and adoption of the general guidelines suggested in this chapter. This citizen involvement is crucial in order to make certain that long- and short-term objectives are clearly defined and understood and that no misunderstanding results in the future.

At the same time, a more precise study of area needs should be made, involving further analysis of land use, assessment, and other data gathered by the 701 Project. Included in this study should be an analysis of potential local credits. The preparation of generalized plans for urban renewal and concentrated code enforcement areas should follow—also with extensive neighborhood involvement. These steps would lead to the preparation of a long-range timetable (to be integrated with the City's Resource Allocation Program) listing specific actions in the first five years and general actions in the following 10 years. Finally, the whole process will require continual revision and

TABLE 62

Needed Major Actions by Type-of-Renewal-and-Development Area

Type of Action	Type of Area				
	Vacant-Land Development	Maintenance	Conservation-and-Improvement	Renovation	Rebuilding
Private Development	X	X	X	X	X
District Housing Inspection (Spot or Complaint Code Enforcement)	X	X	X	X	X
New Public Facilities	X	X	X	X	X
Utilization of Federal Aid Programs for New Housing, Employment and Investment Opportunities, and Environmental Improvement	X	X	X	X	X
Concentrated Environmental Improvement	X		X	X	X
Interim Code Enforcement (Before Start of Renewal or Code Enforcement Project)			X	X	X
Concentrated Code Enforcement, Conservation, and Rehabilitation			X	X	
Spot Clearance of Blighted or Incompatible Structures				X	
Large-Scale Clearance of Blighted or Incompatible Structures					X

updating.

The role of each agency in the total program should be clearly defined. Administratively, authority should be assigned, both to ensure that the various actions do take place and to avoid a possible overlapping of agency functions.

REZONING PROGRAM

Many innovations were built into the new Zoning Regulations adopted by Oakland in 1965. Much of their potential benefit, however, remains unrealized. In effect the City continued the pre-1965 zoning map by converting zones under the old code to the most similar zones under the new one. The really new zones the 1965 ordinance created on paper have remained, for the most part, unmapped.

A principal reason for the delay in updating the zoning map was to allow the 701 Project to prepare land-use proposals which would provide a rational basis for rezonings. The broad recommendations for future land use made in Chapter 7 do, indeed, imply the need for extensive rezonings.

EXISTING ZONING

Oakland's present zoning pattern (shown in Map R in simplified form[1]) has many weaknesses, the most important of which are discussed below.

1. Overzoning and underbuilding are common. In much of the city the capacity of the present zoning is far greater than the amount of development which is there now or which can reasonably be expected.

2. Much of the zoning boundary between the city's industrial and residential areas is very ragged, producing inadequate separation between houses and industries.

3. Several whole residential neighborhoods are actually zoned industrial. Some 20,000 people live in such areas. Many sections are developed almost solidly with homes, yet zoning prohibits new housing units there. In many of these areas, there is little or no current industrial development.

4. The R-50 (medium-density) Zone[2] covers many areas where it is not appropriate. Within the vast expanses this zone blankets, some sections are highly appropriate for large apartment buildings. Others, though, are still valuable areas of single-family houses which are exposed to the intrusion of big apartment structures because of their R-50 zoning.

5. The pattern of high-density (R-60 through R-90) residential zoning is inadequate. It consists essentially of a huge area around downtown plus thin ribbons along a few major streets elsewhere in the city. The former area is in some ways too big, including even predominantly single-family sections within its scope, while the ribbon strips offer insufficient opportunities in outlying areas.

6. The residential zoning pattern promotes excessive segregation by housing type between broad sections of the city. There is almost no single-family zoning in the flatlands and almost no apartment zoning in the Hills.

7. Shallow commercial "ribbon" zoning occurs along many unnecessary miles of the city's major streets. A good proportion of this is underdeveloped or actually in residential use.

8. Most of the downtown commercial district is blanketed, inappropriately, by a single zone—C-50. The C-50 regulations are inappropriate to many of the quite distinct subareas that make up this large district.

9. There is also very little zoning differentiation in the outlying commercial areas. Nearly all these areas—whatever their character and function—are included in C-30 or C-40, both of which are non-restrictive zones which permit gas stations, open parking lots, and billboards to locate anywhere.

10. Real zoning differentiation is also lacking in industrial areas. Virtually all of them—including most of those which either contain large amounts of housing or are adjacent to residential areas—are in the M-30 and M-40 Zones. Both zones allow a very wide range of potentially offensive, or incompatible, industries. No areas are zoned exclusively for industrial parks, and very few are zoned for light industry.

CHANGES IN THE ZONING REGULATIONS

In translating land-use proposals into needed rezonings, there were situations in which none of the zones presently included in the Zoning Regulations would provide appropriate controls for an area. In such cases, either an entirely new zone, or an amendment to an existing one to make it more usable, is required. Some new zones and important text changes are suggested below.[3]

R-30 (Amendment). The planned unit development regulations applying in the R-30 Zone should be changed to allow a mixture of housing types (duplexes and apartment buildings in addition to single-family houses) and a variety of densities within approved developments, but without an increase in overall density. In addition to promoting environmental variety, this would help to reduce the amount of grading often necessary in residential developments occurring in the Hills, almost all of which is in the R-30 Zone.

R-40 (Amendment). The R-40 minimum lot size for duplexes (now 5,000 square feet) should be re-examined. The standard might have to be reduced to avoid the problems R-40 could produce if applied to existing neighborhoods consisting of small lots.

C-46 (New Zone). Designed to encourage more attractive boulevards, this zone, for office and service uses, would include high parking requirements and landscaped setbacks; billboards and heavy commercial uses would be banned.

C-51 (New Zone). Designed for the office and business service areas immediately east and west of the Central District Core, this new zone would control the scale of

1. Combining zones and small spots of zoning are not shown. "Special" zones shown on the map include the S-1 Medical Center Zone applied to Pill Hill and some outlying hospitals, the S-2 Civic Center Zone at the foot of Lake Merritt, and the S-3 Research Center Zone applied to Peralta Oaks near the southeastern end of the city. Superimposed over the basic zones that appear on the map are several supplemental zoning controls. These include the S-4 Zone which requires design approval for new construction or alterations and which is mapped around Lake Merritt, at several other places in the Central District, and at the Coliseum and adjacent Hegenberger Road. The S-7 combining zone, which requires approval for demolition as well as for construction and alteration, applies to downtown's Victorian Row on Ninth Street. The S-5 combining zone is mapped along several major streets to allow motels in zones which would otherwise exclude them. Also, a special "development control map" provides precise siting requirements for Peralta Oaks.
2. For the full name of each basic zone, see Table 63.
3. As of this writing, some of these changes are already actively under consideration. Many more text changes will probably be suggested as administrative experience is gained and the new zones are applied to actual areas.

retail facilities, have a relatively low off-street parking requirement, and restrict the floor-area ratio (total floor space divided by lot area) to 4.00 for nonresidential buildings.

C-55 (New Zone). This zone would provide appropriate standards for the Core itself. A great variety of activities would be allowed, but open land uses would be carefully controlled. There would, however, be no limit on nonresidential floor-area ratios, and individual establishments would not have to provide off-street parking.

S-5 (Amendment). The S-5 Travel Accommodation Combining Zone should be amended to allow gas stations in it if a conditional use permit is granted.

S-8 (New Zone). The S-8 Continuous Retail Frontage Combining Zone should be applied to key pedestrian streets such as Broadway. It would require a generally continuous building frontage and would limit the types of activities at ground level so as to preserve shopper interest.

All Zones. In general, the effectiveness of *all* zones should be improved by requiring the termination, after a reasonable period of years, of uses which do not conform to their zone. Some terminations might be required in the immediate future—at least the more obnoxious uses and the ones which represent only a small investment.

APPROPRIATE ZONING BY TYPE OF AREA

The zoning applied to any given area should be closely tailored—or provide for gradual transition—to the desirable function and character proposed for that area. In the aggregate, however, the amount of land actually zoned for each type of use should not be substantially in excess of demand, given a reasonable margin for individual choice.

Table 63 suggests the basic zone appropriate, *as a general rule*, to each kind of area proposed in Chapter 7. It should be noted that the table covers areas under the jurisdiction of the Port of Oakland even though the City Charter does not require that the use and development of these waterfront areas conform to the Zoning Regulations. (The Charter does, however, require development here to conform to the City's General Plan.) Whatever development controls are actually exercised in these areas by the Port, however, should be consistent with the zoning applied to comparable areas just outside the Port's jurisdiction. For information purposes, Port development policy should be reflected in the City's zoning map by placing each distinct area in the most closely analogous zone.

RESIDENTIAL REZONINGS

As suggested in Chapter 7, the pattern of residential densities should have greater differentiation, with higher densities closely related to good access and to open spaces, creeks, and similar amenities. A wider variety of densities and facility types was also suggested within each major part of Oakland, including the Hills. In addition, areas which will, for the foreseeable future, continue mainly in residential use should be residentially zoned. These and the other proposals made in Chapter 7 imply the need for extensive rezonings.

New Residential Zoning. The following areas should be changed from nonresidential to residential zoning:

1. many of the industrially-zoned residential areas mentioned earlier, especially in West Oakland;
2. thinly developed portions of several commercial strips such as Foothill Boulevard and Grove Street;
3. the planned waterfront residential area just east of Jack London Square, as well as other shoreline sections where residential development proves to be feasible.

Losses of Residential Zoning. In contrast, relatively little reduction should be made in residential zoning. Some changes to commercial or special zoning may be required in the Central District and near Pill Hill and other outlying major centers.

Density Increases. Rezonings from a lower to a higher density residential zone would be appropriate for many locations which are very accessible or which have special amenities. (In general, corridors of higher density zoning should be wide enough to allow some spacing of apartment buildings and to permit siting on side streets instead of just on the major streets themselves.) These might include rezonings to:

1. R-60 or R-70 in corridors along 73rd Avenue, upper Seminary Avenue, and Sausal Creek, and on the hillsides near 14th Avenue;
2. R-70 in much of the corridors paralleling Telegraph Avenue, upper Broadway, and College Avenue; and
3. R-80 near the Rockridge and MacArthur BART stations.

In the lower Hills just above MacArthur Boulevard, where the present boundary between single-family and multiple-family zoning is unstable, sizable portions of such neighborhoods as Laurel and Toler Heights could be rezoned from R-30 to R-40. The R-40 Zone would protect these areas' single-family houses from large, visually intrusive apartment buildings but would allow the controlled development of true garden apartments that could still enjoy the fine views here.

In the upper Hills, apartment construction should be accommodated in a few sections by a change to multiple-family zoning—R-40 or R-50. (This zoning should generally be confined to major-trafficway corridors or undeveloped areas, where apartment houses would not encroach on existing single-family neighborhoods.) In other areas, especially large vacant tracts, apartment house construction should be accommodated within planned unit developments while still retaining single-family zoning.

MAP R

BASIC ZONING, 1969

BERKELEY
SAN PABLO AVE.
ADELINE ST.
TELEGRAPH AVE.
EMERY-VILLE
BROADWAY
WARREN FWY.
PIEDMONT
S.F.-OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE
MAC ARTHUR BLVD.
FRUITVALE AVE.
ALAMEDA
HIGH ST.
FOOTHILL BLVD.
73rd AVE.
98th AVE.
E. 14th ST.
MAC ARTHUR FWY.
NIMITZ FWY.
SAN LEANDRO

- Commercial
- Industrial
- Special or Unzoned Public Property S-1, S-2, S-3
- Single-Family Residential
  Mostly R-30/Some R-10 and R-20 in the Hills
- Medium-Density Residential
  Practically All R-50/a Few Areas of R-40 in the Hills
- High-Density Residential
  Mostly R-70 and R-80/Some R-60 in West Oakland and R-90 in Central District

This is a generalized version of the zoning (on May 31, 1969); it is not an official zoning map.

See Table 63 for full names of zones.

0 ½ 1 1½ 2 Miles

TABLE 63

Appropriate Basic Zoning by Type-of-Use Area

	Type of Area		Zone[a]
Residential Areas	Low-Density	Exclusively Single-Family Houses	R-30, R-20, or R-10, depending on desirable lot size
		Single-Family plus Other Housing Types	R-30 (with planned unit development) or R-40, depending on size of site and desirable density[b]
	Low-Medium-Density	Exclusively Single-Family Houses	R-30
		Single-Family plus Other Housing Types	R-30 (with planned unit development) or R-40, depending on size of site and desirable density[b]
	High-Medium-Density	Older Areas Near Central District	R-60
		Sites within Hill Area	R-30 (with planned unit development) R-40, or R-50, depending on size of site and desirable density[b]
		Elsewhere	R-50
	High-Density	High-Rise Areas in Central District	R-90
		Other Areas Immediately Around Central District, Lake Merritt, and Outlying BART Stations	R-80
		Sites within Hill Area	R-30 (with planned unit development) or R-50, depending on size of site and desirable density[b]
		Elsewhere	R-70 or R-60, depending on desirable density
Industrial Areas	Industrial Parks		M-10
	Light Industrial Areas		M-20
	General or Heavy Industrial Areas	Near Residential-Zone Boundary or Containing Many Residential Uses	M-20
		In Other Cases Near Commercial or Civic Areas	M-30
		Elsewhere	M-40
Special Areas	Medical Centers and Major Hospitals		S-1
	Civic Center and Other Large Clusters of Public Facilities		S-2
	Research or Conference Center		S-3

TABLE 63 (Continued)
Appropriate Basic Zoning by Type-of-Use Area

	Type of Area			Zone[a]
Commercial Areas	Central District Core			C-55
	Central District Inner Ring	Predominantly Office or Business-Service Portions		C-51
		Predominantly Retail or Consumer-Service Portions		C-45
	Compact Centers	Predominantly Retail Districts (Traditional Multi-Ownership Pattern)	Subregional or Community Center	C-45
			Large Neighborhood Center	C-35
			Small Neighborhood Center (or Isolated Store Cluster)	C-10
		Planned Shopping Centers (Most Facilities Built by Single Developer)		C-20
		Automotive Center		C-40
		Other Centers (Restaurant/Recreation, etc.)		C-45 or C-35, depending on desirable range of activities
	Other Areas	General Strip Commercial (with Wholesale and Automotive Sales and Repair)		C-40
		General Strip Commercial (without Wholesale and Automotive Sales and Repair)		C-30
		Offices, Consumer Services, and Motels, Mixed with Apartments		C-46
		Offices Mixed with Apartments		C-25
		Heavy Commercial (Repair Services, Business Supply, etc.)		C-60
		Other Specialized Areas (Recreation, etc.)		C-30 or C-40, depending on desirable range of activities

a. The full names of the basic zones are given below. For controls applying in each, see the Oakland Planning Code.

Residential Zones
R-10 Estate
R-20 Low Density
R-30 One-Family
R-40 Garden Apartment
R-50 Medium Density
R-60 Medium-High Density
R-70 High Density
R-80 High-Rise Apartment
R-90 Downtown Apartment

Industrial Zones
M-10 Special
M-20 Light
M-30 General
M-40 Heavy

Commercial Zones
C-10 Local Retail
C-20 Shopping Center
C-25 Office
C-30 District Thoroughfare
C-35 District Shopping
C-40 Community Thoroughfare
C-45 Community Shopping
C-46 Arterial Service (Proposed)
C-51 Central Business Service (Proposed)
C-55 Central Core (Proposed)
C-60 City Service

Special Zones
S-1 Medical Center
S-2 Civic Center
S-3 Research Center

b. Mixtures of housing types in R-30 could only be provided in planned unit developments. Higher densities in R-30 could be achieved only in pockets **within** large planned unit developments for which the overall density would average out to R-30 standards.

Density Reductions. On the other hand, allowable densities should be reduced in many areas. These reductions should generally occur in the flats and foothills at sections of existing lower intensity development in between major-street corridors.

Many such portions of Fruitvale and North, South Central, and East Oakland —and a few sections of the lower Hills— should be considered for rezoning from R-50 to R-40. In the outer portions of West and North Central Oakland, some of the excessive land now in the R-70 Zone could be remapped to R-60 or R-50.

There should be more single-family zoning in the flatlands. For example, Columbian Gardens and parts of Brookfield Village and Sobrante Park (all in East Oakland) should be studied for rezoning from R-50 to R-30.

NONRESIDENTIAL REZONINGS

Chapter 7 emphasized that Oakland should have a wide variety of commercial, civic, and industrial areas. Each should have its own appropriate zoning. In addition, the overall nonresidential zoning pattern should promote the hierarchical pattern of commercial centers proposed in that chapter. All these considerations imply the need for extensive rezonings which should result, collectively, in much more differentiation than now exists in the kinds of activities and intensity of development permitted in each area.

Rezonings to or from Residential. As discussed earlier, some areas should be rezoned from residential to nonresidential, but considerably bigger areas should be rezoned in the opposite direction. However, the latter areas either are not (and will not be in the foreseeable future) in actual commercial or industrial use or, if they are in such use, are substantially obsolete areas. Within the areas kept in industrial and commercial zoning, ample room will still be available for development.

Replacing the Downtown C-50 Zone. In the vital Central District, the C-50 Zone should be replaced by the appropriate zoning—mostly C-45, C-46, C-51, C-55, or R-80—for each of the distinct subareas now blanketed by this single zone.

Appropriate Zoning for the Outlying Centers. The outlying compact commercial clusters should be placed in those zones— C-45, C-35, C-20, or C-10—which have provisions (such as controls on gas stations and open uses) designed to protect and strengthen these centers. In each case, the amount of land so zoned (and the choice of zone) should be scaled to the desirable level of center—"neighborhood," "community," or "subregional."

The C-10 designation should be applied to many of the isolated small commercial clusters within residential communities, thereby keeping the type and scale of activities compatible with the surrounding neighborhoods. (Other, very small clusters should actually be rezoned to residential.)

More Restrictive Zoning Along the Commercial Strips. Many sections of Oakland's lengthy commercial strips should be rezoned to a more restrictive category. Extensive use should be made of the C-25 Zone, which would allow apartments and only light commercial uses such as offices, thus helping to break up the unsightly strip pattern. This zoning seems especially appropriate for portions of Grove Street, Telegraph and Grand Avenues, and Foothill and MacArthur Boulevards. For other sections where a wider variety of uses is desirable—along such boulevards as Grand Avenue and Seventh Street in and near the Central District—rezoning to the somewhat less restrictive C-46 Zone would be appropriate. (Still other strip sections, typically the ones with the thinnest commercial development, should be placed in residential zones.)

Changes from Existing Industrial Zoning. Industrial areas which lie along the boundary of a residential zone, or which themselves contain a good deal of housing, should be rezoned to the "lighter" M-20 Zone. Industrial parks should be considered for rezoning to the special M-10 Zone.

Also, appropriate commercial or special zoning should be applied to areas which are now industrially zoned but which are actually developed, or should be developed, for commercial or civic use. For example, the Coliseum Complex might be rezoned to S-2, and the commercial area along Seventh Street in West Oakland should be placed in a commercial zone.

CHANGES IN SUPPLEMENTARY ZONING

In many cases, special zoning controls are needed which apply to only a portion of a basic zone or which cut across the boundaries of several basic zones. Such supplementary controls can take the form of combining zones or development control maps (which regulate the precise location, height, bulk, design, or type of uses).

The S-4 Design Review Combining Zone should be mapped at key places, such as those emphasized in the Proposed Design Structure (*Map E*), which require special treatment and careful consideration of the visual relation between facilities. These might include important gateways to the city, prominent nodes like the MacArthur / Telegraph / Broadway area, and frontages facing the outlying BART stations. Logical extensions should be made of existing design-review zoning. For example, the S-4 area around Lake Merritt might be extended up past the freeway at its northeast corner and all the way around Border Lake Park on the west side.

The S-5 Travel Accommodation Combining Zone could be placed over residentially-zoned property at selected freeway interchanges to allow for motels and, subject to a use-permit requirement, gas stations.

The S-8 Continuous Retail Frontage Combining Zone should be mapped along key pedestrian streets in and near the

Central District Core. This zoning might also be appropriate along significant frontages in other major commercial centers.

Other supplementary zoning controls —all of which should be carefully explored—might include regulations over the height and spacing of high-rise buildings where views are critical (such as the hillsides overlooking Lake Merritt), and specially tailored provisions (such as restrictive sign controls or siting requirements) for important intersections.

STAGING THE REZONINGS

The rezonings suggested above should be accomplished in stages, based on the following principles.

1. Priority should be given to rezonings which would either prevent imminent bad development or permit impending good development.

2. Rezonings should be timed, where possible, to reinforce the effects of renewal actions and major capital improvements. For example, rezoning of industrially-zoned neighborhoods to residential should be scheduled to facilitate renewal in these areas.

3. The removal of clear inequities should also receive priority, an example being two similar areas differently zoned to the detriment of one.

4. Early attention should be given to areas where appropriate development is essential to the city as a whole—the Central District, as a prime example.

5. In any case, no rezoning should be undertaken until conditions in an area are "ripe" for it.

Interim rezonings should be undertaken where necessary to provide adequate controls for an area until the circumstances are right for its appropriate long-range zoning. For example, a neighborhood proposed for future high density might be temporarily placed in a low-density zone until the school or street improvements had been made which would then support a higher density.

Another situation which seems to call for interim rezonings is presented by existing pockets of more-or-less solidly residential use which are now industrially zoned, which are shown as future industrial areas in Map F, *and* where renewal action cannot be foreseen for the immediate future. While people are still living in these areas, some lower density residential zone (perhaps R-40) could be applied to them until comprehensive renewal can change the land use in an orderly fashion.

NEW REAL ESTATE DIVISION REGULATIONS

A major element in any city's development program—and of special importance to still-undeveloped sections—is a workable set of land division regulations.

Oakland is presently hampered by a subdivision ordinance, adopted in 1939, which is inadequate to today's needs. Written 30 years ago and based upon the then-prevailing land division concepts, the ordinance has not been able to react adequately to new concepts or problems. The document itself is replete with unclear language and vague requirements, and lacks any clear organization. Various stopgap amendments have introduced more confusion, and created inconsistencies with other City ordinances.

After a thorough review of the ordinance and research into recently-adopted ordinances of other cities and various "model ordinances," it was decided to develop a totally new set of regulations, with the following goals.

1. Eliminate ambiguity in the regulations.

2. Eliminate points of conflict between land division and other City regulations.

3. Organize the regulations into a logical format and incorporate them into the Oakland Planning Code.

4. Increase their scope to cover, in addition to customary subdivisions,[1] all types of real estate divisions including condominiums.

5. Reflect recent changes in the State Subdivision Map Act.

6. Allow for flexibility in future amendments.

A draft document entitled *Real Estate Division Regulations of the Oakland Planning Code* has been prepared as part of the 701 Project. It specifically provides for recent concepts in land development, such as condominiums and planned unit developments.

The new regulations try to recognize the special needs and problems of each type of land division. For example, the street dimensional requirements for subdivisions vary not only with the type of street but also with the proposed use of the abutting land.

In recent years, the number of applications for normal subdivisions has significantly declined in Oakland, while the frequency of lot splits or other minor land division applications has increased. These are presently Oakland's major types of land division activity, but the present ordinance regulates only some, not all of them. The proposed regulations attempt to identify these various types of "non-subdivisions" and to prescribe appropriate standards for them.

1. A subdivision is usually a division of land which involves the creation of five or more lots and the opening of a new street.

APPENDIX: TECHNICAL NOTES

MAJOR SURVEYS OF THE 701 PROJECT

Household Survey. The primary purpose of the Household (or Demographic) Survey, conducted by Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of California, was to collect current information on residents of Oakland's housing units similar to data available in the 1960 Census of Population and Housing. The survey also covered the attitudes of the population on a number of subjects. With the consultative assistance of Stanford Research Institute (SRI), an area probability sample was designed. The sample was so constructed as to provide valid information for seven "household areas" into which the city was divided. Interviews were completed with some 2,600 households between May and August of 1966. The magnetic tapes containing the data are permanently on file with the International Data Library and Reference Service of SRC. In addition to the data published in 701 Project reports, several sets of machine tabulations—including both weighted and unweighted data—were prepared from the tapes. These tabulations, which include a good deal of information not published in the Project's reports, may be examined at SRC or at the City Planning Department.

Shopping Survey. Every household interviewed for the Household Survey was canvassed for the Shopping Survey. The Household Survey interview itself contained certain shopping questions. In addition, a special shopping questionnaire was left with each household for it to complete and mail to SRI, which designed and pretested the questionnaire. This survey was aimed at finding where Oakland residents shop, what they feel about the major stores and shopping areas, and the characteristics of typical shopping trips. SRI did follow-up telephone interviews during 1966 with a sample of the households that failed to send in their questionnaires. All the data were then merged on computer tape with the demographic information from the Household Survey. Machine tabulations were produced by SRI for most of the survey questions and may be studied at the City Planning Department.

Survey of Employers in Alameda County. This survey (also called the East Bay Manpower Survey) was conducted by the California Department of Employment, with the assistance of SRI as general consultant. This sample survey, conducted in 1966, presented a job profile of Alameda County as it was in July of that year and as it would look in mid-1968 and 1971 if employer expectations were borne out. It described the specific manpower skills, by detailed occupational type, currently utilized in the area; identified the kinds of future job opportunities (and the implied changes in industrial sectors) that were likely to occur; and provided information on employer hiring specifications. The sample used in the survey covered approximately 800 establishments, responsible for about 50 per cent of employment in Alameda County. From the questionnaires, tapes were produced which contained the basic results. Extrapolated tabulations were then prepared for the county as a whole and for Oakland. A copy of these tabulations may be examined at the City Planning Department.

Residential Survey. This survey was undertaken to update the information about Oakland's housing supply available in the 1960 Census of Housing. The questionnaires were designed by the City Planning Department in collaboration with the City's Building and Housing Department and SRI. SRI provided expert advice in the construction of a stratified probability sample of residential parcels. The sample was designed to provide information for the same seven areas used by the Household Survey; in addition, it was to provide certain (mainly condition of structure) data for 18 "residential areas." Inspectors from the Building and Housing Department gathered condition and other related data for some 6,700 parcels; for some 1,300 of these (the ones with four or more units) they also obtained, through an interview, information on rents, value, size of units, and vacancies. This was supplemented by the rent and related information on one-to-three-unit parcels already obtained by the Household Survey and—for all parcels—by assessment, age, and construction data from the County Assessor's office. The field survey was conducted mainly between July 1966 and February 1967. Within this period, rent and vacancy data for four-or-more-unit parcels were gathered mostly in October and November (similar data for one-to-three-unit parcels were collected between May and August). The City Planning Department, in cooperation with SRI, the City's Electronic Data Processing Division, and Harvey Conlin and Associates, developed a special computer file, on Card Random Access Memory (CRAM) storage, from the survey results. The file forms one part of the Oakland Planning Information System (OPINS).

Urban Design Survey. This survey was carried out in 1966 and 1967 under the supervision of the consulting firm of DeMars and Wells and Jack T. Sidener with staff from the City Planning Department. It was intended to record the physical character and visual quality of each part of the city, to identify specific problems in the physical environment, and to look for opportunities to improve the environment. The study included some research in office records and a number of unstructured, preliminary field trips; but the heart of it was a systematic, concentrated windshield survey of the city taking several months during 1967. Visually differentiated subareas, open spaces, and major trafficway segments were identified in the field. Information about them was recorded on maps, aerial photographs, and specially designed written forms; numerous photographs were also taken and keyed into the maps. Collectively these documents make up a city-wide environmental information file which may be studied at the City Planning Department.

Business and Industry Inventory. The purpose of this inventory was to provide detailed information about all of Oakland's nonresidential and vacant parcels, buildings, and establishments. The information collected included parcel characteristics, building type, economic use, amount and type of floor space, and number of employees. Parcels containing both residential and nonresidential activities were included in the inventory, but residential parcels containing only dwelling units were excluded. Questionnaires were designed by the City Planning Department with the advice of SRI. The field survey was conducted between July 1966 and March 1967 by Oakland Fire Department personnel and, in the case of some Central District office buildings, by Building and Housing Department inspectors. To supplement the field work, City Planning staff—with base maps, aerials, and assessor's listings—identified and described over 6,000 vacant parcels throughout the city. All these data were then merged with related source material—including information from files in the Assessor's office, mailback rental questionnaires, and land area, locational, and special identification data developed by City Planning staff. The resulting file, stored on CRAM as another part of OPINS, contains records for about 17,000 parcels with 137 data items in each, and 14,000 establishments with 58 data items in each.

Block Summary Land-Use Inventory. This inventory was designed to provide locational, land area, topographic, assessment, zoning, residential, and general land-use information about all land (other than streets) in Oakland. Some of this information is summarized to the block, some to the sub-block, and some to both levels. (A block was divided into separate sub-blocks where two or more important boundaries, such as zoning lines, divide a block.) The data for the file were derived from several sources: the County Assessor's magnetic tape files, the Business and Industry Inventory questionnaires, various East Bay Municipal Utility District base maps, Sanborn maps, special maps prepared by City Planning staff, and aerial photographs of the city as it existed in 1966. The file, stored on CRAM as another part of OPINS, contains a record for each of some 4,000 city blocks and 10,000 sub-blocks. The former consists of 141 data items and the latter, 59.

City-Owned Property Survey. The purpose of this survey was to provide a comprehensive list and description of all land and buildings owned or leased by the City of Oakland. The Business and Industry Inventory itself was intended to cover all governmental parcels and establishments. However, for City-owned (or leased) property, an additional effort was made to complete, correct, refine, update, and add departmental jurisdiction to the information already collected by firemen in the field. (A similar effort was made for Oakland School District property.) As a start, the City Planning Department made a preliminary list of City-owned and leased land and facilities, based on records in the City's Real Estate Division. This list was subsequently updated and expanded through confirmation by individual City departments and by Planning staff research using Business and Industry Inventory questionnaires, base maps, special listings of facilities obtained from affected agencies, and numerous phone calls. In addition a supplemental questionnaire was prepared for City land and facilities, including questions about physical condition, functional usefulness, occupancy status, and anticipated future use. The questionnaires, filled out by City departments in late 1967, along with the listings of City-owned facilities, became important inputs to the Research Allocation Program (RAP).

Financial Capability Survey. The purpose of this survey, conducted by the Finance Department, was to make an inventory and evaluation of the City's existing revenue sources and procedures and to elicit suggestions for improvements and innovations. Each department was given a set of forms calling for a description of each of its revenue sources, existing rates, five-year projections assuming (a) a continuation of existing rates and (b) any suggested modification thereof, an itemization of collection costs, and free-wheeling suggestions for new tax revenues or changes in services. These forms, completed in late 1966, formed the basis of the financial capability study which provided another input to RAP.

Resource Allocation Program Survey. This survey, carried out by the RAP Team, was intended to get the best current thinking of the City's operating departments about necessary or desirable projects. To facilitate this, departments or divisions thereof were grouped into related "functions," which, in turn, were broken down into "activities" which the functions performed. Each function was given alternative budget allocations, assumptions to use about costs and other factors, forms to fill out, and a map on which proposed projects were to be located. On the forms, the function was to indicate either new or expanded physical facilities or operating programs all of which would add up to a balanced long-range program that did not exceed projected fiscal limitations. The function was also asked to list and map unmet needs—desirable projects which could not be fitted in under its balanced program. The completed forms were filled out toward the end of 1968.

MAJOR REPORTS FROM THE 701 PROJECT

(The code numbers in boldface below are those used in this report's tables and figures to identify the indicated publications as sources.)

Poverty and Poverty Programs in Oakland: Selected Results from the 701 Household Survey of Oakland. William L. Nicholls II. Survey Research Center, University of Calif. Berkeley, Calif. September 1967, reprinted August 1968. **(SRC-2)**

Housing and Population Tabulations from the 701 Household Survey of Oakland. William L. Nicholls II. Survey Research Center, University of Calif. Berkeley, Calif. October 1967, revised August 1968. **(SRC-3)**

Tables on Employment and Unemployment from the 701 Household Survey of Oakland. William L. Nicholls II. Survey Research Center, University of Calif. Berkeley, Calif. March 1968, revised August 1968. **(SRC-4)**

Oakland in Transition: A Summary of the 701 Household Survey. William L. Nicholls II and Earl R. Babbie. Survey Research Center, University of Calif. Berkeley, Calif. June 1969. **(SRC-5)**

Oakland Planning Information System: User's Manual. W. K. Williams. Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park, Calif. September 1967.

Oakland Planning Information System: User's Manual—Excerpts. W. K. Williams. Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park, Calif. September 1967.

Oakland Planning Information System: File Maintenance. W. K. Williams. Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park, Calif. September 1967.

Population Projections and Housing Requirements for Oakland in 1985. R. G. Spiegelman. Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park, Calif. December 1968. **(SRI-1)**

Human Resources Development for Oakland: Problems and Policies. Donald Mayall. Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park, Calif. December 1968. **(SRI-2)**

Economic Projections for Oakland to 1975 and 1985. R. K. Arnold. Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park, Calif. December 1968. **(SRI-3)**

Summary Report: An Economic Development Program for the City of Oakland. R. K. Arnold, S. Levy, D. Mayall, R. G. Spiegelman. Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park, Calif. January 1969.

A Survey of Retail Trade in Oakland, 1966. Stanford Research Institute. Menlo Park, Calif. November 1969.

East Bay Manpower Survey: Alameda County, 1966-1971. California Department of Employment, Coastal Area, Research and Statistics Section. San Francisco, Calif. July 1967.

Working Paper No. 1: Suggested Work Program for Urban Design Survey and Preliminary Analysis Phase. DeMars and Wells and Jack T. Sidener. Berkeley, Calif. March 1967.

Working Paper No. 2: Oakland 701 Project Urban Design Study. DeMars and Wells and Jack T. Sidener. Berkeley, Calif. September 1968.

Oakland's Form and Appearance: An Evaluation Based on the 701 Urban Design Survey. DeMars and Wells and Jack T. Sidener with staff from Oakland City Planning Dept. October 1968.

A Design Framework for Oakland: Proposals from the 701 Urban Design Study. DeMars and Wells and Jack T. Sidener with staff from Oakland City Planning Dept. June 1969. **(UDT-1)**

Design Standards for Circulation Facilities. City of Oakland Advance Transportation Planning Team. Oakland, Calif. June 1968.

Oakland Preliminary Circulation Plan, 1966-1985: A Technical Study of Circulation Needs and Plan Proposals to the Year 1985. City of Oakland Advance Transportation Planning Team. Oakland, Calif. September 1968. **(CS-3)**

The Oakland Resource Allocation Program. City of Oakland Resource Allocation Program Team. Oakland, Calif. December 1969.

Financial Capability Study, Part I. City of Oakland Finance Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1968.

Financial Capability Study, Part II (draft). City of Oakland Finance Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1968.

Major Issues and Problems. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. January 1966.

Inventory of Data Sources: Working Paper. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. January 1966.

701 Program Outputs: A Description of Major Tangible Products Emerging From and Used by the 701 Program. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. July 1967.

Revised Overall Economic Development Plan (draft). Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. October 1967.

Oakland's Housing Supply: Cost, Condition, Composition, 1960-1966. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. September 1968. **(CS-2)**

Real Estate Division Regulations of the Oakland Planning Code (draft). Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. October 1968, revised December 1969.

North Oakland: A 701 Subarea Report. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1969.

West Oakland: A 701 Subarea Report. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1969.

Oakland's Fruitvale Area: A 701 Subarea Report. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1969.

East Oakland: A 701 Subarea Report. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1969.

Oakland Hills: A 701 Subarea Report. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1969.

South Central Oakland: A 701 Subarea Report. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1969.

North Central Oakland: A 701 Subarea Report. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. May 1969.

BART Impact: 5 Oakland Station Areas. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. July 1969.

Options for Oakland: A Summary Report on the Oakland 701 Project. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. December 1969.

(Excerpts from) Options for Oakland: A Summary Report on the Oakland 701 Project. Oakland City Planning Dept. Oakland, Calif. December 1969.

NOTES ON THIS REPORT

1. In this report's tables and figures, code numbers are used to identify sources. Those which refer to publications are shown above in "Major Reports from the 701 Project." Two other codes are also used:

SRC-1 refers to unpublished tables from the 701 Household Survey;

CS-1 refers to unpublished tables from the 701 Residential Survey.

2. Most of the 1966 data in Chapters 3 through 6 are ultimately based on the Household Survey, the Residential Survey, or the Survey of Employers, which, as described above, were all based on a sample. As with any sample survey, the standard error increases—that is, the data becomes less reliable—as sample size decreases. Caution should be taken, therefore, in using the results in a table's individual cells, especially where the number of cases in a cell is small.

3. In addition to sample error, the figures for future years are open to all the usual hazards of long-range projections. Any projection is only as good as the assumptions on which it is based.

4. Generally, data for 1966 are rounded to the nearest ten in tables and hundred in the text. Projected future figures are usually rounded to the nearest hundred in tables and thousand in the text. Due to rounding in tables, columns and rows may not add up to their totals.

5. Information contained in Chapters 3 through 9, and the summary of these findings in Chapter 1, is generally drawn from the same sources as those identified in the tables or figures in the chapter. Other sources for individual chapters include: in Chapter 5, *East Bay Manpower Survey* by the California Department of Employment, which also compiled the time series on jobs in Oakland and Alameda County from 1958 to 1966; in Chapter 6, many works in the field of unemployment, notable among which were another Planning Department report, *Revised Overall Economic Development Plan (draft)*, prepared in 1967, and a paper by Anthony H. Pascal, "Manpower Training and Jobs," contained in a report published by the Rand Corporation in 1968, *Cities in Trouble: An Agenda for Urban Research;* in Chapter 7, *Oakland's Form and Appearance* and, for information on school needs, the *Appendix to Report of School Building Committee on Oakland School Needs,* sponsored by Oakland Public Schools, first published in 1964 and revised annually through 1967; and in Chapter 9, special studies made by the City Planning Department. Conclusions drawn from the data are those of the Planning Department, though often based on the technical reports mentioned above.

6. Implications and proposals made in Chapters 3 through 9 and specific recommendations made in Chapters 1 and 2 derive mainly from analysis by the Planning Department—based in part on the technical reports already mentioned and in part on additional study as required. Other sources, not yet mentioned, on which recommendations are based include: in Chapter 2, for recommendations on "Information Systems and Data Maintenance," two SRI reports on OPINS, *User's Manual* and *File Maintenance;* and in Chapter 9, Planning Department consultation, where appropriate, with staff of the Redevelopment Agency and Building and Housing Department.

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Office of the Auditor-Controller
Project Accounting
Building and Housing Department
Residential Survey Field Work
Electronic Data Processing (Statistical Services) Department
Computer Programming and Data Retrieval
Finance Department
Research Allocation Program (as member of RAP Team) and Fiscal Study
Fire Department
Business and Industry Inventory Field Work
Street and Engineering Department
Circulation Study (as member of Advance Transportation Planning Team)
Traffic Engineering and Parking Department
Circulation Study (as member of Advance Transportation Planning Team)

MAJOR CONSULTANTS TO THE 701 PROJECT

California Department of Employment
Survey of Employers in Alameda County
Harvey B. Conlin and Associates
Computer Programming
DeMars and Wells and Jack T. Sidener
Urban Design Study
Stanford Research Institute
Housing and Economic Studies and General Consulting
Survey Research Center, University of California
Household Survey and Demographic Study

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